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FIRM VALUATION : TAX SHIELDS & DISCOUNT RATES 
Thomas ANSAY 1 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a new discounted cash flows’ valuation setup, and derives a general 
expression for the tax shields’ discount rate. This setup applies to any debt policy and any cash 
flow pattern. It only requires the equality at any time between the assets side and the liabilities 
side of the market value balance sheet, which has been introduced by Farber, Gillet and Szafarz 
(2006). This concept is extensively developed in the paper. 
 
This model encompasses all the usual setups that consider a fixed discount rate for the tax 
shields and require a fixed level of debt or a fixed leverage ratio, in particular Modigliani & 
Miller (1963) and Harris & Pringle (1985). It proposes an endogenized and integrated approach 
and modelizes the different market value discount rates as functions of both their relevant 
leverage ratio and the operating profitability of the firm. Among these rates are the cost of debt 
and the tax shields’ discount rate, which are usually assume constant. In this model, all the 
discount rates are likely to vary as soon as perpetuity cases are not considered. 
 
This setup introduces a new rate for the cost of levered equity without tax shields and develops 
the relation between the present value of tax shields and the market value of equity since debt 
tax shields entirely flow to equity. It only requires the risk free rate and the unlevered cost of 
capital as inputs but not the capital structure of the firm, as it tackles the circularity problem by 
considering an iterative approach. 
 
This fully dynamic model yields both theoretical and economic sensible results, and allows 
straightforward applications. It apparently solves the discrepancies of the usual setups and 
hopefully paves the way for further research. 
 
JEL Classification: G12, G30, G31, G32, E22 
 
Keywords: Discounted Cash Flow, Tax Shields, Discount Rates, Cost of Equity, Cost of 
Capital, Tax Shield Risk, Adjusted Present Value, Equity Cash Flow 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is organized as follows. 
The first chapter (II) gives a general overview of the the discounted cash flows’ process for 
firm valuation. We present all the relevant formulas we know from the literature, but in a 
perfectly general fashion and with no particular assumption. These mathematical relations are 
divided in three sections. First, we consider a market value perspective (II.1), where we present 
the market value balance sheet approach. Second, we present an accounting perspective (II.2), 
where we introduce the usual modelizations of the different cash flows relevant to a valuation 
process. Third, we detail the valuation perspective (II.3), where we consider the four main 
valuation methods used to get the market value of the firm. Some comments conclude the 
chapter. 
The second chapter (III) is a comprehensive literature review divided in two sections. First, we 
present the main assumptions (III.1) that are usually made for several parameters when valuing 
a firm, and in particular the discount rate for the tax shields and the level of debt. These 
assumptions are discussed and criticized. We then consider the recent literature (III.2) and 
mention the last insights that have been proposed in order to improve the standard assumptions. 
The third chapter (IV) develops a new setup based on the market value balance sheet approach. 
This chapter is divided in six sections. We first mention its underlying assumptions (IV.1). We 
then initially elude the tax shields’ issue (IV.2) and introduce a new discount rate for the equity 
of the firm. We also present a variable expression for the cost of debt. Finally, we solve for the 
theoretical optimal level of debt that maximizes the value of the firm. The following section 
(IV.3) deals with the tax shields’ issue, and we derive a general expression for the risk of the 
tax shields. Its accounting modelization is also reviewed. The next section (IV.4) performs 
rigourous mathematics in order to prove the relevancy of the setup, and compared the derived 
results with other setups. The expression of the weighted average cost of capital is also 
adjusted. These results are then graphically illustrated (IV.5). Finally, we present different 
examples (IV.6). 
The fourth chapter (V) concludes.  
The fifth chapter (VI) gives a list of the main symbols used in the paper. 
The last chapter (VII) is the bibliography. 
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II. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOWS VALUATION: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
In order to obtain the market value of a firm using a discounted cash flow process, two 
elements are needed : 
- (a) one or several expected financial flow(s) ; 
- (b) one or several appropriate rate(s) - reflecting the respective risk of the flows - used to 
discount them back in order to get their present value. 
 
These flows are based on economic forecasts and may be considered as future expected 
accounting results. On the other hand, the appropriate discount rates are necessarily computed 
at their market value in order to give the present market value of the firm, which is its value 
considering the future profits (or losses) to come. If not, then these rates would just yield the 
current book value of the firm. A firm creates value when achieving accounting results that – 
once discounted back - account for a greater amount than its current book value. This value is 
referred to as the shareholder value. 
 
There are two ways to create this value:  
- (a) running the business such that the operating profitability of the firm is greater that the 
inherent business risk of this particular firm, with regards to its sector and characteristics. This 
will be referred to as operating value creation. 
- (b) using financing policies that allow to keep more profits inside the company and therefore 
that increase the value of the firm, which can be achieved through financial leverage. This will 
be referred to as financing value creation.  
 
Discounted cash flows’ models are aimed to capture this value creation (or destruction) in 
order to give to the firm its real value, which is its market value.  
 
Consequently, this first chapter presents in a totally general fashion – without any assumption 
or constraint – the different relations that can be derived from both the accounting and the 
market value perspectives of the firm ; it then introduces the different valuation models that 
may be used to get the market value of the firm from its forecasted accounting cash flows. 
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II.1. MARKET VALUE PERSPECTIVE 
Referring to the market value balance sheet of the firm, the value of the firm 
€ 
V  can be derived 
at any time2 either from its assets side or from its liabilities side. This fundamental equality can 
be stated as  
 
€ 
V =VU +VTS = E + D (2.1) 
and has to be met whether the discount rates are annually or continuously compounded.  
 
We can graphically represent this as follows : 
Assets Liabilities 
  
 
For valuation purpose, the appropriate discount rates of all these market value elements 
€ 
VU , 
€ 
VTS , 
€ 
E  and 
€ 
D might be all different, that is : 
- 
€ 
KU  as the appropriate discount rate for 
€ 
VU , representing the risk of the unlevered firm 
- 
€ 
KTS  as the appropriate discount rate for 
€ 
VTS , representing the risk of the tax shields 
- 
€ 
KE  as the appropriate discount rate for 
€ 
E , representing the risk of the levered equity 
- 
€ 
KD  as the appropriate discount rate for 
€ 
D, representing the risk of the debt 
 
Some general conditions about the relations between these 4 elements (
€ 
VU , 
€ 
VTS , 
€ 
E  and 
€ 
D) and 
these 4 discount rates (
€ 
KU , 
€ 
KTS , 
€ 
KE , 
€ 
KD ) can be immediately derived ; we refer to these 
conditions as the fundamental conditions, since they have to be met at any time. 
                                                
2 While time indices t may be added to all market value elements and discount rates that will be presented in this 
paper, we will make the economy of them as long as they are not required to prevent confusion, since they do not 
add anything to the developments and make expressions heavier. 
 
 
 
VU 
 
 
E 
VTS 
 
 
D 
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The two first conditions are just rewritings of the relation (2.1), which is equivalent to 
 
€ 
VU −D = E −VTS  (2.2) 
and 
 
€ 
VU − E = D−VTS  (2.3) 
 
From the expression (2.3), we can derive that, if 
€ 
D > 0, then 
 
€ 
D >VTS  (2.4) 
since the tax shields are the tax benefits that come from debt financing and so can only be a 
percentage of the debt itself. Consequently, we must also have 
 
€ 
VU > E  (2.5) 
 
Considering now the discount rates, being a shareholder has always been riskier that being a 
debtholder, since interests have to be paid to prevent bankruptcy, while profits and dividends 
are much more uncertain ; if any, they will go to shareholders only if interests have been paid 
first. Moreover, in case of bankrupt, debtholders are always paid off first against shareholders. 
Therefore, we must always have  
 
€ 
KE > KD  (2.6) 
 
As soon as 
€ 
D > 0, we also know that 
 
€ 
KE > KU  (2.7) 
since they both measure the risk of the equity, but 
€ 
KE  takes also into account the additional 
risk arising from debt financing – which is the financial risk, potentially leading to bankruptcy 
if the company has too much debt –, while 
€ 
KU  only considers the business risk.  
 
Considering further the expression (2.1) from the market value balance sheet, this relation is 
also always true if we weight each market value element relatively to the whole firm value 
€ 
V  
and apply to each element its appropriate discount rate, which we write 
 
€ 
KU
VU
V + KTS
VTS
V = KE
E
V + KD
D
V  (2.8) 
 
Multiplying the expression (2.8) by the market value of the firm 
€ 
V  yields 
 
€ 
KUVU + KTSVTS = KEE + KDD (2.9) 
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From the relation (2.9), using 
€ 
VU = E + D−VTS  and solving for 
€ 
KE , we obtain  
 
€ 
KE = KU + KU −KD( )
D
E − KU −KTS( )
VTS
E  (2.10) 
 
This expression (2.10) for 
€ 
KE  can also be restated as an increasing function of the ratio debt 
over equity 
€ 
D/E, which yields 
 
€ 
KE = KU + KU − KD + KU −KTS( )
VTS
E
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
E  (2.11) 
 
We also know the general formula for the weighted average cost of capital of the firm3 
 
€ 
WACC = KE
E
E + D + KD (1− τ)
D
E + D  (2.12) 
 
Therefore, substituting for 
€ 
KE  from the relation (2.10) and rearranging yields 
 
€ 
WACC = KU 1−
VTS
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ −KDτ
D
V + KTS
VTS
V  (2.13) 
 
All these relations come directly from the paper of Farber, Gillet and Szafarz (2006) and have 
to be met at any time, whatever additional assumptions about 
€ 
D, 
€ 
VTS  and 
€ 
KTS .  
 
We will consider them as standards, as the market value balance sheet approach is the key of 
the model we develop in chapter IV.  
 
We now detail the cash flows that have to be discounted by these discount rates in order to 
obtain the market value elements. So far, we emphasize that the elements 
€ 
VU , D but also E and 
€ 
VTS , present in the discount rates’ formulas, are precisely the market value of these elements 
and not their book values. 
 
                                                
3 We will use the symbol τ to refer to the corporate tax rate to prevent confusion with the time index t. 
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II.2. ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVE 
From an accounting perspective, we consider the actual results of a company year after year, 
and we need to refer to the income statement of the firm when valuing it with a discounted 
cash flow model. The firm’s accounting results are usually modelized as follows : 
 
 
− 
= 
− 
= 
Income Statement Mathematical Modelization 
€ 
EBITt   
€ 
Debt Interestst  
€ 
Debt Interestst = (KDD)t  
€ 
EBTt  
€ 
EBTt = EBITt − (KDD)t  
€ 
Taxest  
€ 
Taxest = It = EBTt × τ = (EBITt − (KDD)t ) × τ  
€ 
Net Incomet  
€ 
NIt = EBTt − It = (EBITt − (KDD)t ) × (1− τ)  
 
 
 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
(2.16) 
(2.17) 
 
The four flows that are then usually considered for valuation purpose are : 
- (a) the Free Cash Flow (
€ 
FCF ), which is equal to 
 
€ 
FCFt = NOPLATt + Depreciationt − Investmentst −ΔWorkingCapitalt  (2.18) 
- (b) the Debt Tax Shield (
€ 
TS ), which, assuming 
€ 
EBIT > KDD,  is  
 
€ 
TSt = (KDD)tτ  (2.19) 
- (c) the Equity Cash Flow (ECF)4, which is equal to 
 
€ 
ECFt = FCFt − (KDD)t (1− τ) + ΔDt  (2.20) 
- (d) the Debt Cash Flow (DCF), which is 
 
€ 
DCFt = (KDD)t −ΔDt  (2.21) 
 
The Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes (NOPLAT) is referred to as 
 
€ 
NOPLATt = EBITt −OperatingTaxest = EBITt (1− τ)  (2.22) 
 
The Operating Taxes – which are the taxes the firm would pay if only equity financed – are 
 
€ 
OperatingTaxest = EBITt × τ = (EBTt + (KDD)t ) × τ =EBTtτ + (KDD)tτ = It + TSt  (2.23) 
 
Substituting the relation (2.18) into the relation (2.20), the ECF may also be restated as 
€ 
ECFt = EBITt (1− τ) + Depreciationt − Investementst −ΔWCt − (KDD)t (1− τ ) + ΔDt  (2.24) 
 
                                                
4 The Equity Cash Flow is a more robust measure than the Dividend Flow as it considers all the flows that go to 
equity, whether or not these are distributed as dividends. 
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Finally, using the relation (2.17), the ECF simplifies to 
€ 
ECFt = Net Incomet + Depreciationt − Investmentst −ΔWCt + ΔDt  (2.25) 
 
We can also consider the Capital Cash Flow (CCF), which is the sum of the flows that go to 
the assets side of the market value balance sheet, and therefore necessarily also the sum of the 
flows that go to the liabilities side, which can be written as 
 
€ 
CCFt = ECFt + DCFt = FCFt + TSt  (2.26) 
 
Finally, we can derive the annual accounting returns of the company. These are5  
 
€ 
ROICt =
NOPLATt
InvestedCapitalt−1
=
NOPLATt
(EBook + DBook )t−1
=
NOPLATt
VBook t−1
 (2.27) 
and 
€ 
ROEt =
NIt
Invested EquityCapitalt−1
=
ROICt ×VBook t−1 − (KDD)t (1− τ )
EBook t−1
 (2.28) 
 
Depending on the difference between 
€ 
EBITt 6 and 
€ 
(KDD)t , the effective ROEt can be written as  
- (a) if 
€ 
EBITt  ≥ 
€ 
(KDD)t , 
 
€ 
ROEt = ROICt + ROICt −KDt 1− τ( )( )
DBook t−1
EBook t−1
 (2.29) 
- (b) if 
€ 
(KDD)t  > 
€ 
EBITt  ≥ 0, 
 
€ 
ROEt = ROICt + ROICt −KDt 1− τ
EBITt
(KDD)t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
DBook t−1
EBook t−1  
(2.30) 
- (c) if 
€ 
EBITt  < 0, 
 
€ 
ROEt = ROICt + ROICt −KDt( )
DBook t−1
EBook t−1
 (2.31) 
 
                                                
5 Please note that, while we conveniently substitute here Invested Capital for VBook, these are slightly different ; 
the Invested Capital is the money that has been invested by both shareholders and debtholders, while VBook is 
assumed to increase (or decrease) year after year depending on the profits (or losses) of the company. Therefore, 
in order to use these ratios in valuation models, we have to keep in mind that, when we write EBook here, this 
actually stands for the money shareholders have really invested in the company (Invested Equity Capital) ; profits 
or losses should not be added to it as they are return gained from investment and not new investement. 
6 We should actually consider EBIT + Extraordinary Results but valuation models do not consider Extraordinay 
Results since they are, by definition, not predictable. 
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Equation (2.29) is well known, and can be found for example in Koller, Goedhart and Wessels 
(2005), while equations (2.30) and (2.31) are just mathematical modelizations of the decrease – 
or even absence, if EBIT is negative – of the tax shield flow that year t when the operating 
result does not cover – totally or partially – the interest expenses. This unrealized tax shield is 
then used as a tax credit on future profits.  All these relations are standards. Some of them will 
be refined in chapter IV. 
 
II.3 MAIN VALUATION MODELS 
When valuing firms with prospective valuation models, four methods are mainly used. The 
three first methods are based on cash flows discounting properly said, while the last one is 
based on discounting the excess return on capital over the cost of capital.  
 
II.3.1. THE WACC APPROACH 
The general formula of the 
€ 
WACC  approach is 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+WACCt )tt=1
∞
∑  (2.32) 
 
The 
€ 
WACC  approach gives immediately the market value 
€ 
V  of the firm, without explicitly 
valuing either elements from the assets side of the market value balance sheet of the firm (
€ 
VU  
and 
€ 
VTS ) or elements from the liabilities side of the market value balance sheet of the firm (
€ 
E  
and 
€ 
D). This method implicitly includes the tax shield flow (
€ 
TS ) in the discount rate 
€ 
(WACC)  
and not in the cash flow (
€ 
FCF ) ; the 
€ 
WACC  is thus a constructed parameter with embodied 
assumptions about the discount rate for the tax shields 
€ 
KTS  and the level of debt 
€ 
D. 
 
For practice purpose, this general formula gets split into two components7 :  
- An explicit period of n years where the free cash flows (FCF) are specifically forecasted, and  
- A terminal value, which captures the value created beyond the explicit period and which is 
based on assumptions about the growth (g) and the return on capital (ROIC) of the firm. These 
two parameters are usually referred to as the value drivers. 
 
                                                
7 Actually, it could be more than two elements : we could subdivide the terminal value into several subperiods 
with different expected growth rates. As it is certainly not the point of the paper, we do not present it here ; 
however, the four models presented can – with more or less mathematical complexity – be accommodated to 
present such subperiods. 
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Therefore, if we forecast that the 
€ 
FCF  will grow at a constant rate g after the explicit period 
and that the ROIC will stay superior to the 
€ 
WACC , then the value of the firm 
€ 
V  is 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+WACCt )tt=1
n
∑ + 1(1+WACCn+1)n
FCFn+1
WACCn+1 − g  
(2.33) 
 
Explicitly based on value drivers8, this expression (2.33) may also be restated as 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+WACCt )tt=1
n
∑ + 1(1+WACCn+1)n
NOPLATn+1 1−
g
ROICn+1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
WACCn+1 − g  
(2.34) 
 
Alternatively, if we expect no growth or the ROIC to equal the 
€ 
WACC  beyond the explicit 
period – whatever growth might be –, we then get the present value of the firm 
€ 
V  with 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+WACCt )tt=1
n
∑ + 1(1+WACCn+1)n
NOPLATn+1
WACCn+1
 (2.35) 
 
Using a non growth perpetuity as terminal value instead of a growing perpetuity is usually 
referred to as the convergence approach. 
 
II.3.2. THE APV APPROACH 
The general formula of the APV approach is 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+ KU )t
+
TSt
(1+ KTSt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
t=1
∞
∑ =VU +VTS  (2.36) 
 
The APV approach values explicitly each element of the assets side of the market value balance 
sheet of the firm (
€ 
VU  and 
€ 
VTS ) in order to give 
€ 
V . Similarly to the 
€ 
WACC  approach, this 
general formula may be split into an explicit period and a terminal value. Depending on the 
assumptions made for the terminal value, we then get : 
- (a) if g > 0 and ROIC > WACC, 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+ KU )t
+
TSt
(1+ KTSt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
t=1
n
∑ + 1(1+ KU )n
FCFn+1
KU − g
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ +
1
(1+ KTSn+1 )n
TSn+1
KTSn+1 − g
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
 
(2.37) 
 
                                                
8 For a mathematical demonstration about how to get from the FCF to the value drivers-based terminal term, see 
for example Dossogne (2003) or Thauvron (2005). 
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or, based explicitly on value drivers, 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+ KU )t
+
TSt
(1+ KTSt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
t=1
n
∑ + 1(1+ KU )n
NOPLATn+1 1−
g
ROICn+1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
KU − g
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
+
1
(1+ KTSn+1 )n
TSn+1
KTSn+1 − g
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
 
 
(2.38) 
- (b) if g = 0 or ROIC = WACC, 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+ KU )t
+
TSt
(1+ KTSt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
t=1
n
∑ + 1(1+ KU )n
NOPLATn+1
KU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ +
1
(1+ KTSn+1 )n
TSn+1
KTSn+1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
 
(2.39) 
 
II.3.3. THE ECF APPROACH  
The general formula of the ECF approach is 
 
€ 
V = ECFt(1+ KEt )t
+
DCFt
(1+ KDt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
t=1
∞
∑ = E + D (2.40) 
 
The ECF approach values explicitly each element of the liabilities side of the market value 
balance sheet of the firm (
€ 
E  and 
€ 
D) in order to give 
€ 
V 9. For practice purpose, splitting the 
general formula into an explicit period and a terminal value, and, depending on the 
assumptions made for the terminal value, we unsurprisingly get : 
- (a) if g > 0 and ROIC > WACC, 
 
€ 
V = ECFt(1+ KE t )
t +
DCFt
(1+ KDt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
t=1
n
∑ + 1(1+ KEn+1 )n
ECFn+1
KEn+1 − g
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ +
1
(1+ KDn+1 )n
DCFn+1
KDn+1 − g
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
 
(2.41) 
or, based explicitly on value drivers10, 
€ 
V = ECFt(1+ KE t )
t +
DCFt
(1+ KDt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
t=1
n
∑ + 1(1+ KEn+1 )n
NIn+1 1−
g
ROEn+1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
KEn+1 − g
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
+
1
(1+ KDn+1 )n
DCFn+1
KDn+1 − g
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
 
(2.42) 
 
 
                                                
9 However, these valuation models usually assume that the market value of the debt D is always equal to its book 
value, which means that the debt is not traded on a financial market. This a rather convenient assumption ; the 
main issue is then about valuing the market value of equity E. 
10 For a mathematical demonstration about how to get from the ECF to the value drivers-based terminal term, see 
for example Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005). 
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- (b) if g = 0 or ROIC = WACC, 
 
€ 
V = ECFt(1+ KE t )
t +
DCFt
(1+ KDt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
t=1
n
∑ + 1(1+ KEn+1 )n
NIn+1
KEn+1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ +
1
(1+ KDn+1 )n
DCFn+1
KDn+1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
 
(2.43) 
 
II.3.4. THE MVA APPROACH 
Finally, the general formula for the MVA approach is 
 
€ 
V = Invested Capital0 +
ROICt −WACCt( ) × InvestedCapitalt−1
(1+WACCt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
t=1
∞
∑  (2.44) 
 
The MVA approach values immediately the market value of the firm 
€ 
V , without valuing 
explicitly either elements from the assets side or from the liabilities side of the market value 
balance sheet. As this is similar to the WACC approach, we consistently also use the WACC as 
the discount rate. However, differently from the WACC approach, the MVA approach focuses 
on the difference between two parameters : the return on capital (ROIC) versus the cost of 
capital (WACC). The difference, if positive, represents the excess return on capital over the 
cost of capital – usually referred to as the economic spread –, and leads, year after year, to add 
economic value (EVA) to the book value of the firm, in order to get the market value 
€ 
V  of the 
firm. 
 
For practice purpose, splitting the general formula into an explicit period and a terminal value, 
and, depending on the assumptions made for the terminal value, we get : 
- (a) if g > 0 and ROIC > WACC, 
 
€ 
V = Invested Capital0 +
ROICt −WACCt( ) × InvestedCapitalt−1
(1+WACCt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
t=1
n
∑
+
1
(1+WACCn+1)n
ROICn+1 −WACCn+1( ) × InvestedCapitaln
WACCn+1 − g  
(2.45) 
or, based explicitly on value drivers, 
€ 
V = Invested Capital0 +
ROICt −WACCt( ) × InvestedCapitalt−1
(1+WACCt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
t=1
n
∑
+
1
(1+WACCn+1)n
NOPLATn+1
g
ROICn+1
ROICn+1 −WACCn+1( )
WACCn+1 − g  
(2.46) 
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- (b) if g = 0 or ROIC = WACC, 
 
€ 
V = Invested Capital0 +
ROICt −WACCt( ) × InvestedCapitalt−1
(1+WACCt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
t=1
n
∑
+
1
(1+WACCn+1)n
ROICn+1 −WACCn+1( ) × InvestedCapitaln
WACCn+1  
(2.47) 
 
The MVA formula can be slightly adjusted in order to differentiate the sources of value 
creation. This is what we had initially referred to as operating value creation or financing value 
creation. Indeed, we can rewrite the expression (2.44) as 
 
€ 
V = Invested Capital0 +
ROICt −KU( ) × InvestedCapitalt−1
(1+ KU )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
t=1
n
∑ + TSt(1+ KTSt )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
t=1
n
∑  (2.48) 
 
The first sum represents the operating excess return over the “operating cost” – since the 
business risk 
€ 
KU  may be considered as the “operating” equity cost – and accounts year after 
year for the operating value creation. We can refer to it as the operating economic spread. The 
second sum is nothing but the present value of tax shields, which is precisely the financing 
value creation. 
 
Using the definition of the ROIC and considering that the initial Invested Capital is equivalent 
to the current book value of the firm, it can be easily shown that developing the expression 
(2.48) – possibly with a growing perpetuity as a terminal value and so the need to split each 
sum of the expression into two elements – will lead to the equivalent expression 
 
€ 
V =VBook + (VU −VBook ) +VTS  (2.49) 
 
The difference (
€ 
VU  – 
€ 
VBook ) will be referred to as the Operating MVA (OMVA), while 
€ 
VTS  can 
be regarded as the Financing MVA (FMVA). The total MVA is then also equal to 
 
€ 
MVA =V −VBook = (VU −VBook ) +VTS  (2.50) 
 
This expression for 
€ 
V  is worth noting as it allows to differentiate the sources of value creation. 
We will use it when illustrating our model with some examples. 
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II.3.5. SOME COMMENTS  
All the relations from these four methods have been so far presented in a perfectly general 
fashion, as we have not referred to any particular assumption ; they are all theoretically 
equivalent and have always to give the same result if consistently used.  
 
For practice purpose, these general models usually collapse to significantly simplified 
expressions according to different convenient assumptions made for several parameters, and in 
particular for the appropriate discount rate for the tax shields 
€ 
KTS  and the level of debt 
€ 
D.  
 
In the next chapter, we will present a comprehensive literature review about the different 
assumptions that are usually made. This chapter will first summarize the main trends that are 
regarded as standard assumptions, and then mention the last insights that can be found in recent 
papers over the subject. For now, we conclude this initial chapter with two more comments 
about these general methods. 
 
II.3.5.1. About Growth in Terminal Value 
For practice purpose, there are two general approaches when considering the standardized 
growth g in the terminal value : 
- (a) the convergence approach where, beyond the explicit period, we assume ROIC = WACC 
or equivalently ROE =
€ 
KE . In that case, no incremental value is created whatever the growth 
rate g is, which obviously includes the case where g  = 0. 
- (b) the sustainable advantage approach, which considers that the firm keeps creating 
incremental value beyond the explicit period, such that g > 0 and ROIC > WACC or 
equivalently ROE > 
€ 
KE . 
If opting for this second approach, the growth rate g to be determined is, depending on the 
valuation model, not based on the same underlying elements. If b is the retention ratio, that is 
the percentage of profits kept in the firm – or equivalently, not distributed as dividends –, we 
may approximate g in different ways. 
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When focusing on the valuation of the firm as a whole (WACC, MVA) or on the assets side of 
its market value balance sheet (APV), we may say that 
 
€ 
g ≈ b × ROIC  (2.51) 
 
When focusing on the financing side of the firm, and in particular on its equity (ECF), we can 
approximatively say that 
 
€ 
g ≈ b × ROE  (2.52) 
 
II.3.5.2. About the Fixing of Capital Structure in Terminal Value 
The terminal value is supposed to represent the value created by the firm when activities are 
normalized – which means when the FCF, the debt level, the growth and the ROIC reach their 
respective “normal” levels.  
 
For all these models, the terminal value – since it has the form of a perpetuity – assumes a 
fixed market value leverage ratio, and therefore also fixed market value discount rates.  
 
Therefore, it is important to make sure that the debt/equity ratio embedded in the terminal 
value is (as close as possible from) the target ratio of the firm, as this terminal value generally 
accounts for a significant part of the total market value of the firm 
€ 
V . 
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The last fifty years have seen many authors dealing with these discounted cash flow methods, 
and in particular with the correct valuation of the tax shields ; today, there is still no clear 
answer to this topic, and a general reconciliation has not been reached between all the authors 
and their respective assumptions. An undisputed, economically sensible and practical solution 
has not come out yet. 
 
Generally, assumptions have been made on - at least - two parameters : the discount rate for the 
tax shields 
€ 
KTS  and the level of debt 
€ 
D. Therefore, the first section of this chapter analyzes the 
standard assumptions for these parameters in order to value tax shields and consequently firms. 
The second section of this chapter reviews the last insights and attempts of improvement of 
these standard assumptions that can be found in recent literature. 
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III.1. STANDARD ASSUMPTIONS 
III.1.1. MODIGLIANI & MILLER AND HARRIS & PRINGLE 
Modigliani & Miller (1958) were the first authors to specifically propose a firm valuation 
framework, and first concluded that leverage was irrelevant to firm value. However, their 
revised version (MM, 1963), considering taxes and therefore the tax benefits of debt financing, 
opened the doors to an increasingly extending literature on tax shields valuation. Their paper is 
based on the assumptions that (a) the level of debt remains fixed throughout the life of the firm 
(
€ 
Dt = D), and (b) the risk associated with the tax shields is the same as the risk of the debt (
€ 
KTS  
= 
€ 
KD ). The cost of debt is also – as in most usual models – assumed constant, whatever the 
level of debt. Under these restrictive assumptions, since both the cost of debt and the level of 
debt are constant, and since the tax shield risk is equal to the cost of debt, the present value of 
the tax shields is also a constant and does not depend on the cost of debt (
€ 
VTS  = τ
€ 
D). 
 
Almost two decades later, Miles & Ezzel (1980) proposed a model for a constant market value 
leverage ratio policy, which is a firm rebalancing its debt once a year in order to maintain a 
fixed debt/firm value ratio (
€ 
L = Dt /Vt) ; in their setup, the risk of the tax shields is the same as 
the constant cost of debt in the initial year, but then supposedly follows the risk of the business 
since leverage varies the same way the value of the firm does. Harris & Pringle (1985) 
completed this constant leverage ratio policy by deriving equations for continuous 
rebalancing ; the risk of the tax shields is then equivalent to the unlevered cost of capital at any 
time (
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU ).  
 
Whereas numerous authors have discussed, criticized, and proposed new assumptions or 
methods since then, the assumptions of MM (1963) and HP (1985) are still the standards in 
today leading corporate finance textbooks. For this reason, and in order to first analyse their 
shortcomings and second propose solutions when developing our new setup, we will now go 
through the relations they have derived for a general cash flow pattern. 
 
All these equations can be derived from the general relations we have detailed in chapter II. 
For each combination of assumptions, we give the related formulas for 
€ 
KE , 
€ 
WACC , 
€ 
VTS  and 
then the way to compute 
€ 
V  using the ECF, the WACC and the APV approaches. The cost of 
debt 
€ 
KD  is assumed constant in these setups. 
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A. Level of debt constant (
€ 
Dt = D) and 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KD  (MM, 1963) 
 
€ 
KE = KU + (KU −KD )(1− τ)
D
E  (3.1) 
 
 
€ 
WACC = KU 1− τ
D
E + D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ (3.2) 
 
 
€ 
VTS =
KDDτ
(1+ KD )t
=
KDDτ
KD
= τD
t=1
∞
∑  (3.3) 
 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+ KU )t
+ τD
t=1
∞
∑ = ECFt(1+ KEMM )t
+ D
t=1
∞
∑ = FCFt(1+WACCMM )tt=1
∞
∑  (3.4) 
 
B. Level of debt fluctuates and 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KD  (Extension MM) 
 
€ 
KE = KU + (KU −KD )
D−VTS
E  (3.5) 
 
 
€ 
WACC = KU 1−
VTS
E + D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ (3.6) 
 
 
€ 
VTS =
KDDtτ
(1+ KD )tt=1
∞
∑  (3.7) 
 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+ KU )t
+
KDDtτ
(1+ KD )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
t=1
∞
∑ = ECFt(1+ KEEXT MM )t
+ D
t=1
∞
∑ = FCFt(1+WACCEXT MM )tt=1
∞
∑  (3.8) 
C. Debt/Firm Value ratio constant (
€ 
L = Dt /Vt)11 constant and 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KD 12 (ME, 1980) 
 
€ 
D = Dt = LVt ⇔ E = Et = (1− L)Vt
⇒
Dt
Et
=
LVt
(1− L)Vt
=
L
1− L =
D
E
 (3.9) 
 
                                                
11 In this setup, debt is rebalanced once a year to keep the ratio L constant ; the time index t refers then to years. 
12 In this setup, the risk of the tax shields 
€ 
KTS  does equal 
€ 
KD  in the initial year, but then equals 
€ 
KU  for the 
expected value of all future tax shields ; in other words, 
€ 
KTS  varies over time in order to keep the WACC constant.  
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€ 
KE = KU + KU −KD 1− τ
KU −KD
1+ KD
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
E = KU + KU −KD 1− τ
KU −KD
1+ KD
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
L
1− L  (3.10) 
 
 
€ 
WACC = KU − τKD
D
E + D
1+ KU
1+ KD
= KU − τKDL
1+ KU
1+ KD
 (3.11) 
 
 
€ 
VTS =
KDDtτ
(1+ KTSt )tt=1
∞
∑  (3.12) 
with 
 
€ 
KTSt = KU + KD −KU( )
τKDL
1+ KD
Vt
VTSt
 (3.13) 
 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+ KU )t
+
KDDtτ
(1+ KTSME )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
t=1
∞
∑ = ECFt(1+ KEME )t
+ D
t=1
∞
∑ = FCFt(1+WACCME )tt=1
∞
∑  (3.14) 
D. Debt/Firm Value ratio constant (
€ 
L = Dt /Vt)13 and 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU  (HP, 1985) 
 
€ 
D = Dt = LVt ⇔ E = Et = (1− L)Vt
⇒
Dt
Et
=
LVt
(1− L)Vt
=
L
1− L =
D
E
 (3.15) 
 
 
€ 
KE = KU + (KU−KD )
D
E = KU + (KU−KD )
L
1− L  (3.16) 
 
 
€ 
WACC = KU − τKD
D
E + D = KU − τKDL  (3.17) 
 
 
€ 
VTS =
KDDtτ
(1+ KU )tt=1
∞
∑  (3.18) 
 
 
€ 
V = FCFt(1+ KU )t
+
KDDtτ
(1+ KU )t
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
t=1
∞
∑ = ECFt(1+ KEHP )t
+ D
t=1
∞
∑ = FCFt(1+WACCHP )tt=1
∞
∑  (3.19) 
 
                                                
13 In this setup, debt is continuously rebalanced to keep the ratio L constant ; the time index t refers then to 
continuous time. 
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III.1.2. COMMENTS & CRITICISMS 
It is straightforward to notice that, for the same company, depending on the assumption for the 
rate 
€ 
KTS , the value of the firm will be different. Indeed, the valuation assuming 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU  will 
always give a lower result than the one using 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KD , since 
€ 
KD  is assumed constant in these 
setups and therefore we always have 
€ 
KU > KD . 
 
Advocates for the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  as the appropriate discount rate for the tax shields argue 
that, since tax shields come from debt, they have to be discounted at the cost of debt 
€ 
KD . On 
the other hand, proponents for the unlevered cost of capital 
€ 
KU  as the tax shield’s discount rate 
point out that the risk of the tax shield is tied to the operating result, since the firm does not 
benefit from (all) the tax shield if the operating result does not cover (all) the interest expenses, 
as previously pointed by the relations (2.30) and (2.31); therefore, like operating results, tax 
shields should also be discounted at 
€ 
KU .  
 
On top of these considerations and supporting MM (1963) and HP (1985), literature14 often 
suggests that : 
- (a) if 
€ 
D is expected to remain stable, then the tax shields should be discounted at 
€ 
KD  
- (b) if 
€ 
D/
€ 
V  is expected to remain stable, then the tax shields should be discounted at 
€ 
KU  
 
However, both policies – fixed debt or fixed debt ratio – remain particular cases rarely met in 
real world ; for companies where neither 
€ 
D nor 
€ 
D/
€ 
V  are expected to remain perfectly stable – 
as it is the case of most companies in practice –, literature does not provide much guidance. 
 
On top of this lack of generality with regards to the debt policy, both models fail to take into 
account other issues which seem important to be considered in order to obtain economically 
sensible and then realistic results ; while they are easy to apply and definitely convenient, they 
are very likely to oversimplify real cases.  
 
We now specifically discuss these shortcomings.  
 
                                                
14 See, for example and among many others, Cooper and Nyborg (2007 and 2004), Bertoneche and Federici 
(2006), Fernandez (1995, 2008a and 2008b) and all leading corporate finance textbooks.  
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III.1.2.1. About Discount Rates 
III.1.2.1.1. Sensitivity of the cost of levered equity KE (and therefore the WACC) to leverage 
In both setups, the cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE , that is the return required by shareholders 
depending on both business and financial risks they face, is a constant throughout the life of the 
company, and so the 
€ 
WACC . This convenience is only correct because of the debt policies 
underlying those setups – fixed level of debt or fixed debt/firm value ratio. Among many 
others, Grinblatt and Liu (2008), Farber, Gillet and Szafarz (2007), Velez-Pareja and Tham 
(2008), or Wood and Leitch (2004) have pointed this out. 
 
However, as stated before, firms rarely follow exactly these strict financing policies. Therefore, 
while it is sensible to assume that the business risk (
€ 
KU ) is a constant – that is, the operating 
risk associated to a particular kind of business in a particular sector15 -, the financial risk does 
change if the leverage varies, which has to be taken into account in the cost of levered equity. 
  
As the WACC uses 
€ 
KE  as an input, the WACC also evolves depending on the level of debt. 
While authors are usually aware of this issue, 
€ 
KE  and WACC are almost always considered as 
constant, and very few have proposed models where the cost of levered equity does vary year 
after year when the financial leverage does not follow a fix pattern. Our model will allow the 
cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE  to fluctuate year after year.  
III.1.2.2.2. Sensitivity of the cost of debt KD to leverage 
On top of the cost of levered equity, the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  does also vary according the level of 
debt. Indeed, the cost of debt is the interest rate paid upon the outstanding debt, and this rate is 
obviously not a constant when the level of debt changes. All other things being equal, any 
lender – banker or bondholder – requires a higher return if the firm becomes more leveraged in 
order to compensate the surplus of (financial) risk associated with the increase in the leverage, 
and inversely. 
 
Therefore, if we refer to the risk-free interest rate as 
€ 
RF  and if we assume the leverage ratio to 
change, while the implicit assumption 
€ 
KDt = KD = RF  for all t is definitely convenient, it 
                                                
15 Basically, KU can be interpreted as a risk index standing for the average and expected profitability of a 
particular kind of business in a determinated sector, and exclusively depending on operationnal elements, or in 
other words, business-specific parameters. 
Firm Valuation : Tax Shields and Discount Rates (T. ANSAY, 2009) 
 
 - 22 - 
  
certainly does not reflect reality. For a brief comparison with the CAPM model, this 
simplifying assumption is equivalent to assuming βD = 0, which would mean that the debt is 
risk-free. Moreover, even models that consider βD ≠ 0 by adding a static debt risk premium to 
the risk-free rate RF, in order to include a credit spread between the corporate cost of 
borrowing 
€ 
KDt = KD = RF + Fixed Credit Spread  and the risk-free rate RF, still fail to take into 
account that the default premium has to rise as the debt ratio increases.  
 
As HP and MM assume either a constant debt level or a constant debt ratio, KD might be 
considered as constant in these setups, but again it does not correspond to most real corporate 
financing policies. In reality, the credit spread is a function of the leverage ratio of the 
company16. 
 
While endogenizing the cost of debt has rarely been done, some authors have proposed such 
models ; for example, Wood and Leitch (2004) discuss a model taking into account the 
sensitivity of both the cost of debt and the cost of equity when the leverage policy changes and 
derive a relation between those two parameters17. We will extensively develop this point in the 
model presented in chapter IV. 
 
III.1.2.2.3. Sensitivity of the tax shield risk  KTS  to leverage 
Finally, as already explained, the risk associated to the tax shields 
€ 
KTS  is assumed fixed in 
almost every model. In MM and HP, it is equal to respectively 
€ 
KD– which is a constant in 
these setups – and 
€ 
KU . 
 
However, this risk does change across the time as it also depends on the leverage ratio. Many 
authors have highlighted this in recent literature. For examples, Liu (2009) identifies four 
parameters that makes the tax shield risk changes across time, Grinblatt and Liu (2008) 
consider four (different) parameters, and Rao and Stevens (2007) argue that the tax shield risk 
is definitely different according the level of debt and the profitability of the firm. However, 
they do not come with a practical and straightforward relation for 
€ 
KTS . 
                                                
16 This is precisely what rating agencies do ; depending on the creditworthiness of the firm (which depends on its 
leverage ratio and its profitability), these agencies will give a rating to the firm, and the firm cost of debt will 
usually be strongly tied to this rating. However, these ratings are not fixed forever as they evolve with the 
performances of the company ; therefore, the cost of debt of the company varies as well. 
17 They arguably derive a parameter 
€ 
Kt = (1+KDt ) /(1+KEt ) ≈ K  which is essentially constant and nearly 
independent of the capital structure for all t. 
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Tax shield valuation lies at the core of this paper and we will develop in chapter IV both its 
market discount rate 
€ 
KTS  and its accounting modelization. So far, we just mention that – all 
other things being equal – the risk for the company to not – even partially – benefit from the 
tax deductibility of the debt interests in a particular year t will increase if the level of debt 
increases, since the firm will then pay more interests ; at a certain level of debt, the interests 
paid will be superior to the operating result EBIT, such that the company will not benefit from 
the – full – tax shield that year t, as previously stated by (2.31) and (2.32).  
 
Actually, while increasing the leverage also increases the potential tax shields, it 
simultaneously increases the risk of these higher tax shields. This statement is even reinforced 
if we refer to what we have just said about the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  ; as the leverage increases, 
€ 
KD  
should also increase, such that both interest expenses and potential tax shields certainly 
increase, but the risk of not benefiting from this tax shield that particular year definitely 
increases as well. 
 
We summarize this subsection about discount rates by concluding that, for any companies that 
do not follow the two strict debt policies assumed by MM and HP – that is, constant level of 
debt or constant debt ratio –, the cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE , the cost of debt 
€ 
KD , and the risk 
associated with the tax shields 
€ 
KTS  (as well as obviously the WACC) do change over time as 
they are functions of the leverage ratio of the firm.  
III.1.2.2. About Losses Carried Forward and Tax Shields Modelization 
Following what we have just said about the discount rate for the tax shields 
€ 
KTS  and focusing 
now on accounting flows and in particular on tax shield flows, HP and MM – as many other 
models – modelize the tax shield every year as TSt = 
€ 
(KDD)t τ ; by so doing, they consider that 
the company always fully benefits from this tax shield that year t even though there is not 
enough operating result to cover the interest expenses.  
 
However, when the company records an accounting loss, the unrealized tax shield will be 
carried forward as a tax credit that will reduce the taxable income when the firm makes profits 
again. Therefore, even if the firm will ultimately benefit from the totality of the tax shield at 
some future time, the appropriate discount rate at that future time may (a) be different from the 
one in t and (b) in any case, the exponent of the discount factor has to be higher as this will 
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happen in a further future than if it had been gained in t. This is simply the well-known concept 
of time value of money which is specifically relevant to discounted cash flows valuation. 
Additionaly, if we consider an extreme example where the firm would never make profits 
anymore, then the firm would only have benefited from a percentage of the amount 
€ 
(KDD)t τ 
that year t, and would never benefit from the rest of it. 
 
In order to value as precisely as possible 
€ 
VTS , we will introduce in our model some refinements 
for the accounting modelization of the tax shields ; the accounts loss carried forward and 
accumulated losses carried forward will be introduced, and consequently the account taxable 
income, which can be different from EBT = (EBIT – KDD)(1 - τ). 
III.1.2.2. About the Circularity Issue 
As we have mentioned in the first part of the paper, accounting cash flows are discounted at 
their respective appropriate market value discount rate in order to obtain the market value of
€ 
E , 
€ 
D, 
€ 
VU , 
€ 
VTS  and ultimately 
€ 
V .  
 
To derive the market value of these elements, you need to know the market value discount 
rates ; however, to obtain these rates, you do need to know the market value elements in order 
to use their respective market value weights. This circularity issue is a well-known drawback 
of these discounted cash flow models.  
 
However, when using the assumption of MM or HP, many authors ignore the problem of 
circularity inherent to those methods ; they elude the difficulty by assuming target levels for 
both equity and debt. While this assumption is practically convenient and might be sometimes 
a decent approximation, it does not reflect the reality when the firm financing policy is 
expected to vary noticeably ; even if not, those target levels may be quite different from the 
effective market value weights, which leads to poor approximations for discount rates. 
Furthermore, those inaccuracies are likely to lead to discrepancies between the four valuation 
methods – APV, ECF, WACC and MVA –, and the extent of the gaps between the methods will 
depend on the difference between these assumed target levels and the actual market value 
weights. To avoid these differences in results between the four methods, authors usually 
present only simple examples – namely, cases with few periods or very often perpetuities. 
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Among others, Velez-Pareja and Tham (2005), Velez-Pareja and Mian (2008) and Wood and 
Leitch (2004) have shown recursive approaches to solve this issue with the help of computer 
software. Indeed, current spreadsheets do not have problems anymore to deal with complex 
relations that require numerical research, and iteration features are now largely available on 
any spreadsheet application. Therefore, we will also use this feature to solve the circularity 
issue when presenting different examples that will illustrate our model. 
 
III.2. RECENT LITERATURE & LAST INSIGHTS 
On top of the papers we have already mentioned, we now briefly discuss some other recent 
papers that have dealt somehow with firm valuation and in particular with tax shields 
valuation. 
 
The first thing we can say about recent literature is that there is still no model that has been 
able to clarify undisputedly the correct discount rate to apply for tax shields, and while 
complex mathematics and elegant theoretical concepts have been proposed, no model has 
really come yet with a practical solution. As previously mentioned, this is probably the reason 
why current corporate finance textbooks do not take position and keep mainly presenting MM 
and HP as standards. 
 
Recent papers usually rather support HP assumptions than MM assumptions, since using 
€ 
KU  as 
the discount rate for the tax shields yields more “reasonable” value for 
€ 
VTS . For example, 
Ruback (2002) merges the Free Cash Flow (FCF) and the Tax Shield (TS), calls this flow the 
Capital Cash Flow (CCF) and discounts this aggregated flow with the cost of unlevered equity, 
implicitly assuming that the risk of the tax shield is equivalent to the business risk. Similarly, 
Schmidle (2006) intends to prove that the appropriate discount for the tax shields is KU. 
 
Some authors have then come out with surprising results, like Fernandez (2004) who claims 
that the value of the tax shields is not equal to the present value of the tax shields. Initially 
controversial, this assumption has been definitely discarded by the paper of Cooper and 
Nyborg (2006), which formally demonstrates that this surprising result has been obtained 
because of confusion between formulas from different setups.  
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Arzac and Golsten (2005) propose an interesting paper where they reduce the problem of the 
tax shield discount rate by using a pricing kernel ; they derive through an iterative process first 
the market value of the firm and then deduce from it the market value of equity and the market 
value of tax shields. However, they still consider a fixed leverage ratio and their results are 
from little help for the appropriate tax shield discount rate. 
 
Grinblatt and Liu (2008) derive the most general setup for the tax shield valuation. They come 
up with a partial differential equation for the value of the debt tax shield in a fully stochastic 
setup ; their results are based on a standard risk-neutral valuation framework, and apply to any 
dynamic debt policies. While this paper certainly encompasses all the others, their results are 
definitely theoretically interesting but practically from little help as they use heavy 
mathematics and some abstract parameters that do not yield a straightforward expression for 
the tax shield discount rate. 
 
Finally, Liu (2009) proposes an unconventional way to consider tax shields and its appropriate 
rate, and makes this rate depend on four variables. His model is based on slicing the present 
value of tax shields into realized tax shields and unrealized tax shields, and adjusts some 
accounting returns. Also worth reading, it is however mostly incompatible with the rest of the 
literature, as recognized by the author himself. 
 
About the circularity issue, we have already mentioned that Velez-Pareja (for example, Velez-
Pareja and Mian, 2008 or Velez-Parja and Tham, 2005) proposes to use the iteration feature of 
modern spreadsheets to tackle this well-known problem. Wood and Leitch (2004) also use this 
iterative process to derive results and, while they do not treat the tax shields issue in particular, 
they endogenize the cost of debt as an increasing function of the level of debt. The model they 
propose is also worth noting as it considers changing capital structure and not fixed debt level 
or fixed debt ratio, requiring only the corporate cash flows, the risk-free rate, the marginal tax 
rate and the unlevered cost of equity as inputs. 
 
We now have presented all the required information to start building our model. Its underlying 
assumptions may be seen as a mix of the different insights recent papers have proposed.  
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First, it is strongly based on the fundamental equality between the assets side and the liabilities 
side of the market value balance sheet of the firm at any time, as introduced by Farber, Gillet 
and Szafarz (2006).  
 
Second, it endogenizes the cost of debt KD as a function of the (appropriate) leverage ratio, and 
only requires the risk free rate, the corporate tax rate, the corporate cash flows and the cost of 
unlevered equity as inputs, similarly to Wood and Leitch (2004).  
 
Third, using the market value balance sheet equality and the portfolio theory that states that the 
return of an asset is the weighted average of its constituting elements’ returns, it derives 
through a step-by-step demonstration a general expression for the market value discount rate of 
the tax shields KTS.  
 
Fourth, it uses the iteration feature of modern spreadsheets to simultaneously solve for the 
market value elements and the market value discount rates thanks to numerical research, as 
proposed by Velez-Pareja and Tham (2005).  
 
Some refinements for the accounting modelization of the income statement of the firm will also 
be done in order to properly forecast the accounting tax shield flows. Comprehensive examples 
will finally illustrate the model. 
 
IV.  TAX SHIELDS AND DISCOUNT RATES : A DYNAMIC, ENDOGENOUS 
& INTEGRATED APPROACH TO VALUE FIRMS 
IV.1. ASSUMPTIONS  
In our setup, we only consider that the risk free rate RF, the corporate tax rate τ and the 
unlevered cost of equity 
€ 
KU , which is the business/operational risk related to a particular kind 
of company in a particular sector, are constant. These requirements are definitely weaker than 
any other valuation setup where other discount rates and debt level/ratio are usually assumed 
constant ; they are also much likely to be close to real situations. 
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All other discount rates (
€ 
KE , 
€ 
KTS , 
€ 
KD ) may vary as they are function of their own relevant 
leverage ratio, and no restriction needs to be done about changes in capital structure that could 
happen from one year to another18. As the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  may vary, the (market value of) 
debt 
€ 
D is not riskless, as its risk will increase will the amount of outsanding debt. However, we 
will consider that the market value of debt 
€ 
D is equal to its book value19. In other words, we 
will consider that the debt is not traded on a financial market. This is always assumed in any 
other valuation setup and may be regarded as a decent simplification. Traded debts are a totally 
other subject in the finance literature, which goes beyond the scope of the present paper.  
 
Therefore, any value the company would be able to create beyond its book value flow only and 
completely to shareholders – either through tax shields (financing value creation) or through 
excess operating return on capital over the unlevered cost of capital (operating value creation) 
–, as debtholders only receive interest expenses that are certain returns that exactly compensate 
the risk they face by granting to the company the outstanding level of debt D ; in other words, 
debtholders do not have claims for a share of the profits the company could make.  
 
Finally, this model also considers the possibility of losses carried forward by the company, and 
therefore the possible existence of tax credits which can be regarded as tax shields carried 
forward. 
 
IV.2. MARKET VALUE BALANCE SHEET EQUALITY : THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE  
Tax shields come from debt financing ; there is no tax shield if there is no debt20. However, 
these debt tax shields, if any, flow entirely to equityholders through the net income, as interest 
expenses are paid before taxes, which reduces the taxable base. Debtholders do not benefit 
from these debt tax shields. 
 
                                                
18 Again, while the market value discount rates may vary every year depending of the level of debt outsanding that 
year, the forthcoming demonstration will omit – when not confusing - to add to every market value discount rate 
and balance sheet element the time index t, as it does not add anything to the developments and makes expressions 
heavier.  
19 Except if its book value is so high that, compared to the operating results the firm is expected to make, the debt 
could never be repaid in full ; in that case, the market value of debt will be equal to the market value of the firm, 
as debtholders will be paid off first against shareholders in case of bankruptcy. See the section IV.2.3. for details. 
See also the section IV.4.3. when considering growing perpetuity cases.  
20 We are just talking here about debt tax shields. Obviously, tax shields may arise from other tax deductible 
items, like depreciation, etc. Nevertheless, the point of the paper is to analyze tax shields arising from financing 
decisons ; we will therefore often omit to say debt tax shields, and simply refer to them as tax shields. 
DEBT 	  	   TAX	  SHIELDS	   EQUITY	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When valuing firms through cash flows discounting, as interest expenses, tax shields and net 
incomes are cash flows that may be considered separatly, it would seem sensible that their 
respective appropriate discount rates follow the same pattern than the cash flows themselves, 
and as we know from the fundamental condition (2.6) that the cost of levered equity has always 
to be greater than the cost of debt, it makes some sense to presume that, when the firm is both 
debt and equity financed, the relations between those discount rates should be 
 
€ 
KD < KTS < KE  (4.1) 
 
So far, this is just an observation ; we will show this formally in our demonstration. Referring 
now to the constant equality between the assets side and the liabilities side of the market value 
balance sheet of a firm, the amount of the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS  that lies on the assets 
side of the market value balance sheet has to have its equivalent somewhere in the liabilities 
side. And as we have just said, tax shields flow entirely to equity. Therefore, we may divide the 
market value of equity into two components : the market value of equity without the market 
value of tax shields, and the market (or present) value of tax shields. This can be written as 
  (4.2) 
and 
 
€ 
V =VU +VTS = E + D = (E −VTS ) +VTS + D (4.3) 
 
This is nothing but just both adding and substracting simultaneously 
€ 
VTS  from the liabilities 
side of the market value balance sheet. We also know from (2.9) that, for each market value 
element of the market value balance sheet, there exists an appropriate market value discount 
rate such that the sum of the products of the market value elements from the assets side by their 
respective appropriate discount rates is equal to the the sum of the products of the market value 
elements from the liabilities side by their respective appropriate discount rates. 
 
Therefore, we may say that there exists an appropriate market value discount rate 
€ 
KE−VTS for the 
market value difference (
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS ) such that the relation (2.9) may be restated, without any loss 
of generality, as  
  (4.4) 
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This market value discount rate 
€ 
KE−VTS  may be considered as the market value discount rate of 
equity if the tax shields that flow to equity when there is debt financing are not taken into 
account. 
 
Therefore, considering the portfolio theory that states that the return of any asset is the 
weighted average of its constituting elements’ returns, we may say that the « global » cost of 
levered equity 
€ 
KE  – the appropriate market value discount rate for the whole market value of 
equity 
€ 
E  –, which we know from (2.10), is also equal to  
 
€ 
KE = KE−VTS
E −VTS
E + KTS
VTS
E  (4.5) 
 
This rate is thus the sum of the respective appropriate discount rates for (
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS ) and 
€ 
VTS , 
weighted by their respective weights with regards to the total market value of equity. So far, 
we have not lost any generality ; we have just decompounded the market value of equity 
between its two market value parts, which could be respectively considered as the operating 
value and the financing value of the firm relevant to equityholders. However, it is important to 
realize that 
€ 
KE−VTS is different from 
€ 
KU .  Indeed, 
€ 
KE−VTS does take into account the increase in 
financial risk – and so the increase in the return required by the shareholders – arising from 
debt financing, and is even bigger than 
€ 
KE , as it supposed that debt tax shields will not flow to 
equityholders and therefore will not decrease somehow the risk associated to debt financing. 
 
Graphically, this decomposition can be represented as follows : 
    Assets     Liabilities         Assets     Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
<=> 
 
 
 
 
VU 
VTS 
 
E 
 
D 
 
 
VU 
VTS 
E - VTS 
 
D 
VTS 
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Therefore, as the market value balanche sheet equality has to be met at any time, this equality 
still holds if we substract from both assets and liabilities sides the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS . This is the subject of the next section ; this will allow to build step-by-step our model to 
derive in fine the appropriate relation for the market value discount rate of the tax shields 
€ 
KTS . 
 
IV.2. MARKET VALUE BALANCE SHEET WITHOUT TAX SHIELDS  
As previously said, we initially elude the tax shield issue and only consider the other market 
value elements and discount rates. When substracting the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS  from 
both assets and liabilites side of the market value balance sheet, the previous graphic can be 
adapted as follows : 
    Assets    Liabilities             Assets    Liabilities 
  
 
 
 
=> 
 
 
Mathematically, if we substract respectively 
€ 
VTS  from both side of (4.3) and 
€ 
KTS
€ 
VTS  from both 
side of (4.4), we get the adjusted equations 
 
€ 
VU = (E −VTS ) + D  (4.5) 
and 
 
€ 
KUVU = KE−VTS (E −VTS ) + KDD , (4.6) 
 
We have then obtained relations that do not explicitly depend anymore on the tax shields 
discount rate 
€ 
KTS . As we assume that 
€ 
KU  is a constant, we can always compute the unlevered 
value of the firm 
€ 
VU  as 
 
€ 
VU =
FCFt
(1+ KU )tt=1
∞
∑  (4.7) 
 
 
 
VU 
VTS 
E - VTS 
 
D 
 
 
VU 
E - VTS 
 
D 
VTS 
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Therefore, we have now to analyze the two other rates from the expression (4.6), which are 
€ 
KE−VTS  and 
€ 
KD . 
 
IV.2.1. THE COST OF LEVERED EQUITY WITHOUT TAX SHIELDS 
The discount rate 
€ 
KE−VTS can be considered as the return shareholders would require if they 
would not benefit from the debt tax shields. From (4.6), we can solve for 
€ 
KE−VTS , which yields 
€ 
KE−VTS =
1
E −VTS
(KUVU −KDD)
⇔KE−VTS =
1
E −VTS
(KU (E + D−VTS ) −KDD)
⇔KE−VTS = KU + (KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
 
 
 
 
(4.8) 
 
Incidentally, substituting this definition (4.8) for 
€ 
KE−VTS  in the alternative definition (4.5) for 
the cost of levered equity, it can be easily cross-checked that this alternative definition is 
effectively equivalent to the general expression (2.10) for the cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE , as 
shows 
 
€ 
KE = KE−VTS
E −VTS
E + KTS
VTS
E
= KU + (KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
E −VTS
E + KTS
VTS
E
= KU
E −VTS
E + (KU −KD )
D
E + KTS
VTS
E
= KU + (KU −KD )
D
E − (KU −KTS )
VTS
E
  
 
We can now consider the accounting flows that are relevant to determine the market value of 
equity. As we have presented in the ECF approach, the annual cash flows that, once 
discounted, yield the market value of equity E are the flows ECFt. Indeed, the « global » 
market value of equity is  
 
€ 
E = ECFt(1+ KEt )tt=1
∞
∑  (4.9) 
 
From the APV method, we also know that the cash flows that are relevant to 
€ 
VTS  are the annual 
tax shields TSt. Therefore, if we consider the market value element 
€ 
(E −VTS ) as a whole, the 
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annual accounting contribution to this element is (ECFt – TSt). Consequently, we may say that 
the difference between this market value of equity  and the market value of the tax shields 
€ 
VTS  is equal to 
 
€ 
E −VTS =
ECFt −TSt
(1+ K(E−VTS )t )tt=1
∞
∑  (4.10) 
 
By definition, this discount rate 
€ 
KE−VTS  is always greater than the actual cost of equity KE, since 
€ 
KE−VTS  does not take into account the tax advantage of debt financing, which lowers the return 
required by the shareholders. Indeed, it is straigthforward to see that the expression (4.8) is 
always superior to the general expression (2.10) for KE, as the present value of the tax shields 
€ 
VTS , even though we do not know the appropriate rate 
€ 
KTS , has some positive value as soon as 
there is debt financing. This remark is important and will be developed later. 
 
If we use again the equality of the assets side and the liabilites side of the market value balance 
sheet of the firm at any time, and in particular the relation (2.2), the expresion (4.8) is also 
equivalent to 
€ 
KE−VTS = KU + (KU −KD )
D
VU −D
 (4.11) 
 
This last expression for 
€ 
KE−VTS is definitely worth noting as it is always right, whatever the 
assumptions about 
€ 
KTS . The only remaining unknown is the cost of debt 
€ 
KD , as we consider 
that the debt interest rate is a function of the leverage of the firm. We analyze in details the 
correct way to endogenize 
€ 
KD  in the next section. 
 
IV.2.2. THE COST OF DEBT 
As we have previously said, valuation models usually do not take into account the fact that the 
cost of debt for a company can vary. However, when the level of debt increases 
proportionnally to the size of the firm, the financial risk of default and hence bankruptcy 
increases. Therefore, the interest rate required by debtholders increases with the leverage ratio. 
In order to consider the sensitivity of 
€ 
KD  to the leverage ratio of the firm, we have to modelize 
€ 
KD  as a function of the level of debt 
€ 
D. In other words, we have to endogenize 
€ 
KD  into the 
model. 
 
! 
E
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The lowest interest rate is the governmental bond’s risk-free rate RF. According to the 
creditworthiness and the level of leverage of the firm, debtholders will add to this risk-free rate 
a debt risk premium, called the credit spread. Consequently, we claim that the only proper way 
to endogenize the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  is the relation  
 
€ 
KD = RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
 (4.12) 
 
This can be interpreted as follows : the (average) cost of debt KD for a company is a function of 
the leverage ratio of the firm D/
€ 
VU , whose initial level is the risk-free rate RF and whose debt 
risk premium is equal to the difference between the business risk faced by the shareholders KU 
and the risk-free rate RF – which is the difference between a risk-free investment and a risky 
investment in a particular sector/business –,  multiplied by the leverage ratio D/
€ 
VU . The factor 
n, that we refer to as the marginal debt risk factor, is discussed later in the section. 
 
When this leverage ratio is small, the cost of debt is close to the risk-free rate RF. As the level 
of debt increases, the cost of debt increases and if the ratio D/
€ 
VU  gets close to one, then the 
cost of debt tend towards the same level as the risk initially faced by the shareholders when 
there is no debt ; actually, as the firm gets close to be only debt financed, debtholders become  
shareholders in a way, facing then the same risk than shareholders do when there is no debt : 
the business risk 
€ 
KU .  
 
This expression for 
€ 
KD  totally integrates the parameters any debtholder takes into account 
when investing, as we now explicitely detail. 
 
Firstly, the initial credithwortiness is represented by 
€ 
KU . As the unlevered cost of capital 
€ 
KU  
represents the business/operating risk of a particular kind of company in a particular sector, the 
higher this rate 
€ 
KU , the higher the premium (
€ 
KU  – RF) and then the higher the cost of debt 
€ 
KD , 
and inversely. 
 
Secondly, the profitability of this particular company compared to other similar companies in 
the same sector is embodied into the unlevered market value of the firm 
€ 
VU . For example, if 
the ROIC of the firm – which is the ratio NOPLAT/
€ 
VBook– is currently (and is expected to stay) 
greater than its minimum unlevered required return 
€ 
KU , then the unlevered market value of the 
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firm 
€ 
VU  is higher than its current book value, which reduces – all other things being equal - the 
ratio D/
€ 
VU  and ultimately decreases the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  for the company ; since debtholders 
face a lower risk of default, they are willing to lend money at a lower interest rate. Inversly, if 
the operating results are (and are expected to stay) low, then the unlevered value of the firm 
€ 
VU  
is low and the cost of debt is high ; the risk for debtholders is high since there might be not 
enough operating results at some point to pay the interest expenses. 
 
Finally, the leverage ratio is repesented by D/
€ 
VU , such that for a fixed ROIC and then a fixed 
€ 
VU , the higher the level of debt, the higher the cost of debt 
€ 
KD . This function for 
€ 
KD  is thus 
perfectly sensitive to both the current business characteristics and the expected future operating 
results of the company, as well as the leverage ratio of the firm. In a way, 
€ 
VU  acts here as the 
element bankers and other borrowers analyze when realizing credit scoring sheets.  
 
We now discuss two more points in further details. 
 
First, one could argue that the relevant leverage ratio to take into account is not D/
€ 
VU  but D/
€ 
V , 
that is D/(
€ 
VU  + 
€ 
VTS ). For example, this is the assumption Wood and Leitch (2004) makes in 
their paper. However, this option is erroneous. Indeed, as we have already stated, the debt tax 
shields flow only and entirely to equityholders ; debtholders do not benefit from this tax 
deductibility. Therefore, the relevant leverage ratio to debtholders is D/
€ 
VU .  
 
This can be proved with a simple example ; we just need to consider the fundamental equality 
of both sides of the market value balance sheet at any time and whatever the level of debt. 
Moreover, we do not need to know KTS to prove this. For the clarity of the explanation, we 
assume a basic perpetuity case21. Assumptions are summarized below. 
 
Market Value B/S         Assumptions 
€ 
KD = RF + (KU − RF )
D
V  ;
€ 
KE−VTS = KU + (KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
; 
€ 
KTS arbitrary  
€ 
E = NIKE
 ; 
€ 
VTS =
TS
KTS
 ; 
€ 
E −VTS =
NI −TS
KE−VTS
 ; 
€ 
VU =
NOPLAT
KU
 ; 
€ 
D = KDDKD
 
                                                
21 But this explanation perfectly holds for any stochastic valuation case. It just makes expressions heavier by 
adding time indices t and sum operators, which does not add anything to our point. 
Assets  Liabilities 
VU 
VTS 
E – VTS 
VTS 
D 
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If we consider a company that switches progressively its equity financing for debt financing 
until reaching the extreme point where D would equal 
€ 
VU , the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  is, according to 
this assumption, equal to 
 
€ 
KD = RF + (KU − RF )
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
< KU  (4.13) 
 
Indeed, because of the tax shields arising from debt financing, 
€ 
VTS  is definitely greater than 
zero, whatever the appropriate discount rate, and therefore adds some value to the unlevered 
market value of the firm 
€ 
VU , such that 
€ 
VU /
€ 
V  is smaller than one and thus 
€ 
KD , whatever the 
marginal debt risk factor n, is smaller than 
€ 
KU . If we refer now to the expression (2.2) from the 
market value balance sheet, we know that when D = 
€ 
VU , or equivalently 
€ 
VU  – D = 0, then the 
expression (
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS ) has also to be equal to zero. Considering first 
€ 
KE−VTS , the denominator 
from the market value (
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS ), we can see from the expression (4.8) that 
€ 
KE−VTS would 
apparently tend to infinity if (
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS ) was effectively equal to zero, since the factor 
€ 
(KU −KD )  is supposedly positive if 
€ 
KD  is smaller than 
€ 
KU . This would then reinforce the 
condition 
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS  = 0.  
 
Therefore, we just have to prove that (
€ 
NI  – 
€ 
TS ), the numerator of the expression (
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS ), is 
equal to zero, or equivalently that 
€ 
NI  = 
€ 
TS . However, this is impossible with this modelization 
for 
€ 
KD . Indeed, if 
€ 
KD< 
€ 
KU  when D = 
€ 
VU , this implies 
 
€ 
KDD = KDVU < KUD = KUVU = NOPLAT  (4.14) 
and the tax shield is 
 
€ 
TS = KDDτ = KDVUτ < KUDτ = KUVUτ  (4.15) 
such that  
 
€ 
NI −TS = (EBIT −KDD)(1− τ) −KDDτ
= (EBIT −KDVU )(1− τ) −KDVUτ
= EBIT(1− τ ) −KDVU (1− τ) −KDVUτ
= EBIT(1− τ ) −KDVU + KDVUτ −KDVUτ
= NOPLAT −KDVU
= KUVU −KDVU
=VU (KU −KD )
> 0
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This proves that, in order to meet the balance sheet equality at any time, 
€ 
KD  has to be equal to 
€ 
KU  when D/
€ 
VU  = 1, since it is the only way to make (
€ 
NI  – 
€ 
TS ) equal to zero and therefore to 
make the market value element (
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS ) equal to zero as well. 
 
It is worth noting that, since D = 
€ 
VU  implies 
€ 
E  = 
€ 
VTS , the market value of equity 
€ 
E  at that 
particular level of debt is just made of tax shields, which is referred to as financial value. All 
the value of the operational assets is owed to debtholders. This is the result of the accounting 
equality NI = TS. Actually, we can develop a little more the accounting flows for that level of 
debt D = 
€ 
VU . The difference between the operating result EBIT and the debt interests 
€ 
KDD  is  
 
€ 
EBIT −KDD = EBIT −KUVU = EBIT − NOPLAT = EBIT − EBIT(1− τ) = EBITτ  (4.16) 
 
This expression
€ 
EBITτ  has some particularities ; indeed,
€ 
EBITτ  is also the amount of taxes the 
company would pay if it had no debt. As tax shields correspond to taxes that are not paid 
because of debt financing, the maximum tax shield that can be realized every year is then also 
equal to 
€ 
EBITτ . Therefore, for any year and for any level of debt, we always have the relation 
 
€ 
EBITτ = I + TS  (4.17) 
 
In other words, the amout 
€ 
EBITτ  is shared between the taxes the company pay and the debt tax 
shield the company realizes. In this particular case D = 
€ 
VU , we may derive from (4.16) the 
value of NI, which is also the value of TS, and is equal to 
 
€ 
NI = TS = EBITτ(1− τ)  (4.18) 
 
Finally, referring to (4.17), the taxes that are paid for that level of debt are also known and are 
equal to 
 
€ 
I = EBITτ −TS = EBITτ − EBITτ(1− τ) = EBITτ 2  (4.19) 
 
If debt interests were not tax deductible, it is straightforward to see that the market value of 
equity
€ 
E  would then be equal to zero since debt interest would still have to be paid before the 
shareholders to get their returns, as shows 
  (4.20) 
 
Therefore, if debt keeps increasing such that 
€ 
VU  < D < 
€ 
V , while the market value of equity 
€ 
E  
is still positive, it is only made of financial tax shields and the market value (
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS ), which 
! 
EBIT(1" # ) "K
D
D = EBIT(1" #) "K
U
V
U
= NOPLAT "K
U
V
U
= 0
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is the value equity would have if debt tax shields were not deductible, is negative. Ultimately, 
if D equals 
€ 
V , the market value of equity 
€ 
E  = (
€ 
E  – 
€ 
VTS ) + 
€ 
VTS  is equal to zero. This case will 
be discussed further in the next section. 
 
Another way to prove that 
€ 
KD  = 
€ 
KU  when D = 
€ 
VU  is to start from the relation (4.6) and to 
isolate 
€ 
KD  instead of 
€ 
KE−VTS , which yields  
 
€ 
KD =
1
D KUVU −KE−VTS (E −VTS )( )
=
1
D KU (E + D−VTS ) −KE−VTS (E −VTS )( )
= KU + (KU −KE−VTS )
E −VTS
D
 
 
 
 
(4.21) 
 
While this expression does not give information about the way 
€ 
KD  has to be modelized, it 
shows that, as 
€ 
KU  – 
€ 
KE−VTS will always be negative as soon as there is debt financing, 
€ 
KD  is 
always smaller than 
€ 
KU  except when 
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS  = 0. Therefore, referring to the relation (2.2), 
€ 
KD  can only be equal to 
€ 
KU  when 
€ 
VU  – D = 0 or equivalently when D = 
€ 
VU . 
 
The relation (4.12) is thus the only proper way to endogenize the cost of debt 
€ 
KD . To conclude 
about the relevancy of this leverage ratio D/
€ 
VU  for 
€ 
KD , consider a last example where the 
ROIC is permanently equal to 
€ 
KU ; the only way to create value then is to use financing policies 
and not operational policies. When there is no debt, the equityholders invest 
€ 
VBook= 
€ 
VU , face a 
risk 
€ 
KU  and get a return just equal to this risk 
€ 
KU . If the debtholders now invest 
€ 
VBook= 
€ 
VU  in 
this firm, they will quite logically face the same risk 
€ 
KU  and thus get the same return. Indeed, 
debtholders certainly do not lower their required return – the interest rate 
€ 
KD  – because their 
loans will allow the firm to get tax shields which will consequently increase the value of the 
firm. This does not make sense. Debtholders only consider the operational value of the firm 
when investing money, which is the value of its assets before the debt to be issued and 
therefore before tax shields ; this is represented by 
€ 
VU .  
 
Reversing this consideration, if two firms, acting in the same sector and running similar 
businesses – which means they both have the same unlevered cost of capital 
€ 
KU  – have the 
same amount of debt D but pay significantly different interest rates for their respective debt, 
this is unlikely to be a coincidence ; rather, this is because the two firms are definitely not 
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valued the same by the respective debtholders, which means their respective operating 
performances are different. Debtholders, while they cannot claim as high returns as 
shareholders, are still investors aware about the basic trade-off risk/return ; a low cost of debt 
for a company means that there are many debtholders willing to lend money to this firm 
because its performance are good and therefore its risk to default is low, such that the required 
interest rate goes down. 
 
The second point which needs some further explanations is about the value to be given to the 
parameter n, which we have referred to as the marginal debt risk factor. This marginal debt risk 
factor n should not be confused with the marginal cost of debt, which is 
 
€ 
KD '=
dKD
dD  (4.22) 
 
This marginal cost of debt measures the marginal increase of the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  for a 
marginal increase of the level of debt D. The compulsory condition about an endogenous 
modelization of 
€ 
KD  is that its formula has to be a strictly non concave increasing function of 
D, which can be stated as 
 
€ 
KD '=
dKD
dD > 0 and KD ' '=
d2KD
dD2 ≥ 0  (4.23) 
 
These conditions are met for any marginal debt risk factor n ≥ 1. Consequently, we discuss 
three forms for n. The basic linear form n = 1 assumes the cost of debt to linearly increase with 
the leverage ratio. In this setup, the marginal cost of debt is equal to  
 
€ 
KD '=
d
dD RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ =
KU − RF
VU
 (4.24) 
 
This simple form offers several advantages ; in particular, it allows some algebraic 
simplifications that are convenient, as we will see later. However, the main disadvantage of 
this case is that the marginal cost of debt does not depend on the leverage (
€ 
KD ' '  = 0). 
Therefore, while this variable cost of debt is a definitely more realistic assumption than a fixed 
cost of debt whatever the leverage of the firm, this form is still unlikely to perfectly fit real 
world cases.  
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The forms for n > 1, integer and constant are the first improvements, with n = 2 as the standard 
assumption22. They allow the marginal cost of debt  to be strictly increasing with leverage and 
so the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  to be a convex function, as shows 
 
€ 
KD '=
d
dD RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ =
n(KU − RF )Dn−1
VUn
 (4.25) 
 
Considering the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  as a convex function of the leverage is most likely to be the 
case in real world, since every additional unit of debt is then riskier than the previous one. 
However, when n = 2, the marginal cost of debt, yet increasing, does only increase linearly. 
And if we use greater integers, we quickly encounter another problem : indeed, the function 
yields then very low cost of debt for « normal » leverage policy (
€ 
KD  ≈ RF), and suddenly 
surges when approaching D/
€ 
VU  = 1, which does not fit reality either. This is because the ratio 
D/
€ 
VU  is supposed to vary between zero and one, such that any too high power will make the 
leverage parameter stay close to zero as long as the leverage ratio is not very high. 
Consequently, an obvious drawback of n constant is that we have to consider relatively low 
values for n even though the marginal debt risk factor will certainly be high for highly 
leveraged companies. Anyway, any form with n > 1 and preferently n ≤ 3 are certainly likely to 
fit more precisely real cases than the linear form. 
 
As we will show in the next section, all these forms with n integer and constant also allow to 
algebraically solve for a theoretical optimal debt level, which is the level of debt such that the 
firm is all debt financed and where the net income is just equal to zero, such that the company 
does not pay any tax ; in other words, this is similar to maximizing the market value of tax 
shields 
€ 
VTS . 
 
On top of these constant forms, we also present forms where the marginal debt risk factor itself 
is a function of the leverage ratio, which can be written as 
 
€ 
n = n(D) =1+ f DVU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  (4.26) 
 
These cases are the most elaborated and do not allow for an algebraic optimal debt level 
solution, as they become transcendental functions.  
                                                
22 This is notably the assumption of Wood and Leitch (2004). 
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However, it is generally possible to calculate their first derivative, which yields a marginal cost 
of debt of 
 
€ 
KD '=
d
dD RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n(D )⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ = (KU − RF )
n(D)
D + Log
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ n'(D)
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n(D )
 (4.27) 
 
This marginal cost of debt, on top of being strictly increasing with the level of debt D, has also 
a convex shape as it increases exponentially with the leverage. This evolution of the marginal 
cost of debt probably best fits real world cases, allowing consequently the (average) cost of 
debt 
€ 
KD  to vary in a way that is probably the closest to reality.  
 
At the end of the paper, we will illustrate the whole model with three different examples ; for 
each example, we will take a different assumption for the marginal debt risk factor n, in order 
to illustrate the three forms we have discussed ; we can summarize these three forms as the 
linear form, the non linear constant form and the non linear non constant form. 
 
We conclude this section by mentioning that such an attempt of modelizing an endogenous cost 
of debt has already been done in some papers (for examples, Wood and Leitch 2004 or Velez-
Pareja and Tham 2005). However, they usually fail to point out the necessary adjustement for 
the relevant leverage ratio to debtholders (D/
€ 
VU  instead of D/
€ 
V ) and barely analyze cases for n 
= 1 and n = 2 ; by differentiating three kind of forms for n – and in particular the form where n 
itself is a function of the leverage ratio, which makes the cost of debt a transcendental equation 
– and analyzing in details their different consequences, our presentation encompasses these 
papers. Moreover, they do not integrate this endogeneous cost of debt within a dynamic and 
perfectly general approach, as they make some restrictive assumptions ; for example, and like 
most papers, they consider the tax shields discount rate to be constant.  
 
Particular efforts have been made here to explore the different forms of the cost of debt 
function since all the other rates, as we will see later, depend somehow on this cost of debt. 
This extra attention may also be attributed to the fact that the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  is the only 
market value discount rate that requires in our setup two constant parameters, which are the 
risk-free rate RF and the cost of unlevered equity 
€ 
KU . Extra developments have been thus 
considered in order to modelize the cost of debt as a function which is as close as possible from 
real corporate interest rate. 
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IV.2.3. SOLVING FOR THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF DEBT IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE FIRM 
VALUE 
Still without knowing the appropriate discount rate for tax shields, we can determine the 
optimal level of debt D* which maximizes the present value of the firm 
€ 
V . This is possible 
because of the permanent equality between the assets side and the liabilities side of the market 
value balance sheet of the company. Indeed, this optimal level of debt D* is also the level of 
debt which maximizes the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS , whatever the appropriate discount 
rate is. This level is obtained when the net income is just equal to zero, such that the company 
does not pay any tax and all the profits are kept for reinvestement in the firm or paid as returns 
to investors ; actually, debtholders become the unique investors since their returns (the debt 
interests) are tax deductible – therefore allowing some financing value creation –, while 
shareholders dividends are not.  
 
Obviously, such a 100% debt financing policy is purely theoretical, and this for at least three 
reasons that we discuss now. 
 
- (a) First, because being entirely debt financed is surely against any business regulation.  
Corporate legislations make sure this cannot happen by requiring minimum level of equity 
financing in order to precisely avoid total tax avoidance but also prevent financially engineered 
or avoidable bankrupts.  
 
- (b) Second, because it assumes that the company will never default, while this is likely to 
happen if, for any reason, the operational result (EBIT) would not cover anymore the interest 
expenses that are exactly « designed » to equal the whole EBIT. Moreover, even if real 
bankruptcy would ultimately not happen, an excessive leverage will cause at some point what 
is usually referred to as financial distress costs, which are all the direct (for example, lawyers 
and other consultants fees during liquidation process) but also prior and indirect (for example, 
loss of clients or difficulties in obtaining loans due to the deterioration of the firm reputation 
when financial difficulties arise) costs related to cash shortages. Indeed, these real or 
opportunity costs are likely to occur when interest expenses become overwhelming, such that 
the cash position of the firm is extremly tight and does not allow for any surplus to face 
unpredicted events.  
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However, there is no valuation model that can formally integrates these financial distress costs 
since they depend on numerous parameters that cannot be considered on a general basis as they 
are mostly firm-specific or at least sector-specific. For example, Booth (2007) proposes an 
elegant paper over this problem and introduces some parameters which are supposed to catch 
these financial distress costs in order to offset at some point the tax advantage of debt 
financing. However, this is from little help in practice, as these parameters cannot be precisely 
quantified. There is no universal guideline to determine them.  
 
While this problem is definitely not to be ignored, this is a well-known issue inherent to any 
corporate finance theories. Whereas all authors are aware of these financial distress costs 
arising from (excessive) debt financing and agree to consider that they should be taken into 
account, it is not possible to explicitly modelize them ; our model cannot come over this issue 
either. Anyway, assessing the value and the importance of these financial distress costs goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
- (c) Third, because in numerous cases (depending on the values of ROIC and 
€ 
KU , but always 
when ROIC ≥ 
€ 
KU ), the optimal level of debt that maximizes the value of the firm would 
require the firm to issue more debt than its current book value, which would suppose that  
- a. first the company can issue new shares in no time, and  
- b. then readily swap them for additional debt until reaching the theoretical maximizing 
level of debt. 
 
Because of all these reasons, actually achieving this optimal level of debt is in real world cases 
more than unlikely to occur ; however, this maximization process is still interesting from a 
theoretical point of view, and it will also show – when going through examples - that debt 
financing certainly cannot account for huge and undefinite (financial) value creation, as some 
models have probably overvalued because of not modeling the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  as a function of 
the level of debt D. Actually, it is rather the opposite that will be shown, with comparatively 
small benefits to additional debt financing from a certain level of leverage,  compared to 
operating value creation (ROIC greater than 
€ 
KU ). Indeed, whatever the value assumed for the 
marginal debt risk factor n, but certainly when we fix n ≥ 2, the level of debt to be taken to get 
some sensible financing value creation is in most cases really high and probably not always 
worth doing compared to the huge financial risk it might involve. This will be illustrated later 
with examples.  
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Nevertheless, we now solve for this theoretical optimal level of debt D* ; as explained before, 
this may be done without having to know about the appropriate discount rate for the tax shields 
because of the equality between the assets and the liablitities sides of the market value balance 
sheet at any time. The value of the firm is maximized when both operational and financial 
profits are totally kept inside the company, which means that the company does not pay any 
tax. As debt interests are tax deductible while dividends not, the firm should optimally be only 
debt financed ; maximizing the value of the firm is then equivalent to maximizing the value of 
its debt.  
 
Therefore, we have to determine the level of debt D* such that its interests expenses are 
exactly equal to the operational result EBIT, in order to have an earnings before taxes EBT 
equal to zero. In mathematical terms, this can be stated as 
 
€ 
Vmax = D* =VU +VTSmax ⇔ E = E −VTSmax +VTSmax = 0⇔
D*
Vmax
=1 (4.28) 
 
To solve for the optimal level of debt D* – assuming EBIT positive –, we have to fix 
  (4.29) 
 
By substituting the relation (4.12) for the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  into the relation (4.29), the optimal 
level of debt has to satisfy the polynomial equation 
 
€ 
RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ D = EBIT
⇔Dn+1 (KU − RF )VUn
+ DRF − EBIT = 0
 
 
 
(4.30) 
 
The roots for D of this polynomial equation give the optimum level of debt D*, which is also 
the maximum firm value 
€ 
Vmax . Assuming EBIT positive, this equation is the unique condition 
to theoretically maximize the value of the firm 
€ 
V , whatever the value of n – which could be 
integer or not, and constant or not – and whatever the appropriate discount rate for tax shields 
€ 
KTS . 
 
When the marginal debt risk factor n is not a function of D and is a constant integer superior or 
equal to one, this equation can be alegebraically solved with root finding algorithm. Please 
note that, the higher n, the lower the advantage of debt financing and so the lower the 
! 
K
D
D = EBIT" EBIT #K
D
D = 0
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maximum firm value ; for n tending to infinity, when D = 
€ 
V , the maximal firm value is then 
€ 
V  
= 
€ 
Vmax  = 
€ 
VU . However, as previously mentioned, the marginal debt risk factor n shoud not be 
greater than 3 if assumed constant, since too high value for n would make the cost of debt to 
stay considerably too low for « normal » leverage ratios.  
 
It should also be mentioned that, while any polynom of degree n has n roots – as states the 
fundamental algebra theorem –, only one in this context makes sense from an economic point 
of view – actually, others roots will be either negative, either complex numbers. To illustrate 
the relation (4.30), we now give the theoretical solution for the optimal level of debt D* for the 
cases n = 1 and n = 2. 
 
For the linear case n = 1, (4.30) reduces to a quadratic equation whose discrimant is 
 
€ 
Δ = RF 2 +
4EBIT(KU − RF )
VU
> 0  (4.31) 
and whose two real roots are 
 
€ 
D1 =
−RF + RF 2 +
4EBIT(KU − RF )
VU
2(KU − RF )
VU
 
€ 
D2 =
−RF − RF 2 +
4EBIT(KU − RF )
VU
2(KU − RF )
VU
< 0 
(4.32) 
 
As D2 is negative, the unique optimal debt level D* is given by D1. For n = 2, it can be shown 
that the unique – since the two other roots are complex – optimal debt level D* = D1 is given 
by 
 
€ 
D1 =
21/ 3RFVU 2
z +
1
3
z
(RF −KU )21/ 3
, 
€ 
with z =
27EBIT VU 2 2KURF −KU 2 − RF 2( )
+ 108RF 3 KU − RF( )3VU 6 + 27EBIT VU 2 2KURF −KU 2 − RF 2( )( )
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
1/ 3
 
(4.33) 
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Once this optimal level of debt D* obtained, we can also derive the leverage ratio D*/
€ 
VU , the 
cost of debt 
€ 
KD* and the cost of levered equity without tax shields 
€ 
KE−VTS *  for this maximum 
level of debt D = D* = 
€ 
Vmax .  
 
Since we can always get 
€ 
VU  from the relation (4.7), the leverage ratio D*/
€ 
VU  is immediately 
known as soon as you have the optimal level of debt D*. For example, in the linear case n =1, 
it is straigthforward from the relation (4.32) to derive the leverage ratio D*/
€ 
VU  as 
 
€ 
D*
VU
=
−RF + RF 2 + 4(KU − RF )
EBIT
VU
2(KU − RF )
 
(4.34) 
 
Once you have derived this relevant leverage ratio to debtholders, you can insert it into the 
formula (4.12) to obtain the cost of debt 
€ 
KD* since the other parameters (RF and 
€ 
KU ) are 
assumed constant. Referring to the maximizing condition (4.28), this leverage ratio is always 
greater than one since D, 
€ 
VTS  and 
€ 
V = 
€ 
VU  + 
€ 
VTS  are maximized such that D = D* = 
€ 
Vmax> 
€ 
VU . 
Therefore, the cost of debt 
€ 
KD*will always be greater than 
€ 
KU  in this maximization case. 
Equivalently, once you know D*, the other way to get 
€ 
KD* is simply to use the inverse of the 
relation (4.29), which is 
 
€ 
KD* =
EBIT
D*  (4.35) 
 
Finally, once we know 
€ 
KD*, it is straigthforward to get 
€ 
KE−VTS *  ; the expression (4.11) can 
simply be rewritten as 
€ 
KE−VTS = KU + (KU −KD*)
D*
VU −D*
 (4.36) 
 
Incidentally, it is also worth noting from this expression (4.36) that, since we know now that 
€ 
KD  = 
€ 
KU  when 
€ 
D = 
€ 
VU , both expressions (
€ 
KU  – 
€ 
KD ) and (
€ 
D – 
€ 
VU ) change of sign exactly at 
the same time, which makes sure 
€ 
KE−VTS is a strictly increasing function of D
23. This has been 
secured thanks to the proper modelization of 
€ 
KD  in the previous section. 
 
                                                
23 See the section IV.4. for rigourous mathematical developments. 
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Concerning now transcendental functions for the cost of debt 
€ 
KD , which happens when n itself 
is a function of the leverage ratio, there is typically no algebraic way to solve it, but numerical 
research algorithms usually allow to approximate a real positive solution which satisfies 
 
€ 
RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n(D )⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ D = EBIT
⇔Dn(D )+1 (KU − RF )VUn(D )
+ DRF − EBIT = 0
 (4.37) 
Once this approximated root found, you can also derive 
€ 
KD* and 
€ 
KE−VTS * . 
 
We can conclude that, thanks to the market value balance sheet equality that has to be met at 
any time, we have been able to derive the theoretical maximum market value of both the firm 
€ 
V  and the debt D, without considering which rate is appropriate to discount the tax shields ; 
these values only depend on the assumption about the marginal debt risk factor n.  
 
We will later refer to the developments of this case D/
€ 
V  = 1 as the theoretical full 
maximization. By comparison, the case D/
€ 
VU  = 1 that has been discussed in the previous 
section can also be regarded as a (weaker) maximization ; we will refer to it as the theoretical 
simple maximization. 
 
We are almost done with building the first part of our model ; in the next section, we will 
tackle the issue of the tax shields discount rate 
€ 
KTS . However, we first conclude this section 
about the optimal level of debt by considering a refinement for the debt valuation.  
 
One could wonder what would happen if the level of outstanding debt – that is the debt book 
value – would keep increasing beyond the market value of the firm 
€ 
V . Indeed, we have 
considered so far that the market value of the debt is always equal to its book value. However, 
if 
€ 
DBook > V , this is not possible anymore. We consider a simple example here ; again, a 
perpetuity case allows to understand directly the point, but it is true for any other case where 
the debt book value would stay year after year superior to the firm market value. 
 
If the book value of debt is – even slightly – greater than 
€ 
V , then the appropriate cost of debt is 
also greater than 
€ 
KD*, which is, as we have just explained, the cost of the debt when  D  = 
€ 
V . 
In other words, the debtholders, facing a greater risk, requires a greater interest rate. 
Consequently, the interest expenses, which are the product of both the rate and the oustanding 
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debt, are also greater than the operating result EBIT. If this is assumed to last indefinitely, it is 
obvious that theses infinite accounting losses decrease the market value of the firm ; by 
recording only losses year after year, the firm destroys (rather than creates) value. 
 
Therefore, if the debt book value keeps increasing beyond the market value of the firm, the 
market value of the debt D decreases exactly the same way the market value of the firm 
€ 
V  
does ; in other words, while the ratio D/
€ 
V  = 1 is maintained – as debtholders are still the 
unique investors – any additional increase in the book value of the debt results in value 
destruction instead of financing value creation as there is not enough operating profit to cover 
the interest expenses. Assuming a perpetuity, debtholders would then never be able to fully get 
their initial investment back, as part of its value is destroyed every year. Without any restrictive 
assumption now, we mathematically state the previous explanation as 
€ 
Dt = MIN
DCFn
(1+ KDn )n= t+1
∞
∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ ,Vt
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  (4.38) 
 
This means that the market value of the debt Dt at any year t is equal to the minimum between 
the sum till infinity of all future Debt Cash Flows (DCFt) to come, discounted at their 
appropriate discount rate 
€ 
KDt which varies if the level of debt vary from year to year, and the 
market value of the total firm Vt that year t. 
 
As we consider that the returns debtholders get through interest expenses always exactly 
compensate for the risk associated with the level of debt outstanding year after year – that is, 
debt interest rate increases if, all other things being equal, the leverage ratio increases, and 
inversely – and since debtholders benefit from no other return than these interest expenses – 
debts are assumed to be not traded on financial bond markets –, the expression (4.38) may then 
also be rewritten as  
€ 
Dt = MIN DBookt ,Vt( ) (4.39) 
 
This last expression ends up the current section about the optimal market value of debt. We 
have now set up solid foundations for our model. First, using the fundamental equality of the 
market value balance sheet, we have decompounded the equity market value 
€ 
E  into two 
elements, the equity market value minus the present value of tax shields (
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS ) on the one 
hand, and the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS  on the other hand. Second, we have derived an 
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expression for the rate 
€ 
KE−VTS , which is the appropriate rate to discount the accounting 
aggregated flows (
€ 
NI  - 
€ 
TS ) in order to get the market value difference (
€ 
E  - 
€ 
VTS ). Third, we 
have extensively discussed the modelization of the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  in order to properly 
endogenize it into the model, and in particular with respects to the market value balance sheet 
equality ; the resulting equation is perfectly sensible with underlying economics, and allows to 
differentiate several cases for the marginal debt risk factor n. Finally, we have shown that we 
can determine the optimal level of debt D* which maximizes both the market value of the firm 
€ 
V  and therefore the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS , even without knowing the appropriate tax 
shield discount rate 
€ 
KTS . The next section is fully devoted to the tax shields issue ; first, we 
derive the correct expression for the tax shields discount rate 
€ 
KTS  ; second, we refine the 
accounting modelization of the tax shields flows. These results will allow to develop the 
general expression of the market value discount rate for the levered equity 
€ 
KE . 
 
IV.3. THE TAX SHIELDS DISCOUNT RATE 
IV.3.1. UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUE 
We argue that, instead of being constant as the other models assume – that is, equal to the cost 
of debt 
€ 
KD  or the unlevered cost of capital 
€ 
KU  –, the appropriate discount rate for tax shields 
€ 
KTS  fluctuate over time. Indeed, the risk associated to the tax shields – which is the risk for the 
company to benefit from the tax deductibility of the debt interest expenses – depends every 
year on three parameters :  
 
- (a) The level of the operating result EBIT 
All other things being equal, the bigger the EBIT, the less risky to get the tax shield, and 
inversely. Indeed, if the operating result is overwhelming compared to the debt interest 
expenses, the tax shield is almost riskless. 
 
- (b) The level of the outstanding debt D 
All other things being equal, the higher the level of debt D, the higher the potential tax shield, 
but also the more risky to get – completely or partially – this tax shield, and inversely. Indeed, 
as the debt interest expenses increase with the level of debt, the operating result EBIT may not 
be large enough to – completely or partially – cover the whole interest expenses. 
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Combining the considerations (a) and (b), we can already presume that they may be reflected 
in a market value leverage ratio, as we have extensively develop for the cost of debt 
€ 
KD . 
 
- (c) The level of the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  
All other things being equal and similarly to the level of debt, the higher the cost of debt 
€ 
KD , 
the higher the potential tax shield, but also the more risky to get – completely or partially – this 
tax shield, and inversely. Indeed, for two companies with the same leverage ratio but whose 
business activities are supposed to not have the same risk – they do not have the same 
unlevered cost of capital 
€ 
KU  –, then the risk premium required by debtholders – the difference 
(
€ 
KU  – RF) – will be higher, and consequently the cost of debt 
€ 
KD . In any case, as the cost of 
debt 
€ 
KD  is a function of the leverage ratio D/
€ 
VU , the higher this leverage, the higher the cost of 
debt and therefore (doubly) the higher the interest expenses – as they are the product of the 
level of debt and the cost of debt –, which is consistent with the consideration (b). 
 
Every year, the riskiness of the tax shield depends then simultanesously on these 3 parameters. 
This is best illustrated and totally consistent with the modelization of the Return on Equity 
(ROE) presented in relations (2.29), (2.30) and (2.31). 
 
Even if the possible unrealized tax shield is still realized at some future time – as soon as the 
firm makes profits again – the benefit of this tax shield occurs in a further future than the 
concerned year, and the exponent of the discount factor has to be higher. Indeed, consistently 
with discounted cash flows valuation model and the concept of time value of money, the 
further in time the cash flow is assumed to occur, the less the present value of this cash flow. 
Therefore, a refinement for the modelization of the tax shield flow is presented later in the 
section. 
 
Considering our previous developments, we have all the elements to tackle the issue about the 
appropriate tax shield discount rate and to derive a general expression for 
€ 
KTS  which is fully 
consistent with the permanent equality between the assets side and the liabilities side of the 
market value balance sheet. However, we first show that the two commonly used assumptions 
about the tax shield discount rate 
€ 
KTS  – this rate is constant and either equal to the unlevered 
cost of equity 
€ 
KU  or equal to the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  – are both erroneous, as soon as you consider 
than the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  is a function of the leverage ratio of the firm. 
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In order to show this, we simply refer to the general formula (2.10) of the market value 
discount rate for levered equity 
€ 
KE , which is 
 
€ 
KE = KU + (KU −KD )
D
E − (KU −KTS )
VTS
E   
 
Tax shields are additional flows for equityholders when the firm uses debt. Consequently, the 
levered cost of equity 
€ 
KE  has to take into account the tax shields benefits. Nevertheless, tax 
shields just lower somehow the risk faced by shareholders, but by no means totally compensate 
for the increase in risk they face when financial leverage increases. By definition, the present 
value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS  represents only a « side effect » of debt financing, such that D  > 
€ 
VTS  at 
any time, as stated by the fundamental condition (2.4). Therefore, the discount rate 
€ 
KE  has to 
be a strictly increasing function of the level of debt D. 
 
If we assume 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KD  without fixing the level of debt D, we have the previously presented 
relation (3.5) for 
€ 
KE , which is  
 
€ 
KE = KU + (KU −KD )
D
E − (KU −KTS )
VTS
E = KU + (KU −KD )
D−VTS
E   
 
Initially, this expression is effectively growing with the leverage level. However, as D keeps 
increasing, even though (D – 
€ 
VTS )/E  is strictly increasing, the decrease of the factor (
€ 
KU  – 
€ 
KD
) – since the cost of debt also increases with the leverage – would at some point totally 
compensates for the increase of the first named factor. Beyond this trade-off point for the level 
of debt, the levered cost of equity 
€ 
KE  would start decreasing, and considering the relation 
(4.12) that we have presented for 
€ 
KD , we know that as the level of debt D tends towards 
€ 
VU , 
the factor (
€ 
KU  – 
€ 
KD ) tends to zero, such that finally 
€ 
KE  would collapse to 
€ 
KU . It would even 
decrease below if the level of debt keeps increasing, and ultimately tend to zero when D/
€ 
V  
tend to 1, as (
€ 
KU  – 
€ 
KD ) would be negative and (D – 
€ 
VTS )/E would be huge. Therefore, this 
assumption can be clearly discarded. 
 
Similarly, if we assume 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU  without fixing the level of debt D, we have the previously 
presented relation (3.16) for 
€ 
KE , which is  
 
€ 
KE = KU + (KU −KD )
D
E − (KU −KTS )
VTS
E = KU + (KU −KD )
D
E   
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Again, this expression is initially growing with the leverage, but exactly like the previous case, 
the decrease of the factor (
€ 
KU  – 
€ 
KD ) would ultimately make 
€ 
KE  collapse to 
€ 
KU  when D = 
€ 
VU , 
and even tend to zero when D/
€ 
V  tend to 1. This is assumption does not hold either. 
 
We could also consider that 
€ 
KTS  is equal to the rate 
€ 
KE−VTS that we have previously introduced. 
To prove that this is not possible either, we have to remember that, even though 
€ 
KE  and 
€ 
KE−VTS  
have some similarities since they measure both business and financial risks faced by 
shareholders – and therefore have both to be strictly increasing functions of the level of debt –, 
€ 
KE  takes into account the tax shields which flow to equityholders while 
€ 
KE−VTS does not, such 
that 
€ 
KE−VTS has to be greater than 
€ 
KE  at any time and whatever the level of debt D.  
 
From relation (4.4), if we assume 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KE−VTS , then we have 
 
€ 
KE−VTS (E −VTS ) + KDD+ KTSVTS = KUVU + KTSVTS
⇔KE−VTS (E −VTS ) + KDD+ KE−VTSVTS = KUVU + KE−VTSVTS
⇔KE−VTS (E −VTS ) + KDD = KUVU
⇔KE−VTS = KTS = KU + (KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
  
 
As debt interests are tax deductible and do provide some extra cash flows to shareholders, 
€ 
KE  
has to be smaller than this expression. We can refer to our alternative definition for 
€ 
KE  
presented in relation (4.5), which is 
 
€ 
KE = KE−VTS
E −VTS
E + KTS
VTS
E   
 
It is then straigthforward to see that this assumption is impossible since we would have 
€ 
KE  = 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KE−VTS , which would mean that debt interests’ deduction represents no benefits. 
Therefore, we can also discard the assumption where 
€ 
KTS  would equal 
€ 
KE−VTS and may conclude 
that the risk of the tax shields 
€ 
KTS  must have its own relevant expression. 
 
It is worth realizing that we have been able so far to make numerous developments, notably 
solving for the theoretical optimal level of debt, without having to know about the appropriate 
tax shield discount rate, thanks to the any time fundamental equality between the assets side 
and the liabilities side of the market value balance sheet. Therefore, it should be noted that 
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finding the appropriate tax shieds discount rate 
€ 
KTS  is essentially a valuation issue, as the 
market value leverage ratio D/
€ 
V  of the firm lies between zero, in which case 
€ 
V  = 
€ 
VU , and one, 
in which case 
€ 
V  = D*. 
 
The main matter about this discount rate 
€ 
KTS  is to properly determinate the extra value debt tax 
shields are supposed to add to the market value of the unlevered firm 
€ 
VU . Indeed, as we have 
notably seen when comparing MM and HP results, the same company gets a quite different 
value depending on the discount rate to use for the tax shields – respectively, 
€ 
KD  according 
MM assumption and 
€ 
KU  according HP assumption. It is then important to use the proper 
discount rate, in order to not overvalue – neither undervalue, but it is usually the opposite – the 
extra financial value 
€ 
VTS  to add to the company, and therefore the value of the whole firm 
€ 
V . 
Typically, this financial value has not to be overvalued compared to the operational value 
€ 
VU  
of the firm. 
 
The importance of precisely valuing this tax shield discount rate 
€ 
KTS  can be highlighted by 
referring to the relation (4.4), which is 
   
 
Focusing on the right hand side of the arrow, this perfectly general equation shows that, 
without regards to some constraints – for example, the previously discussed condition that the 
cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE  has to be a strictly increasing function of the level of debt D –, any 
value for 
€ 
KTS  would still satisfy the equality between the left hand side and the right hand side 
of the equation – since 
€ 
KTS  appears on both sides – and therefore also satisfy the fundamental 
equality between both sides of the market value balance sheet. Particular caution has then to 
been observed for this tax shields discount rate, since potential wrong values for 
€ 
KTS  cannot be 
apparently identified when referring to this relation from the market value balance sheet of the 
firm. 
 
However, we now show that there is only one correct value for the tax shields discount rate. As 
discussed in the introduction of the section, the riskiness of the tax shield varies depending on 
both the leverage ratio of the firm and its operational profitability. Moreover, as we have 
pointed out in the introduction of the model, since tax shields come from debt but flow to 
equity, it intuitively makes sense that 
€ 
KTS  has an intermediate value between 
€ 
KD  and 
€ 
KE . In 
! 
K
U
V
U
+ K
TS
V
TS
= K
E
E + K
D
D"K
U
V
U
+ K
TS
V
TS
= K
E#V
TS
(E #V
TS
) + K
TS
V
TS
+ K
D
D
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the next section, we mathematically derive the right expression for the market value discount 
rate for the tax shields 
€ 
KTS . This expression is perfectly consistent with all the previous 
considerations. 
 
IV.3.2. DERIVING A GENERAL EXPRESSION FOR THE TAX SHIELD DISCOUNT RATE 
If we refer to any study related to the tax shield discount rate 
€ 
KTS , the minimum rate that has 
ever been considered for the tax shields is the cost of debt 
€ 
KD . As tax shields come from debt, 
it is indeed impossible that their risks are lower than the risk of the debt itself. Consistently, 
since both tax shields and interest expenses increase with the level of debt – and so their 
respective risk –, we may state in total generality that the initial minimum risk for tax shields 
€ 
KTS  is equal to the initial minimum cost of debt 
€ 
KD  when the level of debt is “minimum” – 
that is, when there is no debt (D = 0), such that we have 
€ 
KD = KTS = RF .  
 
Indeed, Rao and Stevens (2007) notably show that, as soon as the firm has any debt which is 
not risk-free – that is, there is some credit spread over the risk free rate RF for the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  –, the risk of the tax shields is always greater than 
€ 
KD . They also state – and we 
demonstrate it – that 
€ 
KTS  might be greater than 
€ 
KU , an option than has been barely discussed in 
the literature, since it is usually considered that, even if 
€ 
KTS  would vary, its value would lie 
between 
€ 
KD  and 
€ 
KU . 
 
The upcoming demonstration is mainly based on the relation between 
- (a) the actual cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE , and 
- (b) the rate 
€ 
KE−VTS , which has been previously derived and which represents the return share- 
holders would require if they would not benefit from the debt tax shields. 
 
As explained many times, this rate 
€ 
KE−VTS  has always to be greater than the actual cost of 
levered equity 
€ 
KE . Referring to their respective definition, which are respectively relations 
(4.8) and (2.10), we know that, for any period t and for any level of debt D > 0, we have 
 
€ 
KU + KU −KD( )
D
E −VTS
> KU + KU −KD( )
D
E − KU −KTS( )
VTS
E  (4.40) 
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Therefore, the discount rate 
€ 
KTS  has to be defined such that this inequality is always satisfied. 
From (4.40) and assuming 
€ 
E  > 0 and 
€ 
VTS  > 0, we can isolate 
€ 
KTS , which yields 
 
€ 
KU + (KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
> KU + (KU −KD )
D
E − (KU −KTS )
VTS
E
⇔KTS <
E
VTS
KU + (KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
−KU − (KU −KD )
D
E + KU
VTS
E
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
 
 
 
(4.41) 
 
Please note that the requirements 
€ 
E  > 0 and 
€ 
VTS  > 0 in order to be able to isolate 
€ 
KTS  in the 
last expression may equivalently be stated as 0 < D < 
€ 
V . Indeed, 
€ 
E  = 0 when D = 
€ 
V  = D* and 
€ 
VTS  = 0 when D = 0. Therefore, it is worth nothing that these requirements are precisely 
equivalent to the levels of debt for which we need to know 
€ 
KTS  in order to get the firm value  
€ 
V . Let the right hand side from the inequality (4.41) be referred to as the parameter α. We can 
develop this expression, which yields 
 
€ 
α =
E
VTS
KU + (KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
−KU − (KU −KD )
D
E + KU
VTS
E
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
=
E
VTS
(KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
− (KU −KD )
D
E + KU
VTS
E
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
=
E
VTS
(KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
−
D
E
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ + KU
VTS
E
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
= KU +
E
VTS
(KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
−
D
E
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
= KU +
E
VTS
(KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
1− (E −VTS )E
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
= KU +
E
VTS
(KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
E − E +VTS
E
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
= KU + (KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ = KE−VTS
  
 
This important result allows to conclude that there is a sound relation between 
€ 
KTS  and 
€ 
KE−VTS .  
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Replacing α by 
€ 
KE−VTS  in (4.41), we can say that, when 
€ 
E  > 0, we have 
€ 
KTS  < 
€ 
KE−VTS . 
Consequently, if we assume E < 024 instead of E > 0, then the sign of the inequality (4.41) 
changes, and therefore 
€ 
KTS  > 
€ 
KE−VTS . Finally, since 
€ 
KE−VTS  is defined in E = 0 and since the risk 
for the tax shields 
€ 
KTS  is necessarily, as any other market value discount rate, a continuous 
function25, we may say that when E = 0, then 
€ 
KTS  is equal to 
€ 
KE−VTS . Therefore, in order to 
always meet the condition 
€ 
KE−VTS  > 
€ 
KE , we summarize these results and state that the risk of 
the tax shields 
€ 
KTS  has to satisfy 
 
€ 
if E > 0, KTS < KE−VTS
if E = 0, KTS = KE−VTS
if E < 0, KTS > KE−VTS
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
  
 
Referring to the section about the optimal level of debt D*, and assuming EBIT > 0 every year, 
we know that the market value of equity is equal to zero (E = 0) when the company – 
theoretically – maintains an optimal level of debt D* every year, such that the ratio D/
€ 
V  is 
constantly equal to one. Since maximizing the level of debt maximizes the firm value 
€ 
V , it also 
maximizes the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS , as we have extensively developed when 
solving for the optimal level of debt D*. In terms of accounting flows, this is equivalent to say 
that, every year, we have NI = NI – TS + TS = 0. As we specifically now consider the tax 
shields issue, we actually know the accounting tax shield flow when the level of debt is D*. 
Indeed, since the debt interests are equal to the operating result EBIT, as states (4.29), or 
equivalently since the company does not pay taxes, then the relation (4.17) may be adaptated to 
this particular case, which gives a maximum value for the tax shield flow of  
 
€ 
TS* = KD*D*τ = EBITτ  (4.42) 
 
Therefore, as NI = 0, we also have 
 
€ 
NI −TS* = −TS* = −EBITτ  (4.43) 
 
                                                
24 An attentive reader may argue that, since we have modelized the market value of the debt as the minimum 
between its book value and the market value of the firm, the market value of equity can theoretically never be 
negative. However, this refinement for the market value of the debt is totally personal and is not relevant to the 
equations derived from the market value balance sheet. In any case, the market value of equity may also be 
negative if the operating results are expected to be continuously negative.  
25 See section IV.4.1. for further mathematical details. 
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In other words, the tax shield TS, which has to be discounted at the rate 
€ 
KTS , and the flow (NI – 
TS), which has to be discounted at the rate 
€ 
KE−VTS , have the same (absolute) value. Therefore, 
since both rates consider the tax shield flow TS but in an opposite way, it is consistent to see 
that when these two cash flows have, apart from the sign, the same value, both cash flows have 
to be discounted at the same rate 
€ 
KE−VTS = 
€ 
KTS . In a market value perspective, this allows E – 
€ 
VTS  and 
€ 
VTS  to be also – in absolute amount – equal, such that E = E – 
€ 
VTS  + 
€ 
VTS  = 0.  
 
Referring now to the alternative definition for 
€ 
KE  from relation (4.5), it can be noted that when 
D/
€ 
VU  = 1, which implies 
€ 
VTS /E = 1 or alternatively (E - 
€ 
VTS ) = 0 – as extensively discussed in 
the cost of debt section –, we then have  
 
€ 
KE = KE−VTS
E −VTS
E + KTS
VTS
E = KTS < KE−VTS   
 
This means that 
€ 
KE  and 
€ 
KTS  are equal when the simple maximization debt level is reached ; 
consistently, this expression is also inferior to 
€ 
KE−VTS  since 
€ 
KE  is always inferior to 
€ 
KE−VTS .We 
now have a lot of information about the relations between 
€ 
KTS  and all the other rates, which 
can be summarized as26 
 
€ 
KTS = KD , whenD = 0
KTS < KE−VTS , whenD /V < 1
KTS = KE , whenD /VU = 1
KTS = KE−VTS , when D /V = 1
KTS > KE−VTS , whenD /V > 1
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
  
 
Thanks to all these relations, we claim that the market value discount rate for tax shields 
€ 
KTS  
has to be modelized as  
 
€ 
KTS = KD + (KE−VTS −KD )
D
V  (4.44) 
 
This expression can be interpreted as follows : the appropriate market value discount rate of the 
debt tax shield 
€ 
KTS  is a function of the leverage ratio D/
€ 
V , whose initial value is the cost of 
debt 
€ 
KD  and which tends towards the theoretical market value discount rate 
€ 
KE−VTS  – which is 
                                                
26 Again, as the refinement for the modelization of the market value of debt is not relevant to these equations, we 
may write that D/V is superior to one when E < 0. Alternatively, we can assume that the level of debt to be 
considered here is the book value of debt and not the market value. 
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the return shareholders would require assuming they do not benefit from the debt tax shields – 
as the leverage ratio D/
€ 
V  tends to one. Beyond that level of debt D*, if the debt27 keeps 
increasing while there is not enough operational result EBIT to fully cover the interest 
expenses28 
€ 
KDD, then the tax shields discount rate becomes greater than 
€ 
KE−VTS  
 
This expression (4.44) for 
€ 
KTS  is important. We claim that this is the appropriate modelization 
of the market value discount rate for tax shields29 ; indeed, it is the only expression that fits all 
the intersection points we have mentioned30.   
 
Moreover, this expression is perfectly consistent with all the remarks we have pointed out in 
the introduction of the model and through the whole paper about the riskiness of the debt tax 
shields. Specifically, we have mentioned that the risk of the tax shield depends on 
 
- (a) The operating result of the firm EBIT 
This is perfectly considered by all the parameters of the expression (4.44). All other things 
being equal, the higher the operating result, the lower the cost of debt 
€ 
KD , the discount rate 
€ 
KE−VTS , the leverage ratio D/
€ 
V  and therefore the risk of the tax shield 
€ 
KTS , since the unlevered 
value of the firm 
€ 
VU  increases. 
 
- (b) The level of debt D 
All the parameters of (4.44) are also perfectly sensitive to the level of debt. All other things 
being equal, the higher the level of debt, the higher the cost of debt 
€ 
KD , the discount rate 
€ 
KE−VTS , obviously the leverage ratio D/
€ 
V  and therefore the risk of the tax shield 
€ 
KTS . 
 
 
                                                
27 Same remark that the previous footnote. 
28 We detail this case in the next section. 
29 With regards to linear relations only. But it would surely not make much sense to consider a non linear relation 
for
€ 
KTS . First, because all the other rates 
€ 
KE , KE−VTS and 
€ 
KD  are linearly related between them. Second, because 
the modelization of the cost of debt 
€ 
KD , if not linear – which occurs when the marginal debt risk factor n is 
greater than one –, will impact the way all the other discount rates – and definitely 
€ 
KTS  since its expression 
depends on 
€ 
KD  – will fluctuate. See section IV.4. for details. 
30 Indeed, the relation between 
€ 
KTS  and 
€ 
KE−VTS  has just been detailed and
€ 
KD  is an undiscussed standard for the 
minimum level of risk for the tax shield. Finally, for the level of debt 
€ 
D =VU , see the section IV.4.1 for 
comprehensive mathematical details  that will confirm that this modelization for 
€ 
KTS  is effectively equal to 
€ 
KE  
for that particular level of debt.  
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- (c) The cost of debt 
€ 
KD   
Again, this is perfectly taken into account in the relation (4.44). All other things being equal, 
the higher the cost of debt 
€ 
KD , the higher the risk of the tax shield 
€ 
KTS , since the increase in 
€ 
KD  definitely overcompensates for the decrease of the factor (
€ 
KE−VTS  – 
€ 
KD )/(
€ 
D/
€ 
V )31. 
 
Furthermore, and as expected, the risk of the tax shield 
€ 
KTS  lies effectively between the cost of 
debt
€ 
KD  and the cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE  for any level of debt D between 0 and 
€ 
VU , that is for 
any “economically sensible” debt level, as 
€ 
VU  < D < 
€ 
V  is most unlikely to occur in real world 
and is mainly interesting from a theoretical point of view. 
 
This expression (4.44) needs as an unique assumption the equality at any time between the 
assets side and the liabilities side of the market value balance sheet.  
 
It applies to any level of debt and requires neither the amout of debt D, neither the leverage 
ratio D/
€ 
V  to be constant. As any other market value discount rate, 
€ 
KTS  may vary every year 
according to the level of outstanding debt and the expected operating results of the firm. 
 
Finally, it does even not require to endogenize the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  as we have done in this 
paper. Indeed, the development we have made to derive the correct expression for the risk of 
the tax shields 
€ 
KTS  could still be perfectly derived considering the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  as a 
constant. This is particularly worth noting in order to perform some comparisons with the 
common valuation results – mainly the results from MM and HP assumptions. This will be 
done in the section IV.4.2. 
 
We have just derived a totally general expression for the appropriate market value discount rate 
for the tax shields 
€ 
KTS . In the next section, we consider in further details the accounting tax 
shield flow TS ; we refine the common modelization of this tax shield flow TS, to better value 
cases where there is not enough operating result EBIT to fully cover the interest expenses, such 
that the tax shield is not – partially or totally – realized that year, but carried forward as a tax 
credit.  
                                                
31 See the section IV.4.1 for comprehensive developments. 
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IV.3.3 REFINING THE ACCOUNTING MODELIZATION OF THE TAX SHIELD 
Referring to the expression (4.44) for 
€ 
KTS , this relation states that, as soon as D > 0, the risk of 
the tax shield is greater than the risk of the debt. Indeed, debt interests have always to be paid 
in order to prevent bankruptcy, even if the firm does not have enough operating result EBIT ; in 
such a case, the accounting result of the firm is a net loss. On the other hand, the maximum tax 
shield the firm can realize every year is TS = EBITτ, as we know from (4.42), which is the 
adaptation of the general relation (4.17) when the firm does not pay taxes (I = 0) and then 
reaches its theoretical maximum market value (
€ 
V  = D*). All other things being equal, the tax 
shield that the company realizes every year can never be greater than this value, while the 
interest expenses can increase boundlessly as long as the leverage increases. 
 
Therefore, for any year t where
€ 
EBITt  < 
€ 
(KDD)t , the usual modelization (2.19) for the tax 
shield 
€ 
(KDD)t τ overvalues the actual tax shield flow that is realized that year t. 
Mathematically, for any year t where 
€ 
(KDD)t=
€ 
EBITt  + 
€ 
εt  and 
€ 
εt  > 0, the actual realized tax 
shield that year t is still TSt  = 
€ 
EBITtτ, while the relation (2.19) yields 
 
€ 
KDD( )tτ = EBITt + εt( )τ = EBITtτ + εtτ = TSt + εtτ  (4.45) 
 
The formula (2.19) overvalues thus the actual tax shield TSt realized that year t by 
€ 
εtτ. This 
amount, instead of being realized that year t, is carried forward as a tax credit since the 
accounting loss will reduce the Earnings Before Interests EBT = EBIT – 
€ 
KDD from relation 
(2.15) as soon as the firm makes profits again ; more accurately, this 
€ 
εtτ will be totally realized 
as soon as we can find one (or several) year(s) x, such that, for x = t + 1, …, n, we have 
 
€ 
EBITx − KDD( )x( )τ
x= t+1
n
∑ = εt  (4.46) 
 
Consistently with discounted cash flows valuation methods that are nothing but an application 
of the concept of time value of money, the further in time this (these) year(s) to happen, the 
less present value for this tax credit and therefore for the whole present value of the tax shields 
€ 
VTS , since every further year requires to add one to the exponent x of the appropriate discount 
factor 
€ 
(1+ KTSx )x . Moreover, if we consider any perpetuity case where EBIT  + 
€ 
ε = 
€ 
KDD, then 
the tax credit amout 
€ 
ετ is never realized. 
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This development considers only a particular year t. But any year, the firm can possibly have 
debt interests higher than its operating result, resulting in a tax credit that can be added to 
previous tax credits that would not have been realized yet, and so forth. Therefore, we need to 
introduce several additional accounts in our income statement modelization, in order to 
properly consider these tax credits carried forward and consequently derive the right value for 
the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS , with respect to an appropriate discounting process. 
 
There are many ways to modelize this issue. For clarity, we consider three new income 
statement accounts, which we refer to as Loss Carried Forward (LCF), Accumulated Losses 
Carried Forward (ALCF) and Taxable Income (TI). The Loss Carried Forward (LCF) account 
represents, if any, the excess of interest expenses over the operating result, which is the 
accounting net loss that is carried forward the following year. Mathematically, we modelize 
this as 
 
€ 
LCFt = Max (KDD)t − EBITt( ), 0( ) (4.47) 
 
If 
€ 
EBITt  > 
€ 
(KDD)t , then LCFt = 0. If not, then LCFt has some value 
€ 
(KDD)t –
€ 
EBITt  which we 
have referred to as 
€ 
εt  in our previous explanation. The Accumulated Losses Carried Forward 
(ALCF) account represents the sum of the losses carried forward less the accounting losses that 
have already been used in order to reduce the taxable income (TI). Mathematically, we 
represent this account as 
 
€ 
ALCFt = ALCFt−1 + LCFt −Max EBTt−1 −TIt−1( ), 0( )  (4.48) 
 
Initially, this account is equal to zero (ACLF0 = 0), if the firm has no loss carried forward in its 
balance sheet. Every year t, a loss carried forward, if any, is added to this cumulative account ; 
simultaneously, the difference, if any, between the result EBT = EBIT – 
€ 
KDD  from relation 
(2.15) and the actual taxed income TI from the previous year is substracted. Indeed, if there is 
such a difference, this means that the firm has then benefited that previous year from a reduced 
taxable base ant then realized some tax credits, which has to be taken into account in the ALCF 
account. Finally, the Taxable Income (TI) is, consistently with relation (4.48), modelized as 
 
€ 
TIt = Max EBTt − ALCFt( ), 0( )  (4.49) 
 
If there is no accumulated losses carried forward (ALCFt = 0), then the taxable income TIt  is, 
as expected, simply equal to the Earnings Before Taxes EBTt = EBITt  – 
€ 
(KDD)t . If ALCFt > 0, 
two cases appear. 
Firm Valuation : Tax Shields and Discount Rates (T. ANSAY, 2009) 
 
 - 62 - 
  
- (a) if ALCFt   ≤  EBTt , then the taxable income that year t is equal to TIt  = EBTt – ALCFt , and 
all the tax credits carried forward are realized that year t, such that the accumulated losses 
carried forward the next year ALCFt+1 is, if there is no loss carried forward that next year t + 1, 
equal to zero, which can be stated as ALCFt+1 – LCFt+1  = 0. 
- (b) if ALCFt   > EBTt , then the taxable income that year t is equal to zero (TIt  = 0), and only 
parts of the tax credits carried forward are realized that year t ; precisely, only the tax credit 
amount (EBTt – ALCFt)τ  is realized, and the accumulated loss carried forward of the next year 
ALCFt+1 is reduced by the concerned amount. 
Consequently, the actual taxes It the company pay every year t are simply the product of the 
corporate tax rate τ and the Taxable Income TIt , which we write 
 
€ 
It = TItτ  (4.50) 
 
These new income statement accounts allow now a modelization for the tax shield flow TS 
which is perfectly consistent with regards to the concept of time value of money. Indeed, 
rearranging the relation (4.17) and referring to the relations (4.47), (4.48), (4.49) and (4.50) we 
have just derived, the actual tax shield flow TSt for any year t, which takes into account both 
the actual debt tax shield depending on the level of debt that year t and the potential tax shields 
credit possibly realized that year t is  
 
€ 
TSt = EBITtτ − It  (4.51) 
 
In any case, and as stated before, this debt tax shield TSt can never be greater than 
€ 
EBITtτ. We 
now summarize the derived relations in an adaptated table for the modelization of the income 
statement. Obviously, when 
€ 
EBITt  > 
€ 
(KDD)t , all these relations collapse to the common 
relations presentented in the first chapter of the paper. 
 
 
− 
= 
− 
= 
− 
= 
Income Statement Mathematical Modelization 
EBITt  
Debt Interestst 
€ 
Debt Interestst = KDD( )t  
EBTt 
€ 
EBTt = EBITt − KDD( )t  
ALCFt 
€ 
ALCFt = ALCFt−1 + LCFt −Max EBTt−1 −TIt−1( ), 0( )  
Taxable Incomet 
€ 
TIt = Max EBTt − ALCFt( ), 0( )  
Taxest 
€ 
It = TItτ  
Net Incomet 
€ 
NIt = TIt − It  
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We now conclude this section ; on top of the appropriate market value discount rate for the tax 
shields 
€ 
KTS , we have also refined the usual modelization of the income statement of the firm. 
This has been done in order to obtain an always true expression for the debt tax shield flow TS, 
whatever the level of the interest expenses 
€ 
KDD compared to the operating result EBIT. In the 
next section, we develop further our setup, and perfom rigourous mathematics in order to show 
the relevancy of the model. 
 
IV.4. DEVELOPING THE SETUP : SUBSTITUTIONS, COMPARISONS AND WACC 
IV.4.1. SUBSTITUTING DISCOUNT RATES TO GET COMPARABLE EXPRESSIONS 
We have derived all the relations between the different market value discount rates ; they are 
all linearly related. We can now substitute in the respective appropriate relations for the other 
discount rates in order to get expressions that are only dependent on the risk-free rate RF and 
the cost of unlevered capital 
€ 
KU , which is the inherent business risk of the firm.  
 
Indeed, all the expressions for 
€ 
KD , 
€ 
KTS , 
€ 
KE  and 
€ 
KE−VTS  can reduce to expressions only 
depending on these two rates and on the market value for 
€ 
E , 
€ 
D, 
€ 
VU , 
€ 
VTS  and 
€ 
V . As RF and 
€ 
KU  
are the only required inputs in our setup – with the corporate tax rate τ –, these reductions for 
the different discount rates are simply a consequence of the appropriate relations between all 
these market value discount rates, with regards to the market value balance sheet. The 
upcoming substitution developments are definitely interesting for at least two reasons : 
 
- (a) First, they allow to consistently compare the different ways these rates fluctuate with the 
leverage, as they will be all expressed as functions of RF and 
€ 
KU . Consequently, this allows to 
give both theoretical and economic extra explanations about the relations between these rates. 
In a general way, all the forthcoming equations formalize somehow the developments we 
would have previously done about the market value discount rates without giving a rigourous 
demonstration. Moreover, these substitutions also allow to better understand the graphical 
presentations that will summarize all our results. These are presented in the section IV.5. 
 
- (b) Second, they allow to solve some discontinuity problems we have when using the derived 
general expressions for the market value discount rates. Indeed, for some intersections points 
between these rates, we have relations that are apparently not defined, since some 
denominators – or both numerators and denominators – of the different expressions tend then 
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to zero32. For the linear case – that is, the case which assumes the marginal debt risk factor n to 
be equal to one –, we show that these indeterminate forms are immediately resolved. For any 
other cases, we show that these indeterminate forms can actually be defined. 
 
Obviously, the expression for the cost of debt from relation (4.12) is already the most reduced 
expression for 
€ 
KD , which is 
 
€ 
KD = RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
  
 
Considering now the rate 
€ 
KE−VTS and substituting for 
€ 
KD , we can rewrite this rate as  
 
€ 
KE−VTS = KU + (KU −KD )
D
E −VTS
= KU + KU − RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
D
E −VTS
= KU + (KU − RF ) 1−
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
D
E −VTS
= KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU n
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
E −VTS
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the relation (2.2) from the market value balance sheet, and switching the denominators 
of the last term, we then get  
 
€ 
KE−VTS = KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
 (4.52) 
 
Switching the denominators of the last term allows to consider this rate as a function of the 
leverage ratio D/
€ 
VU , which is similar to the cost of debt 
€ 
KD . This is also consistent with the 
definition of this rate 
€ 
KE−VTS , since it applies to the flows to equity without considering the tax 
shields. Therefore, the maximum claim for equityholders if they would not benefit from the tax 
shields would effectively be the unlevered value of the firm 
€ 
VU .  
 
                                                
32 As we have seen for example when deriving the correct relation for the tax shield discount rate. 
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From (4.52), it is straightforward to notice that if the marginal debt risk factor n = 1, the second 
factor of the last term collapses to one and both 
€ 
KE−VTS  and 
€ 
KD  increase linearly and 
equivalently with the leverage ; they only differ by their respective initial risk, which are 
€ 
KU  
and RF. The other cases (n  > 1) have apparently a discontinuing point for the particular level of 
debt D = 
€ 
VU , since this second factor of the last term would then collapse to zero divided by 
zero. We discuss this case a little further in the forthcoming development. 
 
Considering now the risk of the tax shield 
€ 
KTS , we develop it in two steps. First, we do not 
develop the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  as the initial minimum risk ; we only develop the market value 
risk premium between shareholders – if they would not benefit from tax shields – and 
debtholders required returns, which is the difference (
€ 
KE−VTS – 
€ 
KD ). Referring to (4.12) and 
(4.52), this yields 
 
€ 
KTS = KD + (KE−VTS −KD )
D
V
= KD + KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ − RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
D
V
= KD + (KU − RF ) 1+
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
−
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
D
V
= KD + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
+
VUn −Dn
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
D
V
= KD + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
+
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU −D
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
D
V
= KD + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
D
V
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.53) 
 
Consistently, we still express the tax shield discount rate as a function of the global leverage 
ratio D/
€ 
V . Indeed, the risk of the tax shields is relevant to the whole firm, as the present value 
of tax shields 
€ 
VTS  is precisely the additional financial value over 
€ 
VU .  
 
Considering now specifically the market premium (
€ 
KE−VTS  – 
€ 
KD ), we already know from (4.52) 
that, when n = 1, both 
€ 
KE−VTS  and 
€ 
KD  linearly and identically increase with the leverage.  
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From the expression (4.53), this market premium is now precisely known, and is equal to 
 
€ 
KE−VTS −KD( ) = KU − RF( )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
 
(4.54) 
 
This expression confirms that, when n = 1, this market premium is a constant and is effectively 
equal to (
€ 
KE−VTS – 
€ 
KD ) = (
€ 
KU  –  RF), which is the difference in risk between a risky investment 
and a risk-free investment. Therefore, in addition to the increase of the initial risk 
€ 
KD  for the 
tax shield when the leverage increases and as the modelization of 
€ 
KTS  multiplies this – then 
constant – premium by the leverage ratio D/
€ 
V , the tax shield risk is definitely a strictly 
increasing function of the leverage for n = 1. 
 
If we now focus on the non-linear cases, we can show that, for any marginal debt risk factor n  
> 1 and for any level of debt D, the market premium (
€ 
KE−VTS  – 
€ 
KD ) is then also a strictly 
increasing function of the leverage ratio, and so (doubly) the tax shield discount rate 
€ 
KTS . 
Mathematically, this market premium is strictly increasing if its first derivative is strictly 
positive. From (4.54), differentiating33 the market premium expression with respect to D and 
rearranging yields 
 
€ 
d
dD (KE−VTS −KD ) =
(KU − RF )VU
D(VU −D)2VUn
−Dn+1 + Dn+1n −DnnVU + DVUn( )
=
(KU − RF )VUD
D(VU −D)2VUn
−Dn + Dnn −Dn−1nVU +VUn( )
=
(KU − RF )VU
(VU −D)2VUn
−Dn + Dnn −Dn−1nVU +VUn( )
=
(KU − RF )VU
(VU −D)2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1− D+ n(VU −D)VU
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n−1⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.55) 
 
As soon as D > 0 and D ≠ 
€ 
VU , it is straightforward to realize that the first factor of this 
expression (4.55) is always positive. We then have to consider the second factor. Yet not as 
straightforward as the first factor, we can see that, as the level of debt D increases, the increase 
of the term 
€ 
D /VU( )n−1  is constantly overcompensated by the decrease of the term 
€ 
n(VU −D) , 
whatever the leverage D/
€ 
VU  is greater or lesser than one. 
                                                
33 We only derive here the case where n is a constant integer ; however, the case where n is a function of the 
leverage ratio D/VU  allows similar conclusions. 
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Indeed, for any n > 1, we have 
 
€ 
D+ n(VU −D)
VU
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n−1
< 1 ⇔ 1− D+ n(VU −D)VU
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n−1
> 0
 
(4.56) 
 
This can be stated because we consider here the case where n is greater than one. Indeed, if n is 
equal to one, we immediately see that this second factor is equal to zero ; this is consistent with 
our previous results. But for n > 1 and when D < 
€ 
VU , the factor 
€ 
D /VU( )n−1 is relatively more 
inferior to D/
€ 
VU  than the term 
€ 
n(VU −D)  is superior to (
€ 
VU – D) ; inversely, when D > 
€ 
VU , the 
factor 
€ 
D /VU( )n−1  is less superior to D/
€ 
VU  than the term 
€ 
n(VU −D)  is inferior to (
€ 
VU– D).  
 
In order to conclude, we have now to consider a last case ; the particular level of debt D = 
€ 
VU . 
This level of debt, for any value for the marginal debt risk factor n  > 1, results in apparently 
indeterminate forms for the market premium (
€ 
KE−VTS  – 
€ 
KD ) and therefore for the risk of the tax 
shields 
€ 
KTS , but also for the rate 
€ 
KE−VTS , as we have previously mentioned.  
 
However, we now show that when D = 
€ 
VU  and n  > 1, we can eliminate these indeterminations 
and still derive consistent values for (
€ 
KE−VTS  – 
€ 
KD ), 
€ 
KTS  and 
€ 
KE−VTS . For so doing, we use the 
simple form of the well-known Bernoulli's rule34, which states that if two functions
€ 
f (x)  and 
€ 
h(x) are differentiable in a particular point X such that 
€ 
f '(X) /h'(X)  is defined, and if both 
functions are equal to zero in that particular point X, then the limit for 
€ 
x→ X  of 
€ 
f (x) /h(x) is 
equal to
€ 
f '(X) /h'(X) . 
 
In our setup, referring to the expression (4.54) for the market premium (
€ 
KE−VTS  – 
€ 
KD ), the 
indetermination comes from the factor 
€ 
(VUn −Dn ) /(VU −D) when the level of debt D equals 
€ 
VU .  
 
Therefore, we can consider the two functions 
€ 
f (D) =VUn −Dn  and 
€ 
g(D) =VU −D . These 
functions perfectly meet the required conditions of the Bernoulli’s rule.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
34 This is chosen for clarity ; any other limits’ theorem yields the same results. 
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If we differentiate them with respect to D, we get  
 
€ 
d
dD f (D) =
d
dD (VU
n −Dn ) = −nDn−1 (4.57) 
and 
 
€ 
d
dD g(D) =
d
dD (VU −D) = −1 (4.58) 
 
Consequently, the ratio of their respective derivative in the particular point D = 
€ 
VU  – hence 
also the ratio 
€ 
f (VU ) /
€ 
h(VU ) , as states the Bernoulli’s rule – is equal to 
 
€ 
f '(VU )
g'(VU )
=
−nVU n−1
−1 = nVU
n−1 =
f (VU )
g(VU )
 (4.59) 
 
Therefore, when D = 
€ 
VU , we can substitute for 
€ 
f (VU )  and 
€ 
h(VU )  from (4.59) in the reduced 
expression (4.54) for the market premium (
€ 
KE−VTS  – 
€ 
KD ). This substitution yields 
 
€ 
KE−VTS −KD( ) = KU − RF( )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ = KU − RF( ) nVU
n−1( ) VUVUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ = KU − RF( )n  (4.60) 
 
Consistently, this result also holds for the case n = 1 that we have previously discussed. This 
result for the market premium (
€ 
KE−VTS – 
€ 
KD ) when D = 
€ 
VU  can be adapted for the respective 
expressions of the rates 
€ 
KTS  and 
€ 
KE−VTS , as they are all linearly related. For the tax shields’ 
discount rate, the expression (4.60) can be readily inserted in the reduced expression (4.53) for 
€ 
KTS , which yields 
 
€ 
KTS = KD + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
D
V = KD + (KU − RF )n
D
V
 
(4.61) 
 
Since D = 
€ 
VU  and therefore 
€ 
KD  = 
€ 
KU , the expression (4.61) may be rewritten as 
 
€ 
KTS = KU + (KU − RF )n
VU
V
 
(4.62) 
 
For the rate 
€ 
KE−VTS , we can substitute for 
€ 
f (VU )  and 
€ 
h(VU )  from (4.59) in the reduced 
expression (4.52), as we have done for the market premium (
€ 
KE−VTS – 
€ 
KD ). 
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This gives a value for 
€ 
KE−VTS of 
 
€ 
KE−VTS = KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
= KU + (KU − RF ) nVU n−1( ) DVUn
 (4.63) 
and as D = 
€ 
VU , we have 
 
€ 
KE−VTS = KU + (KU − RF ) nVU
n−1( ) VUVU n
= KU + (KU − RF )n  (4.64) 
 
These results are perfectly consistent. Indeed, if we refer for example to the relation (4.54) for 
the market premium (
€ 
KE−VTS  – 
€ 
KD ) and if we define the parameter ε > 0, such that we consider 
the two levels of debt D1 = 
€ 
VU  – ε  and  D2 = 
€ 
VU  + ε, then we can cross-check the correctness 
of the value of this market premium when D = 
€ 
VU , as shows 
 
€ 
(KU − RF )
VUn − (VU −ε)n
VU − (VU −ε)
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ < (KU − RF )n < (KU − RF )
VUn − (VU + ε)n
VU − (VU + ε)
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⇔
VUn − (VU −ε)n
ε
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ < n < VU
n − (VU + ε)n
−ε
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⇔
VUn − (VU −ε)n
ε
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ < n VU
n
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ <
VUn − (VU + ε)n
−ε
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⇔
VUn − (VU −ε)n
ε
< nVUn−1 < −
VUn − (VU + ε)n
ε
⇔
VUn − (VU −ε)n
ε
< nVUn−1 <
(VU + ε)n −VUn
ε
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.65) 
 
If we then consider again the function 
€ 
f (D) =VUn −Dn  whose value for D = 
€ 
VU  is 
€ 
f (VU ) = 0 , 
the relation (4.65) may be restated as 
 
€ 
f (VU −ε) − f (VU )
ε
< nVU n−1 <
f (VU ) − f (VU + ε)
ε
⇔
f (VU ) − f (VU −ε)
ε
> − nVU n−1 >
f (VU + ε) − f (VU )
ε
 
 
(4.66) 
 
Finally, if we refine the value of the parameter ε by defining ε such that 0 < ε < r for any real 
number r, then the expression (4.66) gives both left and right derivatives of the function 
€ 
f (D) =VUn −Dn  when D = 
€ 
VU . This function
€ 
f (D)  is strictly continuous and differentiable at 
any point ; in particular, when D = 
€ 
VU , the derivative of 
€ 
f  is
€ 
f '(VU ) = −nVU n−1 . Therefore, 
since a function is differentiable at a point X if both its left and right derivatives exist at that 
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point and are equal, for the limit 
€ 
ε → 0 , we have both derivatives equal to 
€ 
f '(VU ) = −nVU n−1. 
This is consistent with the result (4.59) obtained with the Bernoulli’s rule. 
 
We can then conclude that, for any n > 1, the market premium (
€ 
KE−VTS  – 
€ 
KD ) is a strictly 
increasing function of the leverage ratio D/
€ 
V . Consequently, this intensifies the sensitivity of 
the tax shield risk 
€ 
KTS , which then increases more than linearly with the leverage.  
 
Furthemore, for any n ≥ 1, we can conclude that all the market value discount rates 
€ 
KD , 
€ 
KTS  
and 
€ 
KE−VTS are both strictly continuous and strictly increasing functions of their relevant 
leverage ratio, as we could theoretically and economically expect.  
 
We also conclude for now about the risk of the tax shields by deriving the most reduced 
expression for 
€ 
KTS  ; indeed, we can still develop the initial risk of the tax shield – which is the 
cost of debt – in the relation (4.53). We will discuss further this form when comparing the 
results of our setup with other setups in section IV.4.2. Substituting for 
€ 
KD , this most reduced 
expression is 
 
€ 
KTS = RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
+ (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
D
V
= RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
+
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
 
 
 
(4.67) 
 
We now analyze the last market value discount rate we have not considered so far ; the lereved 
cost of equity 
€ 
KE , which is the actual shareholders’ required return. This return has actually 
not been so discussed because of the correctness of its general relation (2.10), since derived 
from the market value balance sheet. We have only derived an alternative formula (4.5) for 
€ 
KE
and have barely considered 
€ 
KE  when comparing it with the rate 
€ 
KE−VTS  in order to derive the 
correct formula for 
€ 
KTS . 
 
However, this is certainly not because of a lack of interest for the “real” cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE , and we now extensively develop this rate ; in fact, this rate is the most complex rate to 
analyze, as it is not a definable rate per se – actually, this rate depends simultaneously on all 
the other rates. This is economically sensible. Indeed, the riskiness of the equityholders’ flows 
(ECF) are, similarly to the tax shield flows (TS), depending on the operating profitability of the 
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firm – represented by the operating result EBIT and which is reflected in the market unlevered 
value of the firm 
€ 
VU  – and on both the level and the cost of the debt for the firm – represented 
by 
€ 
KD  and D  –, but it also depends on the business risk relevant to the particular kind of the 
concerned business, with regards to its particular sector – this is considered by the unlevered 
cost of capital 
€ 
KU . Moreover, this market value levered cost of equity is a little lowered by the 
present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS , which represents the future expected debt tax shields the 
shareholders will benefit in order to partially compensate for the additional financial risk they 
face when there is debt financing. 
 
Incidentally, one should realize that the business risk 
€ 
KU  – which is the minimum required 
return for shareholders to invest in that company, and which is equal to 
€ 
KE  if there is no debt, 
since there is no financial risk – is not necessarily linked to the operational profitability of the 
firm – which is represented by the accounting return ROIC and which is captured by the 
market value operating MVA – ; indeed, there are companies in relatively risky sectors that 
outperform the average results, and inversely, there are companies in supposedly stabler 
sectors whose performances are under the expected/required  results.  
 
Shareholders, in comparison to debtholders, fully benefit from any excess return on capital 
over the cost of capital (ROIC > WACC), and their returns are theoretically boundless. The 
better the operating performance (ROIC > 
€ 
KU ), the greater the unlevered firm value 
€ 
VU , hence 
the lower the cost of debt – as the debt is less risky, more lenders are willing to invest money at 
a lower rate – and therefore the higher the potential returns for equityholders, from both an 
operating value creation perspective and a financing value creation perspective, since the tax 
shield is then less risky – as EBIT is larger in amount compared to the debt interests 
€ 
KD
€ 
D, the 
€ 
KTS  is consistently lower –, which potentially allows to increase the leverage ratio in order to 
benefit further from additional tax shields. This virtuous circle has unfortunately its vicious 
equivalent ; the whole previous development could actually happen precisely in the opposite 
way, leading to a potential value destruction for the shareholders. 
 
On the other hand, debtholders take less risks when investing in a company ; they always 
require a fixed level of return according to the profitability of the firm – represented by 
€ 
VU  – 
and the amount of debt D to lend to the company. Moreover, this interest rate may be revised 
every year in order to adapt the required returns according to the evolution of the business – as 
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€ 
VU  may vary. But less risks imply less returns – as 
€ 
KD  will always be smaller than 
€ 
KE  –, and 
debtholders have no claim on the profits, as long as their interest expenses are paid ; once 
determined, the interest rate 
€ 
KD  is fixed for a year, which is comfortable if performance 
happens to be poor – furthermore, debtholders benefit from the legal priority claim over the 
assets of the firm –, but which may be in a way regarded as an opportunity loss compared to 
the shareholders’ returns if the firm is doing particularly good.  
 
These introductive considerations clearly show that the appropriate market value discount rate 
for the levered equity 
€ 
KE  is not as simple as the other rates to derive. Consequently, it is not 
surprising that the upcoming developments for 
€ 
KE  are slightly thougher than the previous 
substitutions. The main issue arises from the numerous factors appearing when substituting for 
the other discount rates. In particular, it is not straightforward to know about the relevant form 
of the reduced expression for 
€ 
KE , and therefore the factorization process is not obvious ; as 
there are many factors, actually developing all of them would require time consuming non 
linear algebra.  
 
Indeed, the development of all the products between these many terms would require a non 
trivial factorizing process after having done the relevant simplifications as some terms cancel 
each other. This option is mathematically heavy and furthermore, if strictly applied, it does not 
allow to derive similar expressions to the other expressions we have derived so far – that is, an 
initial risk reference, some “risk premium” and a particular leverage ratio. Indeed, full 
developing then factorizing would only yield a polynomial expression. 
 
Therefore, we choose for the option of not developing the factors when not needed, and 
preferently try to collect and present these factors in an economically sensible way. Precisely – 
and similarly to what we have done for the other discount rates –, we first isolate the market 
premium (
€ 
KU  – RF) and then try to derive a mathematically convenient and economically 
sensible expression. In order to perform these developments, we use the general formula (2.10) 
for the cost of levered equity ; alternatively, we could have used our alternative definition 
(4.5). 
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Substituting from the relation (4.67) for 
€ 
KTS  and from the relation (4.12) for 
€ 
KD , we get 
€ 
KE = KU + (KU −KD )
D
E − (KU −KTS )
VTS
E
=KU + KU − RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
D
E − KU − RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
+
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
VTS
E
=KU + KU − RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
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Please note the factoring of the term 
€ 
1− (D /VU )n( ) as a whole so far, and the rearrangement of 
this expression as 
€ 
KE = KU + (KU − RF ) f (D) . Further developments yield 
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We recognize the factor 
€ 
(VUn −Dn ) /(VU −D), that has been met in previous reduced expressions 
for the other discount rates 
€ 
KE−VTS , 
€ 
KTS  and the market premium (
€ 
KE−VTS – 
€ 
KD ),  and whose 
value when D = 
€ 
VU  is known and is equal to 
€ 
nVUn−1, as we haved derived in (4.59). This is not 
coincidence this factor appears in any rate, except 
€ 
KD . Indeed, this factor represents the non 
linear coefficient for theses rates when n > 1, that is when the marginal debt risk factor for the 
cost of debt 
€ 
KD  is assumed to be greater than one, such that any additional amount of debt is 
then more risky than the previous amount. It is thus relevant that we also consider the 
expression 
€ 
(VUn −Dn ) /(VU −D) as a factor in the reduced expression for 
€ 
KE .   
 
In addition, we have isolated the relevant leverage ratio for equityholders, which is the ratio 
D/E, as shows the general relation (2.11) for the expression of 
€ 
KE . Indeed, equityholders are 
interested in the outstanding level of debt against their market value claim, which is the market 
value of equity E. Incidentally, isolating this ratio requires some further developments in order 
to derive economically meaningful ratios. This can be notably done considering 
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It can be noted here that the market value of equity E can be cancelled, as it explicitely appears 
on both numerator and denominator. If so doing, then the new market value leverage ratio that 
can be considered is the debt over firm value ratio D/
€ 
V .  
 
Whether D/E or D/
€ 
V  should be used is mainly a personal consideration, as they actually both 
measure the same thing ; indeed, as the market value of debt is assumed to be equal to its book 
value, once you know D/E , you consequently do know D/
€ 
V , and inversely. We first conclude 
the current development keeping the leverage ratio D/E, and then adjust the formula 
considering D/
€ 
V . 
 
Considering the leverage ratio D/E, we can develop the last remaining market value elements, 
and finally get 
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Considering the leverage ratio D/
€ 
V , the formula slightly adapts to yield 
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Summarizing our results, we have shown that the appropriate reduced form of the market value 
discount rate for the levered cost of equity 
€ 
KE  is equal to : 
- (a) When considering the leverage ratio D/E,  
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E  (4.68) 
- (b) When considering the leverage ratio D/
€ 
V ,  
 
€ 
KE =KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
V
VUn
−
VTS
D
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V  (4.69) 
 
These results are perfectly consistent with economic considerations. Indeed, all the remarks 
presented in the introduction of the current section for 
€ 
KE  are taken into account in these 
expressions (4.68) and (4.69). Specifically, if we analyze in details these two relations, and on 
top of the obvious condition that the higher 
€ 
KU , then the higher 
€ 
KE , we can observe that : 
- (a) the level of profitability of the firm is consistently considered in both relations by the 
unlevered market value of the firm 
€ 
VU . Indeed, both ratios E/
€ 
VUn  and 
€ 
V /
€ 
VUn  are, all other things 
being equal, lower if the profitability of the firm is higher, which decreases the cost of levered 
equity 
€ 
KE . Incidentally, the increase of the factor 
€ 
(VUn −Dn ) /(VU −D) and the decrease of the 
factor 
€ 
VU /
€ 
VUn  only adjust this decrease in the cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE  according to the 
assumption made for the marginal debt risk factor n. 
- (b) the level of the benefits from the debt interests’ deductibility, which is the financial value 
created through tax shields, is also consistently considered in both relations by the ratios 
€ 
VTS
/D. Indeed, all other things being equal, the increase for 
€ 
KE  if the leverage ratios D/E and D/
€ 
V
increase is lowered by the increase of the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS 35. 
 
When not considering the effects of the marginal debt risk factor n – that is, when not 
considering the exponent n in both ratios E/
€ 
VUn  and 
€ 
V /
€ 
VUn  and in the non linear coefficients 
€ 
(VUn −Dn ) /(VU −D) and 
€ 
VU /
€ 
VUn  –, which is equivalent to refer to the simple case n = 1, the 
previous statements are even more straightforward to realize. 
 
                                                
35 If there is enough operating result to cover the interest expenses, as extensively developed in the tax shields’ 
section. 
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Indeed, when n = 1, we have 
- (a) When considering the leverage ratio D/E,  
 
€ 
KE =KU + (KU − RF )
E
VU
−
VTS
D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
E
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
E   
- (b) When considering the leverage ratio D/
€ 
V ,  
 
€ 
KE =KU + (KU − RF )
V
VU
−
VTS
D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V   
 
We conclude the developments for the levered cost of equity 
€ 
KE  with four more remarks, all 
relevant to different points we have previously discussed. These also conclude this section.  
 
First, it may be stated that this cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE  is a strictly increasing function of the 
leverage. If we consider for example the just above formula considering the leverate ratio 
€ 
D /V
for n = 1, it is straightforward to see that this relation is strictly increasing with the level of 
debt. Therefore, it is also undoubtedly the case when n is greater than one since it implies that 
the debt is considered as riskier. We make here the economy of differentiating the expressions 
(4.68) or (4.69) with respect to D, as these derivatives are not as simple as the others, but this 
statement is obvious ; additional tax shields only compensate partially for the increase in the 
financial risk faced by shareholders when the leverage increases, such that any increase in the 
level of debt makes this cost of levered equity higher. 
 
Second, while this function is continuously defined, as we know the relation (4.59) when D = 
€ 
VU  and as it is straightforward to see from the relation (4.69) when E = 0, we can however say 
that, from a economic point of view, when E = 0, – which happens in particular when D is 
continuously equal to D* – it does not make sense to consider a cost of levered equity while 
there is actually no equity. If we consider a limit, as the market value of equity tend to zero, its 
required return should tend to infinity. In any case, we consider that, when D = 
€ 
V , the value 
for the cost of levered equity is irrelevant. 
 
Third, we can now obtain the difference between the actual levered cost of equity 
€ 
KE  and the 
rate 
€ 
KE−VTS . When deriving the correct relation for the tax shield discount rate 
€ 
KTS , we have 
used, yet without knowing the actual difference between these rates, the fact that 
€ 
KE−VTS > 
€ 
KE  
for any D  >  0. We can now formally derive this difference.   
Firm Valuation : Tax Shields and Discount Rates (T. ANSAY, 2009) 
 
 - 78 - 
  
Both most reduced expressions (4.52) and (4.69)36 for respectively 
€ 
KE−VTS  and 
€ 
KE  are 
 
€ 
KE−VTS = KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
  
and 
 
€ 
KE =KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
V
VUn
−
VTS
D
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
= KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
V
V −
VTS
D
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
= KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1− VTSD
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
  
 
Even before deriving the difference between these rates, it is definitely worth nothing the 
perfect consistency of these relations ; indeed, switching 
€ 
V  for 
€ 
VUn  in the leverage ratio of the 
rate 
€ 
KE  and barely simplifying already allow to see that both rates are almost exactly 
modelized the same way, except that 
€ 
KE  takes into account the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS . 
In other words, 
€ 
KE−VTS  could be exactly modelized as 
€ 
KE , but with 
€ 
VTS  =  0 for any level of 
debt D. 
 
Therefore, deriving their difference for any level of debt is straightforward, as shows 
€ 
KE−VTS −KE( ) = KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ − KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1− VTSD
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
= (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
−
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1− VTSD
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
= (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
− 1− VTSD
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
= (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1− 1− VTSD
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
= (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VTS
D
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
= (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VU n
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VTS
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ (4.70)
 
 
                                                
36 Using the relation (4.68) obviously yields the same results. 
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This result may be explained as follows ; every year, the difference in risk for a shareholder 
considering whether or not the debt tax shield is included in the equityholder cash flow (ECF) 
is equal to the difference in risk between investing in that business and investing in a risk-free 
governmental bond, times the present value of the tax shields weighted by the value of the 
firm. If n > 1, this difference in risk is also adjusted by the relevant non linear coefficients.  
 
Finally, we can also formally prove that, when D = 
€ 
VU , then the discount rate for the tax shield 
€ 
KTS  is equal to the levered cost of equity 
€ 
KE , as we have stated when deriving the general 
expression for the tax shield discount rate 
€ 
KTS . Indeed, considering both most reduced 
expressions (4.67) and (4.69) for respectively 
€ 
KTS  and 
€ 
KE , and considering the relation (4.59) 
that proves that, when D = 
€ 
VU , then 
€ 
(VUn −Dn ) /(VU −D) = 
€ 
nVUn−1, we have 
 
€ 
KTS = RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
+
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
= RF + (KU − RF ) 1+ nVUn−1
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
= RF + (KU − RF ) 1+ n
D
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
= RF + (KU − RF ) 1+ n
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.71) 
which is equal to 
€ 
KE  when D = 
€ 
VU , as shows  
 
€ 
KE =KU + (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
V
VUn
−
VTS
D
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
=KU + (KU − RF )nVUn−1
V
VUn
−
VTS
D
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
=KU + (KU − RF )
nV
VU
−
nVTS
D
VUn
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
=KU + (KU − RF )
nV
VU
−
nVTS
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
V
=KU + (KU − RF ) n −
nVTS
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
=KU + (KU − RF ) n 1−
VTS
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
=KU + (KU − RF ) n
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.72) 
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Indeed, the expression (4.72) is equivalent to the expression (4.71), since we have 
 
€ 
KE =KU + KU − RF( )n
VU
V
= RF + KU + KU − RF( )n
VU
V − RF
= RF + KU − RF( ) 1+ n
VU
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
 
 
 
 
(4.73) 
 
Consequently, it is straightforward to see that, since 
€ 
KTS= 
€ 
KE  when D = 
€ 
VU , then the risk of 
the tax shield 
€ 
KTS  is greater than 
€ 
KU  for that particular level of debt. This is required by the 
fundamental condition (2.7) that 
€ 
KE  > 
€ 
KU  for any level of debt D > 0, and this is also 
confirmed by the relation (4.72) since n ≥ 1 and 0 < 
€ 
VU /
€ 
V  < 1 when D = 
€ 
VU , such that the 
product n(
€ 
VU /
€ 
V ) > 0.  
 
Therefore, we can say that the particular level of debt D such that 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU  is inferior to 
€ 
VU  ; 
in order to compare our results with this level for 
€ 
KTS  (HP assumption), the next section will 
derive the particular level of debt that implies these rates to be equal. 
 
These results conclude this section, where we have performed rigourous mathematics in order 
to present the different rates on a common basis, solve some discountinuity problems and 
finally show the relevancy of the setup since all the reduced expressions for the market 
discount rates are perfectly consistent with economic considerations. 
 
Thanks to these developments, the next section will now compare the value of these dicount 
rates with other setups. In particular, we will use the most reduced expression (4.67) for the tax 
shield’s discount rate. 
 
IV.4.2. COMPARING OUR RESULTS WITH OTHER ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE TAX SHIELD RISK 
We have presented a comprehensive valuation setup in which any discount rate may relevantly 
fluctuate according to the leverage ratio and the profitability of the firm. This setup only 
requires the assumption that the assets side and the liabilities side of the market value balance 
sheet of the firm are equal at any time. This perfectly general setup applies to any debt policy. 
Referring specifically to the discount rate for the tax shields 
€ 
KTS , we have derived a general 
expression which is sensitive to any economic consideration relevant to the riskiness of the 
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debt tax shield flow. We can now compare the differences between this general expression for 
€ 
KTS  and the usual assumptions where this rate is either equal to 
€ 
KD  (MM assumption), either 
equal to 
€ 
KU  (HP assumption). Please note that we only compare the assumptions about the 
discount rate 
€ 
KTS  ; we do not assume particular leverage policies – which are fixed level of 
debt in MM, and fixed leverage ratio in HP –, as our setup applies to any debt policy and as we 
have insisted through the whole paper on the fact that discount rates can be adjusted every year 
– in other words, we consider stochastic cash flow patterns and unfixed capital structures, 
instead of perpetuities. Strictly speaking, these comparisons do not specifically refer thus to 
MM and HP setups. 
 
If we consider that 
€ 
KTS  = RF = 
€ 
KD  and are constant at any time t, which is equivalent to the 
MM setup – indeed, even if the MM setup may not consider that 
€ 
KD  = RF, it considers that both 
D and 
€ 
KD  are constant, such that the actual value of 
€ 
KD  does not make any difference for the 
present value of the tax shields 
€ 
VTS  = τD –, this assumption considerably overvalues the 
present value of the tax shields compared to our setup, as it does not take into account the fact 
that the tax shield’s risk – as well as the interest rate required by debtholders – depends on both 
the leverage and the profitability of the firm.  
 
Actually, this discount rate for the tax shields is only equivalent to our setup when there is no 
debt, and therefore no tax shields (
€ 
KTS  = RF = 
€ 
KD  and D = 
€ 
VTS  = 0). As soon as D > 0, this 
assumption gives higher value for 
€ 
VTS  – and therefore for 
€ 
V  – and the more the level of debt D 
increases, the larger the difference between the results for both 
€ 
VTS  and 
€ 
V compared to our 
setup.  
 
Indeed, every year, referring to the reduced expression (4.67) for 
€ 
KTS , the discount rate for the 
tax shield flow is then systematically undervalued by 
 
€ 
KTS − RF = (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
+
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
 
(4.74) 
 
If we consider now that 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KD  but with the cost of debt that varies with the leverage, and if 
we assume that the cost of debt is modelized as we have presented in this paper, then the 
present value of the tax shields 
€ 
VTS  is still overvalued but to a lesser extent than the previous 
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assumption. Indeed, in that case, still referring to the relation (4.67), the discount rate for the 
annual tax shield flow is only undervalued by  
 
€ 
KTS −KD = RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
+
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ − RF + (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
= (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
+
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ − (KU − RF )
D
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
n
= (KU − RF )
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.75) 
 
It is straightforward to see when comparing (4.74) and (4.75) that the annual undervaluation of 
the risk of the tax shield flow is significantly reduced in this last case compared to the previous 
one. Roughly, we can approximatively say that the gap is reduced by half, considering that the 
ratio D/
€ 
VU  is superior to D/
€ 
V  but with the factor n that compensates37 for this difference. Still, 
this assumption fails to consider that, while a greater level of debt implies a greater risk for the 
debtholders, which then require a greater interest rate, the tax shields are even riskier as the 
operating result may be not large enough to cover the full interest expenses. 
 
We now consider the case where 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU . As we will show, this case does not necessarily 
imply either a systematic undervaluation or overvaluation of the risk of the tax shields. It 
actually depends on the level of debt D of the firm. Therefore, this case is worth investigating 
further, and we now perform some developments in order to better understand the relevancy of 
this assumption. Considering the most reduced expression (4.67) for the tax shields’ discount 
rate 
€ 
KTS , it is straightforward to see that this expression is equal to 
€ 
KU  when 
 
€ 
Dn
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ +
VUn −Dn
VU −D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
VU
VUn
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V =1
⇔
Dn (VU −D)V + (VUn −Dn )VUD
VUn (VU −D)V
=1
⇔Dn (VU −D)V + (VUn −Dn )VUD =VUn (VU −D)V
⇔DnVUV −Dn+1V +VUn+1D−Dn+1VU −VUn+1V +VUnDV = 0
⇔−Dn+1(V +VU ) + Dn (VUV ) + D(VUn+1 +VUnV ) −VUn+1V = 0
⇔Dn+1(V +VU ) −Dn (VUV ) −D(VUn+1 +VUnV ) +VUn+1V = 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.76) 
 
                                               
37 If this was precisely derived, this factor n actually overcompensates for the difference between the ratios. 
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We have to solve for the level of debt D that satisfies this expression (4.76). Theoretically, this 
is not trivial if we consider that n could be any integer n ≥ 1.  For low values for n, this 
expression collapses to well know forms, but for higher value for n, it requires heavy 
algorithms. Additionaly, the element 
€ 
V  has also to be specified as 
€ 
V  = 
€ 
VU  + 
€ 
VTS , or 
alternatively as 
€ 
V = E + D, in which case the relation (4.76) has to be slightly adapted when 
isolating the unknown D. 
 
Fortunately, it is worth noting that the expression (4.76) may be conveniently factorized as  
 
€ 
Dn+1(V +VU ) −Dn (VUV ) −D(VUn+1 +VUnV ) +VUn+1V ⇔ (VVU −DV −DVU )(VUn −Dn )  (4.77) 
 
Indeed, it is now straigthforward to find the roots of this simplified expression. The first root 
€ 
D1 =VU  can be immediately discarded, as we know from the previous relations (4.71) and 
(4.72) that 
€ 
KTS  > 
€ 
KU  when D = 
€ 
VU . Therefore, the only level of debt D that implies 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU  
is the second root D2 of this expression, which is 
 
€ 
VVU −DV −DVU = 0⇔D(V +VU ) =VVU ⇔D =
VVU
(V +VU )
=VU
V
V +VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  (4.78) 
 
This level of debt is thus clearly inferior to 
€ 
VU  since the factor 
€ 
V /(
€ 
V +
€ 
VU ) is definitely inferior 
to one38. Yet, this result does not directly allow to comprehend consistent economic 
explanations. However, this result may be restated in some other meaningul ways, as the 
expression (4.78) is equivalent to some other market value ratios. Indeed, we can rearrange this 
expression considering 
 
€ 
D = VUVVU +V
⇔DVU +VVUV
=1⇔D VUVUV
+
V
VUV
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ =1⇔D 1V +
1
VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ =1⇔ DV +
D
VU
=1 (4.79) 
 
This expression can now be interpreted ; this particular level of debt is such that the sum of 
both market value leverage ratios D/
€ 
V  and D/
€ 
VU  is equal to one. Equivalently, the expression 
(4.79) also means that we have 
 
€ 
D
V +
D
VU
=1⇔ DVU
= 1− DV
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⇔
D
VU
=
E
V ⇔
D
E =
VU
V  (4.80) 
 
                                               
38 Actually, the factor
€ 
V /(V +VU )  is only equal to one when 
€ 
VU = 0 which implies 
€ 
VTS = 0 and therefore 
€ 
V = 0. 
This case is obviously not worth considering. 
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From the relation (4.80), we can derive some conclusions. First, we have D/E < 1 since 
€ 
VU /V <1 for any D > 0. Therefore, this implies 
 
€ 
D
E <1⇔
D
V <
E
V ⇔
D
V < 1−
D
V
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⇔
2D
V <1⇔
D
V <
1
2⇔
E
V >
1
2  (4.81) 
 
Furthermore, since we know from the relation (4.80) that E/
€ 
V  = D/
€ 
VU , and deriving the 
expressions for the leverage ratios D/
€ 
V  and D/
€ 
VU  from the condition (4.78), these results may 
be summarized as 
 
€ 
D
VU
=
V
V +VU
>
1
2    and   
€ 
D
V =
VU
V +VU
<
1
2   (4.82) 
 
We can now calculate the difference between the ratio D/
€ 
VU   and the ratio D/
€ 
V , which yields 
    
€ 
D
VU
−
D
V =
V
V +VU
−
VU
V +VU
=
V −VU
V +VU
=
VTS
V +VU
 (4.83) 
 
As we know now both the sum between these ratios from the relation (4.79) and the difference 
between these ratios from the relation (4.83), we can explicit them further. Indeed, adding the 
relation (4.79) to the relation (4.83) gives an explicit value for the ratio D/
€ 
VU ,  as shows 
 
   
€ 
D
VU
+
D
V +
D
VU
−
D
V =1+
VTS
V +VU
⇔ 2 DVU
=1+ VTSV +VU
⇔
D
VU
=
1
2 +
1
2
VTS
V +VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  (4.84) 
 
As D/
€ 
V  = 1 – D/
€ 
VU , it is then straightforward to get a similar expression for D/
€ 
V , which is 
 
   
€ 
D
V =1−
1
2 +
1
2
VTS
V +VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ =
1
2 −
1
2
VTS
V +VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  (4.85) 
 
Therefore, we have shown that, in order to have 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU , the sum of both leverage ratios 
€ 
D /VU  and D/
€ 
V  has to be equal to one, which requires they are both very close to 1/2. Indeed, 
the symmetric gap factor is really small since 
 
   
€ 
1
2
VTS
V +VU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ =
VTS
2(VU +VTS +VU )
=
VTS
2(2VU +VTS )
=
VTS
4VU + 2VTS
 (4.86) 
 
Equivalently, in terms of absolute level of debt instead of leverage ratios, this level of debt D is 
slightly superior to the half of 
€ 
VU  – actually, we have shown that the factor 
€ 
V /(
€ 
V +
€ 
VU ) we had 
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initially considered, and which is in fact equal to the ratio D/
€ 
VU , is close to 1/2 –, and slightly 
inferior to the half of 
€ 
V . 
 
Roughly said, these results can be approximated by considering that 
€ 
KTS  ≈ 
€ 
KU  when the firm is 
half debt financed, half equity financed. Referring to the leverage ratios of the firm, this 
approximation may be stated as 
 
€ 
D
VU
≈
D
V ≈
1
2  (4.87) 
 
From an economic point of view, this has indeed some sense. Approximately, as long as 
€ 
D /E <1, the debt tax shields TS are less risky than the flows ECF shareholders would get if 
the firm was only equity financed (
€ 
KTS  < 
€ 
KU ); indeed, for low levels of debt, the tax shields 
are rather sure flows. On the other hand, when D/
€ 
E  > 1, the riskiness of the tax shields is 
greater ; as there is more debt, more interests are paid and, while annual tax shield’ flows TS 
potentially increase, they are also riskier. Actually, they then become riskier than the ECF are 
when the firm has no debt (
€ 
KTS  > 
€ 
KU ). 
 
In other words, the assumption 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU  appears to refer to a case where we (approximately) 
assume that the firm has a capital structure equally divided between debt and equity. If the firm 
is more equity financed than debt financed, using 
€ 
KU  to discount the tax shields undervalues 
the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS , since these tax shields are not that risky. If the firm has 
more debt than equity, then using 
€ 
KU  as the discount factor for the tax shields overvalues 
€ 
VTS , 
since the higher leverage of the firm accounts for a higher financial risk as more interest 
expenses have to be paid, which makes the risk of the tax shields greater. 
 
We now conclude about the differences between our perfectly general setup and setups where 
the risk of the tax shield is either assumed equal to 
€ 
KD  – which can be considered constant or 
not – and 
€ 
KU . 
 
Obviously, as we have shown, the case where the risk of the tax shield is 
€ 
KD , which is 
assumed constant, is the most erroneous setup. This systematically overvalues to a great extent 
the present value of the tax shields and hence the firm, as the actual riskiness of the tax shield 
flow is considerably undervalued. Considering 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KD  constant is as wrong as considering a 
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risk-free investment risky. Yet, here it is precisely the other way around ; the tax shield is to 
some extent risky and is not a free lunch, as tax shields mean somehow financial risk for the 
firm. 
 
The case where the tax shield’s discount rate is a variable 
€ 
KD , as we have previously 
presented, is less erroneous as it takes into account this increase in financial risk when the 
leverage increases. However, this assumption still overvalues the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS  as tax shields are riskier than the debt itself, as we have extensively developed in the 
previous sections. Incidentally, it can be noted than if D = 
€ 
VU , since 
€ 
KD  is then equal to 
€ 
KU , 
this case would be equivalent to the last case where 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU , and if D > 
€ 
VU , this case would 
actually give a less wrong value for 
€ 
VTS  – yet surely not a correct value, as it still greatly 
overvalues 
€ 
VTS  since 
€ 
KTS  is then greater than 
€ 
KE , as we have seen when deriving the correct 
€ 
KTS  – than the last case. Anyway, from an economic point of view, these values for debt are 
unlikely to happen. 
 
Finally, the last case where 
€ 
KTS  = 
€ 
KU , which is constant, does not necessarily mean an 
overvaluation of 
€ 
VTS , neither an undervaluation. For levels of debt such that the ratio D/E is 
(approximately) close to one, this assumption gives (approximately) correct values for the 
present value of tax shields. If this ratio is appreciably inferior to one, then this assumption 
undervalues 
€ 
VTS , as tax shields for low levels of debt are not as risky as 
€ 
KU . Inversely, if this 
ratio is superior to one, then this assumption overvalues 
€ 
VTS , as the tax shields become riskier 
than the required return for the unlevered equity. All in all, this assumption is a decent 
approximation for firms whose capital structure is not expected to considerably change – which 
is precisely the assumption of the HP setup, since 
€ 
Dt /Vt = L constant for any time t –, but only 
if the ratio D/E is close to one.  
 
These considerations conclude the present section, where we have extensively discussed the 
differences between our general modelization for the risk of the tax shields and the usual 
assumptions we find in most valuation setups.  
 
Before illustrating our results through different graphics and examples, we conclude these 
theoretic developments by considering a last notion : the widely used weighted average cost of 
capital WACC.  
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IV.4.3. ADJUSTING THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL 
The concept of the 
€ 
WACC  is widely developed in the literature over discounted cash flows’ 
valuation. This rates synthetizes the actual costs of the whole capital used by the firm in order 
to finance its activities. Annualy, these costs are the interest expenses paid to debtholders 
€ 
KDD 
and the returns owed to shareholders according to both the business and the financial risks of 
the firm 
€ 
KEE, whether or not these returns are actually paid as dividends. Additionaly, this 
weighted average cost of capital is adjusted to take into account the tax shields’ benefits, which 
is the deductibility of the interest expenses and therefore the advantage to debt financing 
instead of equity financing, since dividends are not tax deductible. 
 
Since the 
€ 
WACC  is an aggregated parameter, discounting cash flows with the 
€ 
WACC  does not 
allow to discriminate between the different sources of value creation – since we only use the 
FCF as accounting flows –, and the different risks 
€ 
KD , 
€ 
KE , and 
€ 
KTS  do not explicitely appear. 
This concept of 
€ 
WACC  is therefore not the main point of the paper, since we have precisely 
and purposely built a whole model where all the rates are explicitely derived and all 
interrelated, such that they vary with the leverage ratio and the profitability of the firm, while 
the 
€ 
WACC  is usually assumed constant in very most setups. 
 
Nevertheless, we now present some considerations about this composite rate, and propose a 
generalized formula for the 
€ 
WACC  which is consistent with the notion of market value balance 
sheet. At first glance, we could simply substitute for the cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE  and the cost 
of debt 
€ 
KD  in its general formula (2.12), or opt for the further detailed formula (2.13), in which 
case we would also insert the discount rate for tax shields 
€ 
KTS . As for the cost of levered equity 
€ 
KE , this would require a(n) (even more) non trivial substitution process, but this is indeed 
possible. 
 
We rather opt for another option. For so doing, we need to remember that all these discount 
rates (and so the 
€ 
WACC ) are market value discount rates ; specifically, this means that their 
inputs are market value elements from either the assets side or the liabilities side of the market 
value balance sheet, which are either E, D, 
€ 
VU  or 
€ 
VTS . However, it is worth noting that in any 
formula for the 
€ 
WACC , the deductibility of the interests are always considered by the factor 
€ 
KDDτ, which is the usual modelization of the tax shield accounting flow, as we know from the 
relation (2.19).  
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Firstly, we know now that this accounting modelization may be refined, as we have done in the 
concerned section when deriving a precise expression (4.51) for the tax shield flow, which is in 
any case always inferior or equal to EBITτ.  
 
Secondly and more importantly, there is an apparent inconsistency when using an accounting 
flow in a market value discount rate ; indeed, the market value total cost of capital, as any other 
market value discount rate, should take into account only market value elements, and not 
particular accounting flows that happen in a particular year. Indeed, as for any other rate, if the 
level of debt changes from year to year, then the value of the 
€ 
WACC  should adapt to take into 
account the variation in the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS , and not consider the particular tax 
shield flow TSt of a particular year.  
 
If both the debt (Dt = D) and the operating profitability (
€ 
VUt =VU ) are expected to stay constant 
and such that we have EBIT  > 
€ 
KDD, then we effectively and consistently have 
 
€ 
TSt = KDD( )tτ = KTStVTSt = KTSt
KDD( )tτ
KTSt
 (4.88) 
 
Incidentally, this allows to point out that, since 
€ 
KTS  > 
€ 
KD  for any D > 0, the present value of 
the tax shields 
€ 
VTS  is, in a perpetuity case, equal to 
 
€ 
VTS =
KD
KTS
τD < τD (4.89) 
 
The higher the leverage, the greater the difference for the value of 
€ 
VTS  compared to MM setup. 
 
As soon as the level of debt D fluctuates, then the perpetuity formula does not hold anymore 
and therefore the usual formula for the 
€ 
WACC  mixes an accounting flow – which may vary 
and whose amount that particular year is not necessarily consistent with the whole present 
value of tax shields, since the level of debt varies – with the market value elements D and E, 
which supposedly does take into account the present value of tax shields and not the particular 
tax shield flow of that year. 
 
This seems to violate the basic principle of discounted cash flows’ methods, which derive 
market value elements by discounting accounting flows at market value discount rates. 
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Therefore, we rearrange the 
€ 
WACC  formula in order to only consider market value elements. 
Referring to the market value balance sheet, and in particular to the relation (2.9), the 
€ 
WACC  
is precisely equal to : 
- (a) the debtholders’ market value return 
€ 
KDD – which is, as long as the market value of the 
debt is assumed equal to its book value, the interests paid –, plus  
- (b) the equityholders’ market value return 
€ 
KEE – which takes into account the present value 
of the tax shields that both lowers the risk 
€ 
KE  and increases the market value 
€ 
E –, minus  
- (c) the “present value of tax shields’ market value return” 
€ 
KTS
€ 
VTS  – which is, like the other 
elements, the return (or equivalently the risk) of the whole present value of tax shields, times 
this present value,  
divided by the total market value on which all the investors – that is, both shareholders and 
debtholders – have claims, which is the market value of the firm. 
 
This may be written as 
 
€ 
WACC = KEE + KDD−KTSVTSV = KE
E
V + KD
D
V −KTS
VTS
V  (4.90) 
and referring to the relation (2.8), this is equivalent to 
 
€ 
WACC = KU
VU
V  (4.91) 
 
These relations (4.90) and (4.91) can easily be interpreted from an economic point of view ; 
indeed, the 
€ 
WACC  is equal to the unlevered cost of capital, adjusted for the financing side 
effects of the capital structure of the firm, which are specifically the debt tax shields’ benefits. 
These formulas for the 
€ 
WACC  are now perfectly consistent with the notion of market value 
balance sheet.  
 
However, the definition itself of the 
€ 
WACC  implies to build this parameter in such a way that 
it is rather not meaningful to use it if there are significant variations in the capital structure of 
the firm from year to year. 
 
To realize this unconvenient lack of flexibility of the parameter 
€ 
WACC , consider the following 
example.  
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Let assume a company that has a perpetual operating result 
€ 
EBIT = X  and therefore a 
perpetual 
€ 
NOPLAT = X(1− τ ) , which is equal to the 
€ 
FCF  because new investments, if any, 
are every year exactly compensated by the assets’ depreciation, and because the Working 
Capital supposedly does not vary (
€ 
ΔWC = 0). The company is currently only equity financed 
€ 
(EBook 0 =VBook 0 ) , but the management has decided that the next year t = 1, since they are aware 
of the tax deductibility of the debt interests which allows to create (financing) value, the firm 
will be leveraged at a particular level of debt 0 < D1 < 
€ 
V  such that the firm will realize an 
accounting tax shield flow TS1, which can always be referred to as a proportion of the 
operating result ; therefore, we can consider a parameter 
€ 
α  such that 
€ 
TS1 =αX , with 
€ 
0 <α < τ  
which implies 
€ 
TS1 =αX ≤ Xτ = EBITτ .  
 
This last condition makes sure that the tax shield is inferior or equal to its maximum possible 
value, such that 
€ 
TS1 =αX  is effectively realized that year t = 1. Therefore, we can also say that 
the firm will pay next year some interest expenses 
€ 
(KD1D1) = Xα /τ( ), such that its earnings 
before taxes in year 1 is 
€ 
EBT1 = X − (Xα /τ) = X(1−α /τ ) > 0  and consequently the firm will 
pay some taxes 
€ 
I1 = EBT1τ = Xτ −αX = X(τ −α) > 0, since 
€ 
α < τ . 
 
However, we consider that this firm will only use debt financing that year  t = 1 ; for any 
reason, the firm will repay its debt principal after year 1, and will only be equity financed 
again, and this for perpetuity.  
 
This absolutely simplistic case could be refined with more sensible economic considerations ; 
yet, this is not the point here, as we just want to make clear the inconvenience of the 
€ 
WACC . 
In any case, the simplicity and the total generality of this example will highlight the problem 
one might encounter when considering the 
€ 
WACC  for valuation purpose.  
 
If the firm had not used debt in year 1, then this case would collapse to a perpetuity case and 
then the market value of the firm 
€ 
V  considering the 
€ 
WACC , APV and ECF methods was 
obviously 
€ 
V = X(1− τ) /KU = X(1− τ ) /KE = X(1− τ) /WACC  since 
€ 
KU = KE =WACC  when 
there is no debt. Incidentally, this value 
€ 
V  can be lower or higher than 
€ 
EBook 0  depending on the 
difference between the 
€ 
ROIC = X(1− τ ) /EBook 0 and the cost of unlevered capital 
€ 
KU . If ROIC > 
€ 
KU , then 
€ 
V  > 
€ 
EBook 0 , which means that there is an operating value creation that we have 
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referred to as Opearing MVA (OMVA). If ROIC < 
€ 
KU , then 
€ 
V  < 
€ 
EBook 0 and therefore there is 
(operating) value destruction, and finally if ROIC = 
€ 
KU , then the firm realizes operating 
performances that just compensates for the risk related to an equity investment in that 
particular kind of business and in this particular sector (
€ 
V =
€ 
EBook 0 ). 
 
However, the firm creates also some financing value in our case, since realizing the debt tax 
shield 
€ 
TS1 =αX  in year 1. As this flow is about to happen soon (in one year), it has definitely 
some present value 
€ 
VTS  that has to be added to the unlevered value of the firm 
€ 
VU = X(1− τ) /KU .  
 
This is precisely where comes the problem with the 
€ 
WACC . Indeed, valuing the flows that will 
happen from year 2 till infinity is only reconsidering the previous case which assumed there 
was not debt, but one year from now. Therefore, the three methods 
€ 
WACC , APV and ECF 
yield consistently all the same value for these flows. The issue is about the cash flows that will 
happen in year 1, which are the 
€ 
NOPLAT = X(1− τ ) and the debt tax shield 
€ 
TS1 =αX . 
 
Indeed, for the 
€ 
WACC  to yield the same discounted cash flows’ value than both the APV and 
ECF method for these two flows that will happen in year 1, we need to have  
 
€ 
X(1− τ )
1+WACC1
=
X(1− τ)
1+ KU
+
αX
1+ KTS1
=
(X(1− τ) − (αX /τ ))(1− τ)
1+ KE1
+
αX /τ
1+ KD1
⇔ X (1− τ)1+WACC1
= X (1− τ)1+ KU
+
α
1+ KTS1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ = X
((1− τ) − (α /τ))(1− τ )
1+ KE1
+
α /τ
1+ KD1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
 
 
 
(4.92) 
 
As 
€ 
EBIT = X  is assumed superior to 0, we can cancel the 
€ 
X , which yields 
 
€ 
(1− τ)
1+WACC1
=
(1− τ)
1+ KU
+
α
1+ KTS1
=
((1− τ ) − (α /τ ))(1− τ)
1+ KE1
+
α /τ
1+ KD1
 (4.93) 
 
For brevity, we now only focus on the comparison between the 
€ 
WACC  method and the APV 
method. Therefore, we can see from (4.93) that we have two unknowns to solve, since the 
parameter α is not an unknown but is just left unconstrained so far in order to derive general 
conclusions.  
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These two unknowns are the 
€ 
WACC1  – in which we are interested –, and the risk of the tax 
shield 
€ 
KTS1 . However, the actual value of the risk of the tax shield 
€ 
KTS1  is not important to 
derive here. Indeed, if considering our setup, and referring to the general formula (4.44) for 
€ 
KTS , then this value will depend on numerous interrelated values for other parameters ; 
specifically, the unlevered value of the firm 
€ 
VU , the level of debt D1 such that the cost of debt 
€ 
KD1will allow the firm to realize a tax shield 
€ 
TS1 = (KD1D1)τ =αX , the present value of tax 
shields 
€ 
VTS  and the total market value of the firm 
€ 
V . However, this present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS  and therefore the total market value of the firm 
€ 
V  are precisely what we try to derive39. 
Furthermore, the point we try to make clear here about the relative inflexibility of the 
€ 
WACC
does not require to consider our setup, neither any setup though ; this is the definition per se of 
this parameter that may result in meaningless values for the 
€ 
WACC , not the assumptions made 
about 
€ 
KTS  neither about any other discount rate. 
 
Therefore, as this value for 
€ 
KTS1 is not relevant to our development, we may consider a 
parameter 
€ 
β  such that 
€ 
β(1+ KTS1 ) =α = TS1 /X  ; in other words, this parameter 
€ 
β  still 
considers the ratio of the tax shield flow over the operating result, but discounts this ratio with 
the appropriate discount factor .  
 
As we have in any case 
€ 
KTS  > 0, it is straightforward to see that 
€ 
β <α  ; still, this parameter 
€ 
β  
is a perfectly general ratio for the tax shield flow compared to the operating result, since any 
increase in 
€ 
TS  - up to its maximum value EBITτ – overcompensates the increase in the 
discount factor (1 + 
€ 
KTS ) – and obviously so if 
€ 
KTS  is assumed constant – when the level of 
debt D increases. Moreover, 
€ 
β(1+ KTS1 ) =α  implies 
€ 
β < τ /(1+ KTS1 )  since 
€ 
α < τ , such that we 
may say that we always have 
€ 
0 < β <1/2 since we typically have 
€ 
τ ≤1/2 .  
 
Consequently, when focusing on the 
€ 
WACC  and APV methods, the expression (4.93) may be 
restated as 
 
€ 
(1− τ)
1+WACC1
=
(1− τ)
1+ KU
+
α
1+ KTS1
=
(1− τ)
1+ KU
+
β(1+ KTS1 )
1+ KTS1
=
(1− τ )
1+ KU
+ β  (4.94) 
 
                                                
39 This is typically the circularity problem we have mentioned in the section III.1.2.2. In order to solve it, we need 
to use a spreadsheet application that solves these circular relations using iterative calculus. See the examples in the 
section IV.6. 
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We now have an expression that does not depend explicitely anymore from the appropriate 
discount rate for the tax shield flow TS1  that will be realized in t = 1. Alternatively, this is 
equivalent to say that we consider any value for 
€ 
KTS , which can be assumed constant or not. 
 
This expression (4.94) is also equivalent to 
€ 
(1− τ)
1+WACC1
=
(1− τ)
1+ KU
+ β ⇔
(1− τ)
1+WACC1
=
(1− τ) + β(1+ KU )
1+ KU
 (4.95) 
 
From the relation (4.95), solving for the 
€ 
WACC , we have 
€ 
(1− τ)
1+WACC1
=
(1− τ ) + β(1+ KU )
1+ KU
⇔WACC1 =
(1− τ )(1+ KU )
(1− τ ) + β(1+ KU )
−1 (4.96) 
 
Rearranging this last expression (4.96) yields 
€ 
WACC1 =
(1− τ )(1+ KU ) − (1− τ ) −β(1+ KU )
(1− τ ) + β(1+ KU )
⇔WACC1 =
KU (1− τ ) −β(1+ KU )
(1− τ) + β(1+ KU )
 (4.97) 
 
Consistently with the definition of the 
€ 
WACC , it is straightforward to see from relations (4.96) 
and (4.97) that this 
€ 
WACC1  decreases with the leverage since the firm benefits then from debt 
tax shields ; specifically here, the parameter 
€ 
β  accounts for these benefits, as it represents the 
ratio of the tax shield flow to come next year divided by the operating result, and adjusted by 
the appropriate discount factor for the tax shield. If there was no tax shield to come, then 
€ 
β  = 0 
and 
€ 
WACC1  = 
€ 
KU . 
 
However, this 
€ 
WACC1 , which we have derived from totally general assumptions, is not quite 
right. Indeed, we now show that considering the 
€ 
WACC  when valuing firms whose capital 
structure is expected to change (like in this simplified example) is not meaningful, whatever we 
use as inputs the present value of the tax shields or the accounting tax shield flow of that year.  
 
Indeed, it comes directly here that there is a particular level for the ratio 
€ 
β  such that this 
€ 
WACC1  is equal to zero ; this happens when 
€ 
β =
(1− τ )KU
1+ KU
 (4.98) 
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as shows, substituting for 
€ 
β  from the relation (4.98) into the relation (4.96), 
€ 
WACC1 =
(1− τ )(1+ KU )
(1− τ ) + (1− τ)KU1+ KU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ (1+ KU )
−1⇔WACC1 =
(1− τ)(1+ KU )
(1− τ)(1+ KU )
−1⇔WACC1 = 0 
(4.99) 
 
Incidentally, this implies the actual accounting ratio α to be 
€ 
α =
1+ KTS1
1+ KU
(1− τ )KU =
TS1
X  (4.100) 
 
In any case, this ratio is small, and roughly said, most likely to be inferior to 1/10, for example 
considering normal assumptions of 
€ 
τ ≤1/2 , 
€ 
KU ≤1/10 and definitely 
€ 
(1+ KTS ) /(1+ KU ) < 2, 
such that this actual level of debt D1 is surely not an extreme or meaningless level of debt. 
 
Furthermore, if 
€ 
β  is superior to this particular level 
€ 
(1− τ )KU /(1+ KU ), then the 
€ 
WACC1  is 
negative. This does not make much sense to consider null or negative cost of capital. 
 
This would not make sense either to try to smooth the 
€ 
WACC  over the following years, in 
order to give all in all an equivalent value 
€ 
V  for the firm ; first, there are neither accounting tax 
shields’ flows nor obvisouly positive values for 
€ 
VTS  in the subsequent years ; second, this is 
totally unconsistent with a correct discounted cash flow process. Therefore, we will not use the 
€ 
WACC  method when illustrating our setup through a comprehensive stochastic case.  
 
However, for a simplified growing perpetuity case, we can derive a consistent formula for the 
€ 
WACC , which has to be slightly adapted compared to the relations (4.90) and (4.91). 
 
Indeed, we know, from the relation (2.33) when presenting then 
€ 
WACC  method, and from the 
relation (2.37) when presenting the APV method, the form of their respective terminal value 
when we consider growing perpetuities.  
 
Therefore, if we directly consider a growing perpetuity from next year and not as a terminal 
value, we get the present value of the firm 
€ 
V  by 
 
€ 
V =VU +VTS =
FCF1
WACC − g =
FCF1
KU − g
+
TS1
KTS − g
 (4.101) 
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The cash flows FCF1 and TS1 are the cash flows to be realized next year, and they will grow at 
a constant rate g in perpetuity. To yield the market values 
€ 
VU , 
€ 
VTS  and 
€ 
V , the discount rate 
€ 
KTS  
but also the WACC have to be computed at their market value too (the unlevered cost of capital
€ 
KU  is constant). 
 
Solving for the 
€ 
WACC , we have 
 
€ 
V = FCF1WACC − g⇔WACC =
FCF1
V + g  (4.102) 
 
From (4.101), since 
€ 
VU = FCF1 /(KU − g) , then we also have 
€ 
FCF1 =VU (KU − g) , which can be 
inserted in (4.102), and yields  
 
€ 
WACC = VU (KU − g)VU +VTS
+ g
=
VU (KU − g)
VU +VTS
+
g(VU +VTS )
VU +VTS
=
1
VU +VTS
VU (KU − g) + g(VU +VTS )( )
=
1
VU +VTS
VUKU − gVU + gVU + gVTS( )
=
1
VU +VTS
VUKU + gVTS( )
= KU
VU
V + g
VTS
V
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.103) 
 
Referring to the relation (2.8) of the market value balance sheet, this is equivalent to 
 
€ 
WACC = KE
E
V + KD
D
V −KTS
VTS
V + g
VTS
V = KE
E
V + KD
D
V − (KTS − g)
VTS
V  (4.104) 
 
It is definitely worth noting that we have derived the formula (4.103) only by using the equality 
between the APV and the 
€ 
WACC  approaches ; if we now assume that the growth rate g = 0, 
then these expressions (4.103) and (4.104) collapse to the relations (4.90) and (4.91) we have 
previously introduced, and which use the market value return 
€ 
KTS
€ 
VTS  and not the annual tax 
shield accounting flow 
€ 
(KDD)t τ  to compute the 
€ 
WACC .  
 
Indeed, in a growing perpetuity case – where the capital structure does change since both the 
debt and the operating result increase at a rate g, but where this variation follows a fix 
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increasing debt pattern, such that the market value average cost of capital 
€ 
WACC  has a 
meaningful value, compared to the previously detailed case –, then the relation (4.88) does not 
hold anymore and the usual and widely used formula (2.12) for the 
€ 
WACC  does not give the 
same value than these formulas (4.103) and (4.104), which have to be true since only derived 
using the theoretically undiscussed equality between the 
€ 
WACC  and the APV method.   
 
The relevancy of this adjustement 
€ 
gVTS /V  in the formulas can be easily proved. As we know 
from the relation (4.101), the initial tax shield TS1  is equal to TS1 = (
€ 
KTS  – g)
€ 
VTS  since 
€ 
VTS
=TS1/(
€ 
KTS  – g). This tax shield flow TS1 is thus inferior to the “market value return of the tax 
shields” 
€ 
KTS
€ 
VTS  that would have been obtained if the firm had had since the beginning and 
permanently a level of debt DBook equals to its “market value” level of debt D. This is the tricky 
point about a simplified growing perpetuity case. Indeed, if we consider the ECF approach 
instead of the APV approach, then we equivalently have 
 
€ 
V = E + D = FCF1WACC − g =
ECF1
KE − g
+
(KDDBook )1
KD − g
 (4.105) 
 
Therefore, the “market value” of the debt is  
 
€ 
D = (KDDBook )1KD − g
 (4.106) 
 
We use the quotation marks here because this higher market value for the debt – since g > 0 
and therefore 
€ 
KD /(KD − g) >1 – compared to its book value is not due to excess returns or any 
“debt” value creation ; this is simply because the book value of the debt will increase at a 
constant rate g every year and forever. Therefore, this increase in the level of debt will create 
increasing tax shield flows – but which will have the same risk since the operating result also 
increases by g, as requires the simplified assumptions of a growing perpetuity – such that, in 
order to have the equality between the ECF method and the other valuation methods, we need 
to consider the “final” level of debt D. 
 
As we assume that the initial EBIT is greater than the initial interests 
€ 
KDDBook , one could argue 
here that the initial tax shield flow TS1 = (
€ 
KTS  – g)
€ 
VTS  is then also equal to the usual expression 
(2.19) for the tax shield 
€ 
TS = KDDτ  such that the general formula (2.12) is equivalent to the 
formulas (4.103) and (4.104). 
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This can be represented as 
€ 
WACC = KE
E
V + KD
D
V −
(KTS − g)VTS
V = KE
E
V + KD
D
V −
KDDτ
V = KE
E
V + KD (1− τ)
D
V  
 
This is erroneous. The tax shield in year 1 is effectively equal to 
€ 
TS1 = KDDBookτ = (KTS − g)VTS , 
but this last equality between the formula (2.12) and (4.104) for the WACC is wrong because it 
does not consider the just explained point about the “final” level of debt D. The WACC, as any 
other discount rate, is a market value parameter. Therefore, the level of debt D and the market 
value leverage ratio D/V in the formula for the WACC has to consider this “final” level 
€ 
D = KDDBook /(KD − g)  from relation (4.106), such that  
 
€ 
WACC = KE
E
V + KD
D
V −
(KTS − g)VTS
V = KE
E
V + KD
D
V −
KDDBookτ
V ≠ KE
E
V + KD (1− τ )
D
V   
 
If one wants to use an adjusted form of the usual formula (2.12), then this can be done by 
 
€ 
WACC = KE
E
V + KD
D
V − (KTS − g)
VTS
V = KE
E
V + KD 1− τ
DBook
D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V  (4.107) 
 
As the “final” level of debt D is higher than the initial book value of the debt, this adjusted 
expression (4.107) yields a higher value for the WACC – and therefore a lower value for the 
firm – than the usual formula (2.12), which can be stated as 
 
€ 
WACC = KE
E
V + KD 1− τ
DBook
D
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
D
V > KE
E
V + KD (1− τ )
D
V  (4.108) 
 
This is precisely the reason of the adjustement 
€ 
gVTS /V  in the formulas (4.103) and (4.104). 
Discount rates refer to market value elements, not accounting flows. Considering the general 
formula (2.12) would overvalue the present value of tax shields 
€ 
VTS  since it would consider 
that the firm benefits readily from the first year of a tax shield 
€ 
TS1 = KDDτ  while initially 
realizing a tax shield flow of 
€ 
TS1 = KDDBook 0τ < KDDτ  since 
€ 
DBook 0 < D . And it takes time for 
the firm to reach this final level of debt D – basically, a perpetuity… Therefore, the factor 
€ 
gVTS /V  adjusts the WACC and makes it slighty higher. 
 
Incidentally, please also note that when considering a growing perpetuity case, since operating 
result and tax shield flow both increase every year by g, both market value elements D and 
€ 
VU  
also increase by g every year. This implies that the cost of debt 
€ 
KD  does not vary, as we have 
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relevantly modelized it as a function of this leverage ratio D/
€ 
VU . This is the reason why we can 
use the convenient growing perpetuity mathematical simplifications in our setup ; any other 
modelization for a variable cost of debt implies this cost of debt to vary every year in a 
growing perpetuity case and therefore the mathematical simplified formulas cannot apply. 
 
We conclude this section for the WACC by summarizing our different results. For a simplified 
perpetuity case without growth, the relations (4.90) and (4.91) give the correct value of the 
weighted average cost of capital of the firm, and are equivalent to the usual formula (2.12). 
However, for a simplified perpetuity case with growth, the usual formula (2.12) for the WACC 
undervalues this cost, and only the relations (4.103) and (4.104) give correct values, 
considering the theoretical undiscussed equality between the APV and the WACC approach. 
Finally, for general stochastic operating cash flows and debt level patterns, the WACC is not a 
meaningful discount rate. 
 
These statements also conclude the developments and results of this paper. We have derived a 
hundred equations, all related somehow to the appropriate market value discount rates ; all the 
presented results only require the permanent equality between the assets side and the liabilities 
side of the market value balance sheet of the firm. The best way to illustrate them now is to 
represent graphically the difference between these rates. The next section presents graphics 
where one can see the evolution of the different discount rates according to the leverage of the 
firm40. We also represent graphically the evolution of the market value of the firm with this 
leverage, assuming that the unlevered market value of the firm is fixed41. We present these 
graphics for three different assumptions about the marginal debt risk factor ; the case where n = 
1 – linear case –, the case where n = 2 – constant case – and the case where 
€ 
n =1+ 2D /VU  – 
non constant non linear, such that the cost of debt is a transcendetal function of the leverage 
ratio 
€ 
D /VU . Finally, in the last section 4.6, we will illustrate our setup through different 
examples ; specifically, we will present three cases : a perpetuity case assuming 
€ 
n =1+ 2D /VU , 
a growing perpetuity case assuming n = 2 and a totally stochastic case assuming n = 1. In this 
last case, as explained, the WACC valuation method will not be presented. 
                                                
40 Please note that the case where the leverage D/V > 1 may be regarded as the case where the debt book value is 
superior to the market value of the firm. As the market value of equity E is then equal to zero, there is no relevant 
€ 
KE  for these levels of debt. 
41 The curves relevant to the respective market value elements and market value discount rates are the one whose 
final levels are in the same order than the appropriate symbols’ presented order.  
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IV.5. GRAPHICS 
IV.5.1. MARGINAL DEBT RISK FACTOR N = 1 (LINEAR) 
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IV.5.1.3. Market Value Elements functions of the leverage ratio 
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IV.5.2. MARGINAL DEBT RISK FACTOR N = 2 (CONSTANT)  
IV.5.2.1. Market Value Discount Rates functions of the leverage ratio 
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IV.5.2.3. Market Value Elements functions of the leverage ratio 
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IV.5.3. MARGINAL DEBT RISK FACTOR N = 1+2D/VU (TRANSCENDENTAL)  
IV.5.2.1. Market Value Discount Rates functions of the leverage ratio 
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IV.5.2.3. Market Value Elements functions of the leverage ratio 
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IV.6. EXAMPLES 
As we have explained previously, we use in our examples the iterative feature of spreadsheet 
applications in order to determine simultanesouly both market value discount rates and market 
value balance sheet elements. As you will see through the different spreadsheets42, the results 
of the different valuation methods APV, ECF, MVA and WACC – for the perpetuity cases – are 
perfectly equivalent. 
 
As previously said, we present three cases : a perpetuity case assuming 
€ 
n =1+ 2D /VU , a 
growing perpetuity case assuming n = 2 and a fully stochastic case assuming n = 1. For each 
case, we also present significant differences in the assumptions about the operating result EBIT 
and the level of debt D in order to highlight all the results we have presented when deriving our 
general formulas. Finally, in order to make some comparisons between the different cases, we 
keep the same assumptions for the unlevered cost of capital (
€ 
KU = 8% ), the risk-free rate 
€ 
(RF = 3%), the corporate tax rate (
€ 
τ = 30%) and the book value of the firm (
€ 
VBook =1750). 
 
For the perpetuities cases, the FCF is equal to the NOPLAT, as perpetuities assume normalized 
performance of the company ; in any case, considering that both could be different does not 
change anything to the perfect equality between the methods43. In these cases, formulas 
dramatically simplify and we also present the levels of debt that theoretically maximize the 
value of the firm – the simple maximization, where we have 
€ 
D =VU , and the strict 
maximization, where we have 
€ 
D = D* =V . 
 
We start with the basic non growing perpetuity case. Purposely, we assume a high level of debt 
(D = 1200) and a perpetual operating result which is slightly superior to the result that would 
just cover the business risk faced by shareholders (EBIT = 220). Indeed, if EBIT = 200, then 
€ 
VU = 200 /8% =1750 , which is the book value of the firm. Here, we have 
€ 
VU = 220 /8% =1925  
and therefore the operating market value added is 
€ 
OMVA =1925 −1750 =175. Consequently, 
as 
€ 
n =1+ 2D /VU , we have 
€ 
n =1+ 2 × (1200 /1925) ≈ 2,25  ; as the level of debt is high, the 
marginal riskiness of any increase in D is also high, and the whole debt is surely risky. This 
makes the present value of the tax shields relatively low for such a level of debt, and actually 
                                                
42 Microsoft Office Excel 2008 has been used here. 
43 We just have to adjust the expression for the ROIC as ROIC = FCF/VBook. This is what we have done for the 
stochastic case where the free cash flows are then different from the NOPLAT. 
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insifignicantly superior to the operating value creation 
€ 
(VTS ≈175 =OMVA). This shows that 
sound operating performance is definitely much likely to create value for shareholders that a 
risky financial leverage. Additionaly, it can be noted that the tax shield flow is relevantly equal 
to the market value discount rate for the tax shields times this present value for tax shields 
€ 
(TS = KDDτ = KTSVTS ≈17) , such that both the usual formula (2.12) for the WACC and the 
derived market value formulas (4.90) and (4.91) yield the same results. Finally, please note 
that, in any non growth perpetuity case, the simple maximization level for the debt 
€ 
D =VU  
always allows to derive directly the market value of the firm 
€ 
V . Inded, as 
€ 
KD = KU  when 
€ 
D =VU , then the interest expenses are 
€ 
KDD = KUVU  and therefore the tax shield flow is 
€ 
TS = KUVUτ . Moreover, since we have shown that 
€ 
KTS = KD + (KE−VTS −KD )(D /V )  – which is 
the general expression (4.44) for 
€ 
KTS  – , then we have 
€ 
KTS = KU + (KE−VTS −KU )(VU /V ) when 
€ 
D =VU . Finally, we know from relation (4.64) that 
€ 
KE−VTS = KU + (KU − RF )n  for this particular 
level of debt 
€ 
D =VU .  
 
Therefore, we have 
€ 
KTS = KU + (KU + (KU − RF )n −KU )(VU /V ) = KU + (KU − RF )n(VU /V )  for 
any n when 
€ 
D =VU . Consequently, the market value 
€ 
V  of the firm is  
 
€ 
V =VU +VTS =VU +
KUVUτ
KTS
=VU +
KUVUτ
KU + (KU − RF )n(VU /V )
  
 
As all the parameters from this expression are know except 
€ 
V , we can solve for 
€ 
V , as shows 
 
€ 
V =VU +
KUVUτ
KU + (KU − RF )n(VU /V )
=VU +
VKUVUτ
VKU + (KU − RF )nVU
⇔V 1− KUVUτVKU + (KU − RF )nVU
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ =VU
⇔V VKU + (KU − RF )nVU −KUVUτ( ) =VU (VKU + (KU − RF )nVU )
⇔V 2KU +V (KU − RF )nVU −KUVU (1+ τ )( ) −VU 2(KU − RF )n = 0
⇔V 2KU −V RFnVU + KUVU (1+ τ − n)( ) −VU 2(KU − RF )n = 0
 
 
 
This equation gives two roots for 
€ 
V , but only one is meaningful since the other is negative, 
such that the market value of the firm when 
€ 
D =VU  is 
 
€ 
V = RFnVU + KUVU (1+ τ − n)( ) + RFnVU + KUVU (1+ τ − n)( )
2
+ 4KU (KU − RF )n
2KU
  
 
Full details of the present non growing perpetuity case are presented in the next table. 
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The next example is a growing perpetuity case. As we have mentioned in the WACC section, 
our dynamic setup only applies for the mathematical simplifications of a growing perpetuity 
because we have relevantly modelized the cost of debt as a function of the leverage ratio 
€ 
D /VU  
and, since D and 
€ 
VU  increase every year by g, the cost of debt does not vary. Any other 
modelization for a variable cost of debt would imply this cost of debt to vary year after year, 
and so all the other discount rates, such that one could not use the growing perpetuities 
formulas. 
 
Please note that we refer to the « market value » cost of debt 
€ 
KD , that is the cost of debt that 
considers the « final » level of debt D and not the initial value DBook. This is consistent with the 
fact that discount rates are market value discount rates. Economically, this can also be easily 
interpreted ; for a firm, requiring that its debtholders increase their investment by a constant 
rate g every year has a cost. Providing annual extra funds on a fix and determined basis implies 
additional risks for debtholders, which then increase their initial required interest rate. 
 
In the WACC section, we have extensively discussed the appropriate form of the WACC for a 
growing perpetuity case. This WACC has to be computed according to the respective market 
value weights of the different elements of the market value balance sheet. Therefore, this 
market value WACC, like the 
€ 
KD  and like all the other discount rates, does not vary from year 
to year in such a growing perpetuity case.  
 
We discuss now the MVA approach, which uses the WACC as the discount factor. First, if we 
refer to the formula (2.45) which gives a general expression for the market value of a company 
if we assume a growing perpetuity as terminal value, then the formula to value a firm 
considering a growing perpetuity starting in t = 1 is  
 
€ 
V =VBook +
(ROIC1 −WACC) × InvestedCapital0
WACC − g =VBook +
(ROIC1 −WACC)VBook
WACC − g   
 
Actually, this formula makes different assumptions about the growth g, and does not yield the 
same results than the other methods if used so. It is not wrong ; it just does not make the same 
assumptions. Indeed, this formula consider that the economic spread – the difference (ROIC – 
WACC) – is positive but does not increase ; in other words, this means that the Invested Capital 
– which is the book value of the firm minus the accounting profits/losses realized every year, 
or in other words, the money invested by both shareholders and debtholders in the company – 
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also grows every year by g since 
€ 
ROICt = NOPLATt /InvestedCapitalt−1 and since the 
operating result EBIT and therefore the NOPLAT do grow at a constant rate g. 
 
As we already know that the debt grows at a constant rate g, this means that the Equity 
Invested Capital also increases by this rate. This is perfectly possible – and actually, more 
realistic than a continous growth of the retun on capital over the cost of capital. But in any 
case, this obviously does not yield the same value for 
€ 
V  than the other methods, as shows 
 
€ 
V =VBook +
(ROIC1 −WACC)VBook
WACC − g
=
VBook (WACC − g) + (ROIC1 −WACC)VBook
WACC − g
=
(ROIC1 − g)VBook
WACC − g
=
NOPLAT1
WACC − g −
gVBook
WACC − g
=V − gVBookWACC − g <V
  
 
In other words, this assumes that the NOPLAT increases by g because the capital invested by 
both shareholders and debtholders also increases by g, such that the return on capital, yet 
superior to its cost, is constant. Again, this is perfectly sensible and rather more likely to occur, 
but this gives a inferior value for 
€ 
V  since there is not such a large value creation. However, if 
we want to have a MVA formula that yields the same results than the other methods, then we 
have to consider that the firm switches every year part of its equity for debt, with the debt 
growing at a constant rate g ; consequently, the Invested Capital is constant and equal to the 
initial book value of the firm. If we assume so, then the MVA approach gives the same result 
than the ECF, APV and WACC approaches, as shows 
 
€ 
V =VBook +
(ROICt −WACC)VBook
(1+WACC)tt=1
∞
∑
=VBook +
(ROIC1(1+ g)t−1 −WACC)VBook
(1+WACC)tt=1
∞
∑
=VBook +
ROIC1(1+ g)t−1VBook
(1+WACC)t −
WACC ×VBook
(1+WACC)tt=1
∞
∑
t=1
∞
∑
=VBook +
ROIC1 ×VBook
WACC − g −VBook =
NOPLAT1
WACC − g
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Therefore, rearranging the last expression in order to show explicitely the economic spread 
which is specific to the MVA approach, we have 
 
€ 
V =VBook +
ROIC1 ×VBook
WACC − g −VBook
=VBook +
ROIC1 ×VBook
WACC − g −
(WACC − g)VBook
WACC − g
=VBook +
(ROIC1 − (WACC − g))VBook
WACC − g
=VBook +
((ROIC1 + g) −WACC)VBook
WACC − g
  
 
We now clearly see that this growth rate g also applies to the operating return since added to 
the ROIC from the first year. Whether or not this assumption is realistic is not the point ; 
actually, valuing firms only by a simplified perpetuity formula is already not that realistic. Still, 
the MVA approach now yields equivalent results to the other methods. Furthermore, the WACC 
has been relevantly adjusted and is higher than the the value it would have using the general 
formula (2.12), compensating somehow the optimistic assumption about the operating growth 
of the firm. Similarly, the Operating MVA (OMVA) may be so derived and is equal to  
 
€ 
OMVA = ((ROIC1 + g) −KU )VBookKU − g
  
 
We can now detail the assumptions we take for this growing perpetuity example. We assume a 
initial level of debt not too high (
€ 
DBook = 500) compared to both the book value of the firm and 
the previous example. We also assume an initial operating result that, if not growing, would 
yield a lower value for the unlevered market value of the firm than its book value 
€ 
(EBIT1 =175) . But as we consider a growing perpetuity case, both the operating performance 
and the leverage of the firm grow at a constant rate which is usually regarded as decent for 
valuation purpose 
€ 
(g = 2%). Finally, remember we assume the marginal debt risk factor to be 
constant but superior to one 
€ 
(n = 2) .  
 
Since the operating result is initially insufficient to compensate the business risk 
€ 
KUof the firm, 
the operating economic spread is initially negative 
€ 
(ROIC1 < KU ) but the « total » economic 
spread – which considers the financing effect – is almost null thanks to the leverage 
€ 
(ROIC1 ≈WACC). As the level of debt is initially not too high and since the operating 
performance, even if not good initially, grows afterwards at a sound constant rate, the cost of 
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debt (
€ 
KD ≈ 4%) and the risk of the tax shields (
€ 
KTS ≈ 7,5%) are not too high, which yields a 
present value for the tax shields 
€ 
(VTS ≈115) not that inferior to the previous case where the 
leverage was permanently really high. Still, the operating value creation accounts for the 
largest part in the market value added of the firm 
€ 
(OMVA ≈ 290) . In the end, the firm has a 
market value which is about 25% over its book value 
€ 
(V ≈ 2155) . This is not bad for a 
company which is, during the initial years, destroying value if not considering the tax shields. 
This could be assimilated to a(n) (optimistic case of) promising company in its early stages.  
 
This example seems also like a rather decent case concerning the capital structure of the firm 
and its leverage ratio. Indeed, we can see that, even if the firm had a much larger leverage 
initially, still this would not create much more value in the end, as the value of the firm in both 
theoretic maximization cases is not that higher – if 
€ 
D =VU , then 
€ 
V ≈ 2285, and if 
€ 
D = D* =V , 
then 
€ 
V ≈ 2330 . Also for the shareholders, their market value discount rate is not that high 
€ 
(KE ≈11%), even without the tax shields’ flows 
€ 
(KE−VTS ≈11,5%), since the present value of 
tax shields only accounts for about 10% of the whole equity. All this is due to the operating 
growth, since a constant growth rate of 2% is a solid securing asset. 
 
Even if the debt increases, the firm ends up with market value leverage ratios which are not too 
high –
€ 
D /VU ≈ 48% and 
€ 
D /V ≈ 45%  –, but large enough to benefit decently from the debt tax 
shields. Therefore, we can make some conclusions about the appropriate leverage ratio for a 
company. If the operating profitability of the firm is significantly greater than its unlevered 
cost of capital 
€ 
(ROIC > KU ) , which implies the unlevered market value of the firm to be 
notably superior to its book value 
€ 
(VU >VBook ), then using a high leverage ratio does create 
significant value, since the risks faced by both debtholders 
€ 
(KD )  and shareholders even without 
tax shields 
€ 
(KE−VTS ) are low, such that the risk of the tax shields 
€ 
(KTS ) is also low, while the tax 
shield flows 
€ 
(TS)  can be increased by rising the level of debt since the operating result (EBIT) 
is surely large enough to cover the interest expenses 
€ 
(KDD) .  When the operating performance 
is just equal to the business risk 
€ 
(ROIC = KU ) , a decent leverage does increase the market 
value of the firm but surely not as much as other setups assume – for example, we have clearly 
€ 
VTS < τD  – and if the operating performance is poor 
€ 
(ROIC < KU ) , leverage is unlikely to 
create any significant additional value. 
 
Full details of the present growing perpetuity case are presented in the next table.  
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We now present a last case, which is the outcome of all our developments and the concluding 
piece of our setup and therefore of this paper : a multiperiod stochastic pattern of operating 
cash flows, coupled with a dynamic debt policy. Additionaly, this case also considers the gain 
of tax credit carried forward, which happens when the firm does not have enough operating 
result to – partially or fully – cover the interest expenses, such that the debt tax shield is not 
realized that year but may be used for tax deduction on future profits, as we have detailed in 
the particular section dealing with the modelization of the tax shield flow. 
 
Even in such a fully dynamic case, we show that the three methods APV, ECF and MVA – as 
explained, the WACC is not relevant here, such that we refer to the adjusted expression (2.48) 
for the MVA – still yield equivalent results if used consistently and, in particular, if considering 
all the appropriate market value discount rates which vary every year with regards to the 
market value weights of their respective relevant elements from the market value balance 
sheet ; simultaneously, the market value of these asset and liability elements also vary every 
year, such that an equilibrium is found using an iterative process. 
 
In order to do so, we need here to pay extra attention to the time indices. The final objective is 
to find the market value of the firm 
€ 
V =V0 , that is its current present value. We assume that we 
are currently at the beginning of year 0, and that the first cash flows will occur one year from 
now. One year from now may be regarded in two ways ; either, it is the very end of year 0, 
either it is the very beginning of year 1. We have to be particularly cautious here, as both 
elements from the market value balance sheet and market value discount rates are computed 
such that they apply to the year to come, while the accounting cash flows occur at the end of 
this year to come, or similarly at the very beginning of the next year ; in other words, a rate 
computed at its market value is relevant to the concerned next cash flow to come, which will 
precisely occur in one year.  
 
To make such a multiperiod case work, we have to consider the second option, since there is a 
discrepancy in time between the valuation of both the market value elements and the market 
value discount rates at the beginning of the year, while the accounting income statements - and 
so supposedly the cash flows - are set at the end of the year. 
 
Consider for example the cost of debt ; debtholders fix their required interest rate 
€ 
KD at the 
beginning of the year (for example, in t = 0) but get their cash flow – that is, here, the interest 
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expenses 
€ 
KDD  that compensate for the risk of investing a level of debt D throughout the whole 
year in the company, that is here from t = 0 to t = 1 – at the end of this year, or equivalently at 
the very beginning of the next year (t  = 1).  
 
Therefore, any accounting cash flow occurring at the end of any year t will be considered as 
happening in year t +1, with t referring to the very beginning of the year, and is discounted at 
its relevant market value discount rate applying for that year t, which is the rate that relevantly 
represents the risk of this cash flow during all this year t. We insist on this point to leave no 
room for confusion, as rates change from year to year. By so doing, one can check in the 
coming tables that we perfectly meet, for any year t, and with both market value elements and 
market value discount rates fluctuating from year to year, the required condition (2.9) from the 
market value balance sheet, which, if we now add the times indices, may be clarified as 
 
€ 
KEt
Et
Vt
+ KDt
Dt
Vt
= KU
VUt
Vt
+ KTSt
VTSt
Vt
  
 
We now discuss the assumptions and the results of this fully dynamic example. We present the 
forecasted income statements of a company for the 10 coming years. Both operating results 
EBITt and levels of oustanding debt Dt vary without following a fixed pattern ; they fluctuate 
according to economic forecasts relevant to this particular company. Beyond this explicit 
period of 10 years, the firm reaches both its normalized operating performance and leverage 
ratio, and is expected to grow at a constant rate (g = 2%) in perpetuity. Therefore, market value 
discount rates and market value elements of year 10 are derived according to the « market 
value » level of debt  
€ 
D10 = (KD10DBook10 ) /(KD10 − g) , as done in the previous growing perpetuity 
case and as discussed in the WACC section. Consequently, the market value leverage ratios – 
€ 
D /VU  and 
€ 
D /V  – do not vary anymore beyond year 10. 
 
Incidentally, please remember the difference between the book value of equity – and therefore 
the book value of the firm – and the actual invested equity capital – and therefore the actual 
total invested capital – ; normally, the book value considers the accumulated accounting losses 
and profits, while the invested equity capital – and therefore the invested capital – only 
represents the funds shareholders – plus debtholders – invest in the company, not the gains or 
losses realized year after year , which are the net income NIt. The book value of debt is equal to 
the debt invested capital since debtholders do not receive extra returns over the interest 
expenses. However, we conveniently refer to the invested equity capital and to the invested 
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capital as the equity book value and as the firm book value, which is always done when 
computing the accounting return ratios ROICt and ROEt for valuation purpose. Consequently, 
the ROICt considers an invested capital equal to the initial book value of the firm, which is 
constant since the variation of the book value of debt implies a similar variation but in the 
opposite way of the book value of equity  
€ 
(ICt = EBook t + DBook t = IC =VBook ) . This ROICt 
considers now the free cash flows of the company FCFt and not the tax adjusted operating 
result NOPLATt of the firm, which are not equal since investments, depreciations and working 
capital vary (ROIC2t). Those free cash flows are significantly different from these operating 
results, except in year 9 and 10, where the free cash flow tends to normalize, and in year 11  – 
which is the first year of the growing perpetuity – where they are equal since the company is 
assumed to reach a standardized operating performance. 
 
The operating result of the firm EBITt significantly varies from year to year, with very low 
levels in years 3, 4 and 5, then surging in years 7 and 8, decreasing in years 9 and 10 and 
finally reaching a normalized level 
€ 
(EBIT11 = 230)  in year 11, the first year of the perpetuity. 
The level of debt Dt stays relatively low compared to the equity book value 
€ 
(0,15 < DBookt /EBookt < 0,55)  but increases in year 10 and reaches its normalized level 
€ 
(DBook10 /EBook10 =1) in year 11, the first year of the perpetuity. As mentioned previously, the 
market value leverage ratios do not vary anymore during this perpetuity, but the book value 
leverage ratio changes since the level of debt increases every year by g while the book value of 
equity decreases by the equivalent amount. The low operating results in years 3 and 4 are 
actually lower than the interest expenses of these years, which results in the accumulation of 
tax credits. These are mainly used in year 5 and then totaly realized in year 6.  
 
Market value discount rates and elements from the market value balance sheet significantly 
vary from year to year, according to the evolution of both the operating results and the levels of 
debt. The firm is finally valued with a market premium MVA of about 15% over its book value 
€ 
(V ≈ 2037) , with the value creation approximately equally divided between operating value 
creation 
€ 
(OMVA ≈132)  and financing value creatio 
€ 
(FMVA =VTS ≈155) . Finally, please 
remember that we consider here the linear case for the debt marginal risk factor 
€ 
(n =1) . 
 
Full details of the present case assuming a stochastic cash flows pattern and a dynamic debt 
policy are presented in the next tables.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the model of Modigliani and Miller (1963), tax shields’ valuation has been one of the 
most controversial subjects in corporate finance for the last fifty years. The fundamental 
equality at any time between the assets side and the liabilities side of the market value balance 
sheet, a concept introduced by Farber, Gillet and Szafarz (2006), apparently helps to solve this 
hot issue. 
 
The circularity problem, which is the simultaneous determination of the market value of both 
the elements from this balance sheet and their appropriate discount rates, has usually been 
eluded assuming a target capital structure for the firm and hence constant discount rates. This 
implies to consider only strict debt policies, which are either a fixed outstanding amount of 
debt or a fixed leverage ratio. 
 
However, most companies’ financing policies do not follow these strict debt policies. Our 
model applies to any level of debt ; it is based on the breaking up of the market value of equity 
between its market value without the tax shields and the present value of tax shields, since the 
tax shields are created from debt financing but entirely flow to equityholders. These two 
elements have different risks. We show so simply using the assertion that the return of any 
asset is equal to the weighted average of its constituting elements’ returns, as states the 
portfolio theory. 
 
Our setup does not require the capital structure of the firm as an input, but only the corporate 
cash flows, the risk-free interest rate, the corporate tax rate and the unlevered cost of equity. It 
endogenizes all the other discount rates into the model, and in particular the corporate cost of 
debt – which is equal to the risk-free rate plus a credit spread depending on both the leverage 
ratio and the profitability of the firm – and the tax shields’ discount rate – which depends on 
both the cost of debt and the levered cost of equity without tax shields, and whose value is 
progressively transferred from the first to the lattest as the leverage ratio of the firm increases. 
 
Indeed, the riskiness of the debt tax shield is not constant ; it varies over time depending 
simultaneously on the level of the operating result, the level of the outstanding debt and the 
cost of this debt. If there is not enough operating result to cover – fully or partially – the 
interest expenses, then the percentage of unrealized tax shield is carried forward as a tax credit. 
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Consequently, our developments show that the appropriate discount rate for the tax shields is 
not fixed ; while it might be close to the cost of debt for low leverage ratio and close to the 
unlevered cost of capital – the assumption of Harris and Pringle (1985) – when the firm is 
equally financed by debt and equity, these cases are particular cases and, in general, the tax 
shields’ discount rate will lie somewhere between the cost of debt and the cost of levered 
equity without tax shields. 
 
This model encompasses all the other setups, as it considers dynamic debt policies and takes 
into account the sensitivity of all the discount rates to the leverage of the firm ; it is also 
perfectly compatible with the rest of the literature. It yields theoretically sound and 
economically sensible results, and allows straigthforward applications to value firms with 
dynamic capital structure, as it is mostly the case in real world.  
 
This paper hopefully paves the way for further insights about discounted cash flows’ valuation. 
It challenges the results obtained by current models, and concludes that, while leverage might 
create significant value, any case has to be differentiated as it mainly depends on the operating 
profitability of the firm. 
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VI. LIST OF MAIN SYMBOLS & ABBREVIATIONS 
€ 
KE  : Market Value Discount Rate for Equity ; Cost of Levered Equity 
€ 
KU  : Market Value Discount Rate for the Unlevered Firm ; Cost of Unlevered Equity  
€ 
KD  : Corporate Interest Rate ; Cost of Debt 
€ 
RF  : Risk-free Interest Rate 
€ 
KE−VTS  : Discount Rate relevant to the Market Value difference E - 
€ 
VTS  
€ 
KTS  : Market Value Discount Rate for Tax Shields 
E : Market Value of the Equity 
D : Market Value of the Debt (assumed equal to its Book Value44) 
€ 
VU  : Unlevered Market Value of the Firm 
€ 
VTS  : Present (or Market) Value of the Tax Shields 
€ 
V  : Market Value of the Firm 
WACC : Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
APV : Adjusted Present Value Valuation Method 
ECF : Equity Cash Flows (Both Accounting Equityholders Flows and Valuation Method) 
ROE : Return on Equity 
ROIC : Return on Invested Capital 
FCF : Free Cash Flow 
TS : Debt Tax Shield Flow 
EBIT : Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
NOPLAT : Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes 
NI : Net Income 
MVA : Market Value Added 
OMVA : Operating Market Value Added 
FMVA : Financing Market Value Added 
EBook : Book Value of the Equity 
VBook : Book Value of the Firm 
n : Marginal Debt Risk Factor or Number of Years of the Explicit Period  
€ 
τ  : Corporate Tax Rate  
t : Time Index 
g : Growth Rate Beyond The Explicit Period  
                                                
44 Except if DBook is superior to V (in which case D = V), or if we consider a growing perpetuity, in which case 
€ 
D = KDDBook /(KD − g)  
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